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INTRODUCTION
The much-toasted "Chevron Revolution" began with a bubble. The Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977 capped pollution-emissions levels at "major station-
ary sources."1 Representing an Arizona smelting company, the tony Washing-
ton, D.C., law firm Shea & Gardner persuaded the EPA that an entire cluster of
buildings within an industrial plant should count as a single stationary source;
this "bubble concept" would allow firms flexibility to offset increased emissions
from one building by reducing them elsewhere within the single plant.2 The
D.C. Circuit twice rejected the bubble concept for "non-attainment" states
where the Act required improved emissions levels.3 The second case, Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,4 reached the Supreme Court,
where the bubble concept got an important conceptual boost from Deputy
Solicitor General Paul Bator. Representing the EPA, Bator argued that Con-
gress's purpose was complex-to clean up the nation's air (the lower court's
focus), but at a reasonable cost to industry (Shea & Gardner's focus). Because
the statute was fairly open-ended, the EPA had considerable discretion in setting
this policy balance, and federal judges should not upset that balance unless the
EPA's view was clearly contrary to the statute. 5
Penned by the first "political" deputy within the Solicitor General's Office,
Bator's brief was a roadmap for the relief from excessive regulatory burdens
that was a hallmark of the Reagan Administration. Liberal Justice William
Brennan was suspicious of Bator's framework, but the Administration caught
some lucky breaks as Justices dropped out of the case like flies in a hailstorm.6
1. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172(b)(6), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (2000)).
2. The genesis of the "bubble concept" is based upon conversations with attorneys at the former
Shea & Gardner. Professor Eskridge was an associate at that firm from 1979 to 1982.
3. ASARCO Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency [EPA], 578 F.2d 319, 329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ruling that
the bubble concept was required for programs seeking to preserve existing air quality, but inappropriate
in the Clean Air Act program mandating improvement in air quality), followed in Natural Res. Def.
Council [NRDC] v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
4. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. On the Bator brief and its background, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making
of an Accidental Precedent, in ADMisTPATIVE LAW STORMus 398, 413-14 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
See also Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 397-401 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J.) (arguing for the
need for courts to allow the EPA regulatory flexibility so that costs are not disproportionate to benefits).
6. Although liberal Justice Brennan voted to affirm the D.C. Circuit, his liberal colleague Thurgood
Marshall was absent due to illness. After voting with Brennan to affirm, Justice O'Connor also dropped
out of the case because of a potential conflict of interest after her father died. See Memorandum from
O'Connor to the Conference, June 14, 1984, in Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Library of Congress,
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Their biggest break, though, was that the legality of the bubble concept was
impossibly complicated for the Court. Apparently the shakiest voice in the
original 4-3 conference vote to reverse the D.C. Circuit, Justice Stevens ex-
plained his tentative willingness to side with the EPA: "When I am so confused,
I go with the agency."7 Encouraged by Justice White, the assigning Justice in
the case, Justice Stevens not only accepted Bator's argument of a complex
statutory purpose, but endorsed a very broad rule of deference.8 His opinion for
a unanimous Court announced a two-step inquiry. Step one: Has Congress
"directly spoken to the precise question at issue"?9 If so, Congress's directive is
controlling. "If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly ad-
dressed the precise question at issue, the court [should] not simply impose its
own construction on the statute." Instead, the court should move to step two and
ask "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible," or reasonable,
"construction of the statute."' If so, the court should accept the agency's
interpretation.
Just as important as the precise rule was Justice Stevens's broad articulation
of the reasons judges should defer. First, when Congress has delegated rulemak-
ing responsibilities to agencies, courts are obligated to go along with those rules
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute. That was black-
letter administrative law, but Stevens added that delegations could be "implicit,"
and perhaps implemented through means other than rulemaking. "In such a
case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."" Second,
when an interpretation involves "reconciling conflicting policies," judges must
defer to agencies with experience and expert judgment, especially when the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, and the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned manner.12 Third, and most originally, agencies
are relatively more legitimate policy-balancers than courts, because the execu-
tive branch is more "directly accountable to the people."13 Thus, when Congress
Madison Building, Box 397, Folder 7 [hereinafter Blackmun Papers]. Also out of the case was Justice
Rehnquist, who would probably have been a voice for deference. (As O'Connor mentioned during
Conference, the bubble concept was helpful to smelters and other ailing industries in Arizona, her and
Rehnquist's home state. See Conference Notes for Chevron, in Blackmun Papers, supra).
7. Conference Notes for Chevron, March 2, 1984, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 6, Box 397,
Folder 7.
8. John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam: Byron R. White, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2002) (Justice
Stevens's account of the Chevron assignment).
9. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
10. Id. at 843. The neat two-step formula was similar to less structured formulations the Court had
previously announced. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. [NLRB], 437 U.S. 483,
500-01 (1978) (labor law); Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1978)
(tax); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) (safety-net programs).
11. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
12. Id. at 844-45, 864-65. This reflected Bator's insight into the New Deal era justification of
deference because of agency expertise. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961).
13. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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(the most accountable branch) has not directly addressed the issue, and the
agency has filled the statutory gap in a reasonable way, "federal judges-who
have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do."
' 14
In short, Justice Stevens not only delivered an opinion that accepted Bator's
argument from conflicting statutory policies, but threw in his own argument
based on democratic legitimacy. Almost immediately, Reagan Administration
officials and appointees proclaimed a "Chevron Revolution." In 1986, D.C.
Circuit Judge Kenneth Starr (later Solicitor General) announced that Chevron
was a Magna Carta for agencies to deregulate and to demand judicial acquies-
cence, which his court was prepared to deliver. 15 Antonin Scalia, Starr's col-
league on the D.C. Circuit, announced the same line and pressed a similarly
strong reading of Chevron after Reagan appointed him to the Supreme Court.16
The "revolution" was not without its critics. Other judges, including then-
Chief Judge Stephen Breyer of the First Circuit, rejected Starr's broad reading
of Chevron as inconsistent with the traditional understanding of the judicial
power granted by Article 1I. 17 Perhaps for this reason, the Reagan and George
H.W. Bush Solicitor Generals did not press Chevron nearly as strongly at the
Supreme Court level, reportedly out of fear that the Court would clarify
Chevron in unhelpful ways, as Justice Stevens tried to do in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca.18 But even Cardoza-Fonseca revealed the rhetorical tilt toward defer-
ence. Although the Court invalidated the INS's narrow view of asylum protections
and rejected Justice Scalia's broad understanding of Chevron, Justice Stevens's
opinion for the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca closed with a concession that the
agency had considerable leeway in implementing the asylum standard the Court
found in the statute. 19 Even as they sought to narrow Chevron, the Justices were
publicly ceding the details of statutory policymaking to agencies.20
14. Id. at 865-66.
15. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. oN REG. 283, 284, 312
(1986).
16. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Due L.J.
511, 521; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 269, 277 (1988).
17. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 373
(1986).
18. 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, ADMIN. L.
NEws, Winter 1994, at 1, 14 (confessing that the Solicitor General's Office pressed Chevron hard at the
D.C. Circuit, but less so at the Supreme Court, lest the Court trim back on its reasoning).
19. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448; Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Blackmun, February 9,
1987, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 6, Box 466, Folder 6 (rejecting Blackmun's suggestion to give
more substance to the statutory "well-founded fear" standard, because there was no consensus among
the majority as to what that substance would be).
20. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n [ICC] v. Texas, 479 U.S. 450, 457 (1987) (following
Chevron to allow ICC discretion in exempting carriers from state taxes); Luckhard v. Reed, 481 U.S.
368, 383 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (applying Chevron to allow the Department of Health and
Human Services [HHS] broad discretion to impose inclusive definition of "income" for purposes of the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] program); Chem. Mfrs. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 135
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Since Cardoza-Fonseca, there has been a doctrinal tug of war within the
Supreme Court between Justices Stevens (Chevron's author) and Scalia (the
cheerleader for a broad reading). The struggle came to a head in United States v.
Mead Corp.21 The lower court had overturned a Customs Service letter ruling
regarding the characterization of an import item for tariff purposes. Rejecting
Chevron deference, eight Justices formally ratified Justice Stevens's position
that Chevron governed only those cases where the agency was acting under a
congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to the agency.22 The Mead
Court further held that, even when an agency interpretation is not entitled to
Chevron deference, its factual and legal arguments are often "entitled to re-
spect" based upon their "power to persuade"-a standard called Skidmore
deference, after the leading case.2 3 In his scorched-earth Mead dissent, Justice
Scalia argued that Skidmore deference is obsolete and that any interpretation
formally adopted by the agency head (except for "litigating positions") is
entitled to two-step Chevron deference.24
In 2006, the Court again followed the Mead structure, with a twist, in
Gonzales v. Oregon.25 Finding that the Attorney General had no delegated
authority under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 to preempt Oregon's
death-with-dignity law, which allowed doctors to help terminally ill persons
bring their lives to closure, the Court held Chevron inapplicable and evaluated
(and rejected) the Attorney General's reasons under Skidmore. Again in dissent,
Justice Scalia not only argued that the Attorney General was entitled to Chevron
deference, but also that he was entitled to Seminole Rock deference, which
requires that an agency interpretation of its own regulations be upheld unless
(1985) (following Chevron to allow the EPA to consider plant-specific factors and to allow variances
from pretreatment regulations for pollution sources). In all of these cases, the record of the Conference
discussions suggests that a broad understanding of deference was the critical factor in the votes of key
Justices. See Blackmun Papers, supra note 6, Box 416, Folder 1 (Chemical Manufacturers); id. Box
470, Folder 4 (ICC v. Texas); id. Box 471, Folder 8 (Luckhard).
21. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
22. Id. at 226-27, 230-33 (2001), followed in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 259 (2006); Nat'l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005). Mead's
understanding reflects a rough scholarly consensus as well. See, e.g., Administrative Conference of the
United States, Recommendation 89-5, Achieving Judicial Acceptance of Agency Statutory Interpreta-
tions, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,972-73 (July 10, 1989); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations
Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALmE J. oN Rwo. 1, 4 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking
Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 CoLuM. L. REv. 2097, 2171
(2004); Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLum. L. REv. 1, 6 (1983)
(presciently articulating this view on the eve of Chevron).
23. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). The Mead
Court remanded the case to the lower court to evaluate the agency's ruling in light of the Skidmore
factors--"the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
24. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (The Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case).
[Vol. 96:10831088
HeinOnline  -- 96 Geo. L.J. 1088 2007-2008
THE CONTPIUM OF DEFERENCE
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. '26 Even though Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court rejected the application of Seminole Rock, both
it and Justice Scalia's dissent assumed that Seminole Rock deference survives
and augments Chevron.
Another front of the deference debate was dramatically revealed during the
same Term in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which invalidated the President's order
creating military commissions providing summary justice to alleged "illegal
enemy combatants." 27 Again writing for the Court, Justice Stevens concluded
that the President's order was inconsistent with both the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions' assurances of minimal rights for
prisoners of war and others.28 In dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the Court
must give the strongest possible deference to the President's interpretation of his
constitutional and statutory authority in times of war.2 9 He evoked the seminal
case Curtiss-Wright, which provides for the executive a "degree of discretion
and freedom from statutory restriction [in the field of foreign affairs] which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved., 30 Only Justice
Scalia joined this analysis, however, and the Hamdan majority declined to give
the President heightened deference in that case.
This brief tour d'horizon reveals that unpacking the implications of Chevron
for Supreme Court jurisprudence is a complicated affair. Other scholars have
comprehensively analyzed the doctrinal ins and outs of Chevron,31 and a few
have surveyed the application of the Court's deference jurisprudence at various
times, and at various levels of the federal system.32 Our project is a more
ambitious endeavor. We conducted an empirical study of all 1014 Supreme
Court cases between Chevron and Hamdan in which an agency interpretation of
26. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945),followed and elaborated on in
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Justice Scalia's Oregon dissent therefore terms this "Auer
deference."
27. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
28. Id. at 2789-98.
29. Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding the President's
action against Curtiss-Wright for selling guns to Bolivia, assertedly in violation of a congressional
embargo statute). The holding of the case is supportable under ordinary principles, but Justice
Sutherland's opinion went further and has long been controversial. See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The
Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 496-97
(1946).
31. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADmiN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 189 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001).
32. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Mathew D. Krueger, In Search of the "Modem" Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLum. L. REv. 1235, 1271-80 (2007) (circuit court application of Skidmore); Orin S.
Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 15 YALE J. oN REG. 1, 1 (1998) (circuit court application of Chevron); Peter H. Schuck & E.
Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 984, 987 (D.C. Circuit's application of Chevron in selected periods after the decision). Although
not empirical, a valuable study of Mead among the lower courts is Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead
Has Muddied Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 58 VAR. L. Rav. 1441 (2005).
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a statute was at issue. In this way, we hoped to marry hard empirical data-
lacking in the academic discourse on Chevron-with theoretical discussion of
the proper role of agency deference in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Part I of this Article describes the methodology of our study. We explain the
means by which we identified cases where the Supreme Court addressed an
agency interpretation of a statute,3 3 and then how we coded each case for 156
different variables.34
Part II presents our empirical findings. Based upon our data, we conclude that
there has not been a Chevron "revolution" at the Supreme Court level. The
deference regime associated with the Chevron decision is not completely new
and continues to exist alongside old feudal lords-Skidmore, Seminole Rock,
Curtiss-Wright, and Beth Israel.35 Indeed, from the time it was handed down
until the end of the 2005 term, Chevron was applied in only 8.3% of Supreme
Court cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations. As we demonstrate in
section II.A, during this time frame, the Court employed a continuum of
deference regimes. This continuum is more complicated than the literature or
even the Court's own opinions suggest, and it is a continuum in which Chevron
plays a modest role.36 Indeed, our most striking finding is that in the majority of
cases-53.6% of them-the Court does not apply any deference regime at all.
Instead, it relies on ad hoc judicial reasoning of the sort that typifies the Court's
methodology in regular statutory interpretation cases.
We then examine, in section II.B, the application of Chevron in depth. To our
surprise, we found that the Court usually does not apply Chevron to cases that
are, according to Mead and other opinions, Chevron-eligible. Moreover, in
analyzing how Chevron is applied in the cases where it is invoked by the Court,
33. Our methodology was simple: We read every case decided between 1984 and 2006 in which an
agency interpretation of a statute was at issue and in which the Supreme Court produced a published
opinion; if the United States filed a brief interpreting the statute or the Court's opinion (or even a brief
in the case) revealed a publicly available agency interpretation on point, we included that case.
Statutory interpretation cases where there was no agency interpretation on point were not included.
Many of the statutory cases not included were constructions of the federal habeas statute as applied to
state prisoners (hence, there was no United States brief unless requested by the Court), but other cases
not included were cases where there was, surprisingly, no agency position available. See, e.g., Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 123-24, 126 n.2 (1989) (providing important interpretation of Warsaw
Convention, but without any executive input). Conversely, we included a number of constitutional cases
where the Court narrowly construed a statute at the suggestion of the Department of Justice. See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
34. The dataset is available on-line through The Georgetown Law Journal. See The Georgetown
Law Journal, http://www.georgetownlawjournal.com/extras/96.4/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). An Appen-
dix to this Article reproduces our Codebook, which explains our methodology.
35. See the discussion above for a description of Skidmore, Seminole Rock, and Curtiss-Wright. Beth
Israel is a category we have devised for post-Chevron Supreme Court opinions that announce a special
deference regime (often in the field of labor) and apply a reasonableness analysis similar to that in
Chevron, but without citing Chevron (or a Chevron-following case), instead citing to and following a
pre-Chevron deference case like Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
36. Cf. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 32, at 1057 (finding that the courts of appeals not only cited
Chevron repeatedly, but also that agency interpretations prevailed more often).
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we found little doctrinal consistency. There is some indication that while
congressional delegation is not a solid predictor of when the Court will invoke
Chevron, it is correlated with, and may influence, the agency's chances of
prevailing once Chevron has been invoked. And there is clear evidence that
where Chevron is invoked, legislative history remains relevant to the two-step
inquiry. However, explanations for why the Court chose to invoke Chevron
when it did, and how the Court applied Chevron once invoked, were not
apparent from the data.
In section II.C we examine the predictive capacity of our data. Specifically,
we ask: Are there factors that predict (1) when particular deference regimes will
be invoked, and (2) when the agency is more likely to win? As to the first
question, our data offer little to latch onto; there is no clear guide as to when the
Court will invoke particular deference regimes, and why. As to the second
question, our data were somewhat more helpful. Based upon the academic
literature, we expected to find that high agency win rates would be positively
associated with (1) the application of Chevron or Seminole Rock deference; (2)
an open, legitimate process such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication; and (3) the absence of a plain statutory meaning (which leaves
more room for agency discretion). We found some positive correlation with the
first two factors, but none with the third. Based upon our own experience, we
expected to find that high agency win rates would also be positively associated
with (1) statutory subject matter and comparative agency expertise; and (2)
agency consistency in adhering to the interpretation over time. Both hypotheses
bore out. As a separate point, we also found (3) a strong association between
judicial ideology and the likelihood of liberal or conservative agency interpreta-
tions prevailing, with liberal justices more likely to support liberal agency
interpretations, and conservative justices more likely to support conservative
agency interpretations.
In Part III we turn to normative questions: Is this complicated regime
defensible? To what extent and under what circumstances should the Court
defer to agency interpretations of federal statutes and regulations? Our main
suggestion is that the degree of deference the Supreme Court ought to afford an
agency interpretation of the statute it is applying should be driven by three
variables: (1) whether the agency interpretation is made pursuant to a congres-
sional delegation of lawmaking authority (Chevron/Mead), (2) whether the
agency is applying special expertise and using its understanding of the facts to
carry out congressional purposes (Skidmore), and (3) whether the agency inter-
pretation is consistent with larger public norms, including constitutional values
(Oregon). Although our empirical study suggests caution about the Court's
collective ability to follow any doctrinal framework consistently, we close with
some suggestions for the Justices to consider as regards the continuum of
deference regimes that they have followed in the last generation.
First, simplification. Although the complicated and unevenly applied defer-
ence continuum is working fine for deciding cases before the Supreme Court,
2008] 1091
HeinOnline  -- 96 Geo. L.J. 1091 2007-2008
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JouRNAL
this is not a satisfactory regime for providing guidance to lower courts, legisla-
tors, agencies, and the citizenry. The Court should simplify the continuum along
the following lines:
" Chevron's special deference regime should apply where Congress has
delegated lawmaking authority to an executive or independent agency or
to the President;
* Skidmore should be the default regime under which the Court considers
agency inputs, with those inputs being especially valued when (a) the
agency has expertise on issues as to which judges do not; (b) the agency
has rendered a reasoned judgment after input from the public; and/or (c)
there has been public or private reliance on agency rules or guidances;
" Oregon anti-deference ought to be the baseline when the agency interpre-
tation (a) represents a fundamental change in statutory policy; (b)
extends criminal liability; or (c) raises serious constitutional problems.
The Court ought to apply this simplified continuum more consistently, espe-
cially as regards special Chevron deference; our study illustrates the difficulty
of consistent application but also some possible strategies for improvement.
Second, institutional dialogue and balance. The Court's deference jurispru-
dence helps structure the process by which statutes are elaborated and devel-
oped by agencies and might, under some circumstances, affect Congress's
agenda and structure. For example, we join other scholars in encouraging the
Court to explicitly recognize the greater legitimacy of notice-and-comment
("legislative") rulemaking pursuant to congressional delegation as the model for
Chevron deference. This would encourage agencies to elaborate statutory policy
through a process that is more legitimate, though more time-consuming and
costly. If that baseline were more transparent, agencies would have a clearer
idea as to the availability of special deference and Congress would have a better
idea about the different effects of different kinds of statutory delegations. Our
concern for balanced governance is mobilized by our empirical finding that
agency interpretations prevail most frequently (usually under a Skidmore stan-
dard or less) in areas where the Justices perceive themselves as least competent
to handle the substantive issues, areas such as pension, bankruptcy, health, and
intellectual property. Agency inputs are critically important in these areas, but
are also potentially biased; in bankruptcy, for example, the federal government
is often a creditor, and its amicus briefs often reflect a pro-creditor policy bias.
For reasons of institutional balance, the Supreme Court or the Judicial Confer-
ence ought to create a trial process whereby public-interested amicus briefing is
sought from another source, and not just the Solicitor General.
Third, modernization. The Court ought to recognize, expressly, that statutory
interpretation doctrine needs to be understood through a new lens, that of the
modern administrative state. Such a lens requires fresh conceptualization of
such judicial doctrines as the plain-meaning rule, purposive interpretation,
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legislative history, stare decisis, and the substantive canons of statutory construc-
tion. For example, our study has important implications for the contentious
debate over whether the Court should rely on legislative history: the data
establish that the Justices in fact consistently rely on such history in agency-
interpretation cases; our reading of the briefs as well as opinions suggests that
agencies provide useful accounts of that history; and our normative framework
indicates that legislative history provides legitimating links between original
enactments and new applications. Indeed, consulting legislative history is the
only mechanism that shows any (tentative) promise for ameliorating the ideologi-
cal voting that our dataset reveals.
I. METHODOLOGY
Even though Chevron is often described as having revolutionized the jurispru-
dence of agency deference, relatively few studies have attempted to empirically
examine the application of the Chevron doctrine, and none has attempted to
examine the Supreme Court's Chevron jurisprudence systematically in light of
the entire universe of potential deference cases. Those studies that have focused
on Chevron can be described as partial or incomplete, at best. Some studies
examine cases only from small, discrete time periods.37 Others limit their
examination to judicial review of actions taken by particular agencies. 38 Still
others attempt to quantify the impact of Chevron by examining only those cases
in which judges explicitly cite or invoke Chevron.39 None has employed
random sampling.
Given these features, previous studies are of limited value. Studies of small,
discrete periods of time may not be representative of the Court's overall
practice. Studies that attempt to extrapolate from cases involving only a few
agencies raise questions about whether those cases are representative of the
Court's deference jurisprudence or anomalous to it. And studies that only
include those cases in which a particular deference regime is employed ignore
critical questions about when and why the regime is invoked and what is
37. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 32 (examining appeals court cases involving "judicial review
of federal administrative action" in four discrete six-month periods in 1965, 1974-75, 1984, and 1985,
and one two-month period in 1988); Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107
DICK. L. Rv. 289, 290 (2002) (examining federal court cases in the six months directly following the
Supreme Court decision in Mead and occasionally comparing them to federal court cases in the year
prior to Mead).
38. See Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv.
1717, 1721 (1997) (examining all cases decided by the D.C. Circuit between 1970 and 1996 that
challenged the health and safety decisions of twenty federal agencies); see also Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U.
Cm L. Rev. 823, 825 (2006) (examining published appeals court decisions from 1990-2004 in which
federal judges reviewed interpretations of law by the EPA and NLRB).
39. See Kerr, supra note 32, at 4 (examining every application of the Chevron doctrine in the courts
of appeals during 1995 and 1996); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 825 (examining eighty-four
Supreme Court cases applying the Chevron doctrine, sixty-nine of which cite Chevron directly).
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happening in the cases where it is not applied.
Our study attempts to fill this empirical gap and provide a more comprehen-
sive analysis of Supreme Court deference practice.4°
The dataset for this study consists of all Supreme Court cases decided
between Chevron (1983 Term) and Hamdan (2005 Term) in which a federal
agency interpretation of a statute was at issue, 1014 in all.4' Each case was
coded for 156 variables. The variables ranged from basic descriptive informa-
tion about the statute and agency in play to more nuanced information about the
form, continuity, and legal force of the agency interpretation. We recorded the
voting record of each Justice and the form(s) of reasoning employed in each
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinion.42
Each variable and its coding criteria are described, often in some detail, in the
Appendix, which reproduces the Codebook explaining our methodology. Some
variables are easy to code, such as the name of the case, the citation reference,
the agency whose interpretation the Court considered, and so forth. Other
variables involve matters of informed judgment. Where that is the case, the
Codebook provides a detailed account of how we applied that informed judg-
ment and often gives representative examples. For example, we coded agency
and judicial interpretations for ideology, including "liberal," "conservative," or
"mixed." We have generally followed conventional criteria, explicitly identified
for each subject area in the Codebook. Thus, we coded bankruptcy act interpreta-
tions favoring debtor interests as "liberal," and interpretations favoring creditor
interests as "conservative. 43
Our primary concern is with two response variables: (1) what deference
regime the Court invoked, and (2) whether the Court ultimately agreed with the
agency interpretation. Although they sound quite similar, these variables are
important to distinguish. Thus, "deference regime invoked" refers to the analyti-
cal framework, if any, used by the Court to evaluate or weigh an agency
40. For an excellent model that provided us with guidance, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear,
Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1, 59-63
(2005). Like earlier studies of Supreme Court cases, ours cannot make strong assertions about some
issues because of selection biases-namely, the likelihood that the cases available for Supreme Court
review will change over time in response to the Court's deference jurisprudence. For example, Thomas
W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YAL L.J. 969, 981-84 (1991), reported that
agency interpretations prevailed at the Supreme Court 75% of the time in the three years before
Chevron, but only 70% in the six years after Chevron. This interesting finding, similar to those that we
report, does not mean that Chevron failed to induce greater deference among lower court judges or even
Supreme Court Justices, because the post-Chevron cases might have been skewed in favor of challeng-
ers, with agency victories going largely unappealed and government attorneys emboldened to take
appeals in weaker cases than they had done pre-Chevron.
41. This number does not include the Chevron decision itself, which was also coded but is not
included in our statistical analysis.
42. Coding of all 1014 cases was done by one author, thereby eliminating the coding inconsistencies
that often arise when multiple coders are used. As a further safeguard, the other author then cross-
checked all coding for internal consistency and errors.
43. See infra Appendix 1: Codebook, "Agency Interpretation," Note. The Note identifies our litmus
test for each area of law represented in our dataset.
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interpretation. It records the logical framework the Court used to build its
reasoning (for example, the Chevron two-step inquiry, the Skidmore all-things-
considered approach, etc.). Section II.A describes each of the deference regimes
we found. The Codebook in the Appendix goes into great detail explaining our
criteria for designating a case as falling within each deference regime identified
in section II.A.44
In contrast, "agreement with the agency interpretation" refers to whether the
Court ultimately upheld the statutory interpretation put forth by the agency. Did
the agency win? (In contrast with the previous variable, this one was easy to
code.) It is critical to note that even when the Court invokes a deference regime,
the agency position does not always prevail. Applying Chevron (or any other
deference regime), the Court might still reject the agency interpretation if the
standards set forth by any particular test are not met. Conversely, even when the
Court applies no deference regime, the agency interpretation might still prevail,
because the Court believes, upon its own independent examination, that the
agency interpretation was correct as a matter of law.
The breadth of data collected in our study enables us to paint a thorough and
complex picture of the many factors affecting the Court's invocation of different
deference regimes and its decision to defer to agency interpretations.45 Further,
because our dataset consists of the entire population of cases of interest to us,
and not a sample of cases from the population, the data we provide in this
Article consist, not of sample statistics, but rather of actual population parame-
ters. As a result, for most issues there is no need to conduct significance tests on
the basic summary figures we lay out. Such tests show that the likelihood that
variations between sample statistics are due to actual variation in the population
and not random variation within the sample. Here, we can report with one
hundred percent certitude that the variations we describe exist in the population
at hand, and therefore we can spend our time on the more interesting endeavor
of postulating why these variations are there and whether they are meaningful.
Despite the strengths of our study, there are important methodological limita-
tions to it. First, even though there is no need to run significance tests on our
findings, there is a need to determine whether observed variations are "signifi-
cant"-that is, whether they offer any meaningful insight into the Court's
deference practice. This is a matter of judgment, and we are sensitive to the fact
that our interpretations of significant differences between different values may
be influenced by our own hypotheses about what is driving the Court's behav-
ior. That said, we have attempted to be as objective as possible in attributing
significance to the observed differences in various population parameters. When
we make comparisons within a given area, we establish standards for what
44. See id., "Deference Regime Invoked," Note.
45. We also examine the extent to which these variables interact with each other--that is, whether
the deference regime invoked has an impact on how frequently agency interpretations are upheld, and
whether the Court's desire to uphold certain agency interpretations may influence the deference regime
it chooses to invoke.
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magnitude of variation will count as significant, and when we deviate from
these standards, we explain why, noting whether our reasoning is mathematical
(for example, an extremely small subgroup), or theoretical (for example, exter-
nal knowledge about the Court's practice), or both. We also explain why we
take note of seemingly minor variations in some areas, while glancing over
seemingly larger variations in others. We aim to be as transparent as possible in
our reasoning, knowing that some methodological disagreement will be inevi-
table, and welcoming the debate that such disagreement will cause.
Second, we do not develop a statistical model to explain the Court's behavior
in invoking different deference regimes and evaluating agency interpretations of
statutes. One reason for not modeling the Court's approach is that the raw data
have so much to tell. Given the large number of variables we examined, there is
a huge quantity of information to report just about the population parameters.
Indeed, this Article does not report more than a fraction of the parameters
determinable from our dataset. Further, given the current dearth of empirical
work on the Supreme Court's deference practice, there is a value to reporting
these parameters alone. They can inform future work, both empirical and
theoretical, and act as a starting point for more in-depth quantitative analysis at
a later point. Most importantly, we are somewhat skeptical of the value added
from modeling the Court's deference practice. Our judgment is that any formal
model would be incomplete, at best, and unable to control for the innumerable,
uncodable factors that influence judicial decisionmaking. We are comfortable
reporting on trends in deference practice grounded in empirical data, but less
warm to the idea (or value) of reporting such manufactured facts as the
percentage variation in deference regime due to subject area, or delegation of
lawmaking authority, or any of the other 156 items of which we took note.
Third, we examined only Supreme Court cases, not cases in the courts of
appeals. As many scholars have correctly pointed out, in terms of the number of
cases at issue, the courts of appeals are the primary venue for judicial review of
agency interpretations. Given its discretionary jurisdiction over appeals and the
Justices' disinclination to exercise that discretion, the Supreme Court reviews
only a small percentage of agency interpretations that make their way through
the federal court system.46 Relatedly, the agency-interpretation cases that come
before the Supreme Court are not representative of the cases that come before
the courts of appeals. As we explain in section II.C, there are several selection
46. In the time frame examined in this study (1983 to 2005) the number of agency-interpretation
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court dropped from a high of 66 cases the term after Chevron was
decided, to 38 cases in the 2005 term. The precise breakdown of cases, by term, is as follows: 1983
term, after and including Chevron, 17 cases; 1984 term, 66 cases; 1985 term, 56 cases; 1986 term, 57
cases; 1987 term, 57 cases; 1988 term, 49 cases; 1989 term, 47 cases; 1990 term, 51 cases; 1991 term,
46 cases; 1992 term, 62 cases; 1993 term, 41 cases; 1994 term, 35 cases; 1995 term, 36 cases; 1996
term, 41 cases; 1997 term, 49 cases; 1998 term, 43 cases; 1999 term, 31 cases; 2000 term, 36 cases;
2001 term, 42 cases; 2002 term, 38 cases; 2003 term, 42 cases; 2004 term, 35 cases; and 2005 term, 38
cases.
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effects that flow from the fact that the Supreme Court has discretionary review
and takes a small percentage of appeals while the courts of appeals are required
to hear almost all the appeals falling within their jurisdiction. As a consequence,
the Supreme Court will hear cases that present tougher legal issues. Even less
predictable is the effect of the much-touted "Chevron Revolution" (or the
perception of such a revolution) on the kinds of cases that are litigated and
appealed into the federal courts generally, as well as at the Supreme Court
level.47
That said, we believe that the Supreme Court is where any analysis of agency
deference ought to begin. The Court, of course, develops deference tests that are
applicable throughout the federal judiciary. Therefore, we can assume that, of
all courts, its practice would be particularly well-informed and, perhaps, inter-
nally consistent. More important, the appeals courts look to the Supreme Court
for guidance. The Supreme Court devises deference tests, defines their parame-
ters, and provides definitive applications of those tests-all of which are
binding on the courts of appeals. Lower court judges presumptively follow the
Court's lead, to the extent that a "lead" can be discerned.48 If our empirical
study illuminates the Court's precise practice, it provides useful information to
lower court judges (and perhaps to Supreme Court Justices themselves). Our
focus on the Supreme Court does not deny the importance of the courts of
appeals, and we may conduct similar studies at the appellate level in the future.
Rather, it is merely indicative of the fact that, in our calculus, studying the
Supreme Court is logically prior to studying the courts of appeals.
In the next Part, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the Supreme Court's
deference practice over the past quarter century. Part III evaluates the Court's
complicated deference jurisprudence and makes some suggestions for reform.
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: THE SUPREME COuRT's CONTINUUM OF DEFERENCE
REGIMES, ITS APPLICATION OF THOSE REGIMES, AND REGULARIms IN AGENCY WIN
RATES
Mead, Oregon, and Hamdan (and their dissenting opinions) suggest that there
are many issues Chevron left unresolved. Does Chevron supplant previous
deference regimes, such as Skidmore, or co-exist along side them? After Mead,
is Chevron deference limited to cases where the agency is acting pursuant to a
congressional delegation of lawmaking authority? Should the Court defer to an
agency's interpretation of its own jurisdiction or lawmaking authority? Is there
47. One would expect that the perception of a Chevron Revolution would have discouraged litigants
from challenging some legally vulnerable agency interpretations that would have been challenged
under a regime perceived to be more skeptical, while agencies would be encouraged to defend a
broader array of interpretations they might have abandoned under the previous regime.
48. If, on the one hand, the Court is establishing formalist tests for deference, but, on the other hand,
applying them infrequently and inconsistently, then we might expect appeals court practices to be
similarly haphazard. At the very least, we would need to know this before being able to analyze
whether deference practice at the appeals court level is "normal" or "deviant."
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special super-deference when agencies are interpreting their own prior regula-
tions or acting on foreign affairs or national security matters? How does
Chevron interact with various substantive canons of statutory interpretation?
These are doctrinal questions. What the Court says is relevant to answering
them. But so is what the Court does. Our empirical study looked at the latter
issue-the Court's practice-and the extent to which it confirms, contradicts, or
raises'new questions about the former issue-the Court's stated approach. As it
turns out, the gulf between actions and words is, in some places, quite large.
Our descriptive analysis starts with the continuum of deference regimes the
Supreme Court has explicitly or (for one regime) implicitly invoked in cases
where an agency has interpreted the statutory provision in suit. Although there
is clearly such a continuum, the Court is wildly inconsistent in applying any of
the regimes, including and especially the Chevron regime, which plays a
surprisingly modest role in the Court's deference jurisprudence. We do find
regularities in the Court's treatment of agency interpretations, but those regulari-
ties owe more to functional and political factors than to deference doctrine.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONTINUUM OF DEFERENCE REGIMES
Contrary to Justice Scalia's Mead dissent, the Court has at no point followed
a Chevron-or-nothing approach. But the Chevron-or-Skidmore dichotomy sug-
gested by the Mead majority is only somewhat more reflective of the Court's
practice. Instead, our study of the 1014 agency-interpretation cases from Chev-
ron to Hamdan reveals that the Court's deference practice functions along a
continuum, ranging from an anti-deference regime reflected in the rule of lenity
to the super-strong deference the Court sometimes announces in cases related to
foreign affairs. The continuum we found is as follows:
" Curtiss-Wright Deference, the super-deference afforded to executive
interpretations involving foreign affairs and national security;
* Seminole Rock Deference, a strong form of deference afforded to agency
interpretations of their own regulations;
" Chevron Deference, the famous two-step approach that permits reason-
able agency interpretations so long as the statute has not clearly spoken
to the issue;
* Beth Israel Deference, the pre-Chevron test permitting reasonable agency
interpretations that are consistent with the statute;
" Skidmore Deference, giving agency interpretations respect proportional
to their power to persuade;
" Consultative Deference, where the Court, without invoking a named
deference regime, relies on some input from the agency (for example,
amicus briefs, interpretive rules or guidance, or manuals) and uses that
input to guide its reasoning and decisionmaking process; and
" Anti-Deference, which invokes a presumption against the agency inter-
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Table 1. The Supreme Court's Continuum of Deference
Percentage of
Deference Cases in Agency Win
Regime Form of Deference Population Rate
No Deference Ad hoc judicial reasoning 53.6% 66.0%
Anti-Deference The Court invokes a presumption 6.8% 36.2%
against the agency interpretation
in criminal cases (the rule of
lenity) and in some cases in
which the agency interpretation
raises serious constitutional
concerns (the canon of
constitutional avoidance)
Consultative The Court, without invoking a 17.8% 80.6%
Deference named deference regime, relies
on some input from the agency
(e.g. amicus briefs, interpretive
rules or guidance, or manuals)
and uses that input to guide its
reasoning and decisionmaking
process
Skidmore Agency interpretation is entitled 6.7% 73.5%
to "respect proportional to its
power to persuade," with such
power determined by the
interpretation's "thoroughness,
logic and expertness"; its "fit
with prior interpretations"; etc.
Beth Israel Pre-Chevron test permitting 4.8% 73.5%
reasonable interpretations that
are consistent with the statute
Chevron Reasonable agency 8.3% 76.2%
interpretations of ambiguous
statutes accepted. If the statute is
clear, no deference to agency
Seminole Rock Strong deference afforded to an 1.1% 90.9%
agency's interpretations of its
own regulations
Curtiss-Wright Super-strong deference to 0.9% 100.0%
executive interpretations
involving foreign affairs and
national security
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pretation in criminal cases and in some cases in which the agency
interpretation raises serious constitutional concerns.
Table 1, on the previous page, presents these deference regimes, the percentage
of the Court's deference cases that they constitute, and the agency win rate
under each regime.49
Table 1 presents what was, for us, a most unexpected finding: a majority of
the Court's cases involving an agency interpretation of a federal statute do not
invoke any deference regime, not even the informal "consultative deference"
regime we identified. Indeed, in a whopping 53.6% of the cases studied, the
Court eschews formal or informal deference tests in favor of ad hoc judicial
reasoning. Somewhat less surprising in light of previous studies, we also find
that agency interpretations prevail 68.3% of the time before the Supreme
Court.
50
This section explains six of the seven deference regimes (all but Chevron) in
full and offers some insight into the reasoning behind the Court's choice of a
particular deference regime. Section 11.B examines the Chevron regime in even
greater detail and demonstrates that the Court's ad hocness in the less-celebrated
regimes extends to its inconsistent application of Chevron as well. In section
II.C, we add complexity to this analysis by noting how the choice of deference
regime seems to affect the rate at which agency interpretations are upheld.
1. Curtiss-Wright Super-Deference in Foreign Affairs/National Security
We begin with the strongest form of deference we encountered: super-strong
deference to executive department interpretations in matters of foreign affairs
and national security. We call this regime Curtiss-Wright deference after the
famous 1936 decision in which the Court held that "congressional legislation
... within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible
were domestic affairs alone involved."'', The source of this discretion in statu-
tory enforcement is the inherent power of the President to represent the nation
in foreign matters and to protect America's security interests.
Curtiss-Wright deference is distinguishable from Chevron deference. Because
it rests in part upon the President's Article II powers, rather than just on
Congress's Article I authority, Curtiss-Wright deference does not depend upon a
statutory delegation of lawmaking responsibilities, although the power of its
49. The tables in this Article employ the terms and coding schema explicated in our Codebook,
which is attached as an appendix.
50. For earlier studies finding high agency win rates at the Supreme Court level, see Martha Anne
Humphries & Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight of Federal Administrative
Agencies, 61 J. POL. 207, 208-10 (1999); Reginald S. Sheehan, Federal Agencies and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of Litigation Outcomes, 1953-1988, 20 AM. POL. Sci. Q. 478, 480-82 (1992).
51. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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presumption would be augmented by such delegation.5 2 Moreover, the Curtiss-
Wright rule is a more deferential standard than Chevron: the executive depart-
ment interpretation prevails not only in cases of statutory ambiguity, but also in
cases where Congress has not clearly trumped the agency or presidential
construction.
Curtiss-Wright deference was important long before Chevron, 3 and our study
establishes that it survives Chevron as well. For example, the Court in Depart-
ment of the Navy v. Egan ruled against judicial review of presidential revocation
of security clearances.54 Given the President's broad powers to protect national
security and conduct foreign policy, the Court reasoned that, "unless Congress
specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally [should be] ... reluc-
tant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national
security affairs. 55
Surprisingly, even with a sizeable docket of cases that touch on foreign
affairs and national security (93 cases out of 1014, or 9.2%), it remains a rarity
for the Court to announce super-strong deference as it did in Egan. Indeed, we
identified only nine post-Chevron cases where the Court openly applied super-
strong deference of this sort.56 In each case, the executive interpretation won,
providing a perfect 100% win rate for the government.
In our judgment, this win rate is inflated, albeit only somewhat, due to a
strong selection bias. Curtiss-Wright deference is invoked only in cases where
the Court is going along with the executive department and wants to make a
statement about the President's broad authority in foreign affairs, while it is
52. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (President acting under direct statutory authorization has maximum
authority; President acting contrary to statutory directive has minimal authority; President acting in a
"twilight zone" with neither statutory authority nor contrary directive has authority to act commensu-
rate with his inherent powers and whatever powers Congress has implicitly accorded him in the past).
53. For example, it helps explain the Supreme Court's decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981). In that case, the Court held that an executive agreement suspending hundreds of
lawsuits against the Islamic Republic of Iran and creating an international claims tribunal to handle
them did not violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA). Id. at 686. The Court
grounded this dynamic interpretation of the FSIA in the President's inherent Article II powers, and in
Congress's acquiescence to the exercise of these powers, even in the face of the FSIA. Id. at 680-83.
54. 484 U.S. 518, 530, 534 (1988); accord Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188
(1993) (invoking President's foreign affairs power as one reason to defer to his interpretation of
immigration laws); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 169-71 (1985) (invoking executive national security
authority as reason to defer).
55. Egan, 484 U.S. at 529.
56. In addition to Egan, the cases are as follows: Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
[ICE], 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (strongly deferring to executive branch construction of immigration
law); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385-86 (2004) (deferring to high executive branch
official resisting discovery on national security grounds); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 375-76 (2000) (international trade); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. [INS] v. Agnirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (immigration); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 309, 312 n.8 (1993)
(immigration); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (immigration and
protection of national borders); Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93 (1988) (national security, invoking and
following Egan); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988) (immigration).
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ignored in those few national security or foreign affairs cases where the Court is
disposed to be skeptical of the President's exercise of authority. Indeed, this is
exactly what happened in Hamdan: Justice Thomas's dissent was structured
around Curtiss-Wright super-deference, while Justice Stevens's majority opin-
ion ignored it.5 7 Furthermore, even though few of the ninety-three cases whose
subject matter involved foreign affairs and national security directly cited
Curtiss-Wright or announced super-deference, the executive's interpretation
prevailed 78.5% of the time. This is less than the perfect record in the cases
explicitly applying a super-deference regime, but still mighty high, especially in
light of the human rights issues often implicated in immigration cases, which
were the largest portion of this subject-matter category.
In short, this is an arena where the Court's practice has been highly deferen-
tial, even when the Justices do not explicitly invoke Curtiss-Wright. Indeed,
some decisions are incomprehensible unless thought of as implicit applications
of Curtiss-Wright's super-strong deference.58 One example is United States v.
Alvarez-Marchain.59 The Court upheld federal jurisdiction to try a suspect
whom the United States had kidnapped in Mexico and brought to this country
for criminal trial. Mexico filed a protest that this violated its extradition treaty
with the United States. Under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation,
those arguments would probably have carried the day,60 but a majority went
along with the Administration on this matter, given longstanding judicial acqui-
escence in executive kidnappings like this one.6' As noted above, there are a fair
number of cases like Alvarez-Marchain, where the Court says nothing about
deference but goes along with legally weak executive department arguments in
cases involving foreign affairs or national security.62 Although these cases are
not coded as Curtiss-Wright deference under our coding schema, they support
what our Curtiss-Wright category of cases stands for: the notion that super-
strong deference to the government in the areas of foreign affairs and national
security remains a prominent part of the Court's deference practice.
57. Hamdan v. Rurnsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2825 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (invoking Curtiss-
Wright super-deference to support the President's military commissions); see also Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 614-15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking Curtiss-Wright super-deference to argue for
no judicial review of executive dismissals of law enforcement personnel).
58. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654; discussion supra note 53.
59. 504 U.S. 655, 669, 670 (1992) (interpreting Mexican-American extradition treaty to allow
international kidnapping by executive department without extradition duty).
60. See id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (powerfully analytical dissent critiquing the Chief
Justice's legal arguments).
61. See, e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886) (ruling that executive kidnapping of criminal
defendants abroad and bringing them to this country for trial is not unconstitutional).
62. See, e.g., Ministry of Def. for Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450 (2006) (sovereign
immunity); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (executive agreement preemption);
Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1993) (state tax on international
businesses); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 484 (1992) (immigration); Dooley v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998) (death on the high seas).
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2. Seminole Rock Strong Deference for Agency Interpretation of Its Own
Regulations
In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., the Court ruled that an agency
interpretation of its own properly issued regulation is "controlling ... unless it
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation., 63 Like Chevron,
Seminole Rock empowers agencies vested with lawmaking authority by Con-
gress. Beyond Chevron, Seminole Rock recognizes the practical reality that an
agency interpretation of its own (valid-under-the-statute) concept or complex
web of regulations should be followed by judges unless there is a strong
statutory reason to reject it. In Auer v. Robbins, for example, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Department of Labor was entitled to such strong deference when
it was elaborating on a legal concept that was a "creature of the [agency's] own
regulations." 64 Likewise, in Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, the Court
ruled that the Department of Health & Human Service's (HHS) interpretation of
its own complicated regulatory scheme was entitled to the special deference that
Seminole Rock affords.65
A particularly interesting invocation of this deference approach is Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.66 The Court ruled that the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 196667 and an agency standard adopted pursuant to
the Act implicitly preempted state tort law.6 8 The federal law, as applied by the
Department of Transportation in the period in suit, did not require airbags.
Writing for a closely divided Court, Justice Breyer's opinion concluded that
state tort law requiring airbags conflicted with that federal policy and so had to
yield.69 The primary reason for finding preemption was that the Department's
explanation for the airbag-optional standard was strongly inconsistent with such
an aggressive operation of state tort law.70 Concluding his opinion (and citing
Auer), Justice Breyer placed "some weight" on the Department's view that the
state tort law was in fact in conflict with the regulatory objectives of its own
standard.7'
As these cases reflect, Seminole Rock survives Chevron. But Seminole Rock
deference is just as episodically invoked as Curtiss-Wright (or Chevron, as we
shall subsequently demonstrate). Between 1984 and 2006, the Court wrote
decisions in 155 cases where an agency was construing its own regulations.
However, we identified only eleven of those cases as ones where the Court
63. 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
64. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (upholding a Department of Labor interpretation of its own regulatory
concept embodied in Fair Labor Standards Act regulations).
65. 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (upholding HHS's interpretation of its own complicated Medicare
regulations).
66. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
67. 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.) (repealed 1994).
68. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886.
69. Id. at 874-75.
70. Id. at 874-81.
71. Id. at 883-84.
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invoked Seminole Rock or analogous precedent (such as Auer or Thomas
Jefferson) as the deference test; in other words, Seminole Rock was employed in
a mere 7.1% of eligible cases. Why has the invocation of Seminole Rock been
so sporadic?
One partial explanation is that the Court was more likely to invoke the
deference regime when it was prepared to uphold the agency's view. The
agency win rate for cases where the Court invoked Seminole Rock (or an
analogous precedent) was an outstanding 90.9%. This is significantly higher
than the win rate for those Seminole Rock-eligible cases where Seminole Rock
was not invoked, which was 75.0% (not unimpressive). A more interesting
reason has been suggested by Justice Thomas. Dissenting in Thomas Jefferson,
he cautioned that Seminole Rock deference runs the risk of an agency bootstrap-
ping dubious statutory views into law by adopting vague regulations and then
construing them.72 In this vein, the Court sometimes declines to apply Seminole
Rock deference when the agency has changed its interpretation, perhaps suggest-
ing opportunism rather than a law-like deployment of detailed regulations.73
A third, and in our view the best, explanation is that Justices authoring
opinions upholding agency constructions of their own regulations had other
deferential options. As Table 2 indicates, the Court invoked a range of deference
regimes when it could have, instead, been invoking Seminole Rock, most
notably Consultative Deference (21.3% of cases), Chevron (20.0% of cases),
and Skidmore (12.3% of cases). Yet it is notable that, consistent with the overall
trend in the dataset, the most common choice made by the Court was to invoke
no deference regime at all; in 27.7% of all cases involving an agency interpreta-
tion of its own regulation, the Court used ad hoc judicial reasoning as opposed
to a deference test.
72. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (declining to apply Auer
[Seminole Rock] deference when the regulation itself is clear and only entitled to Skidmore deference);
Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 ADmIN.
L.J. AM. U. 1, 4-12 (1996) (arguing that current Supreme Court deference toward agency interpreta-
tions goes against the spirit of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by allowing agencies effectively
to create their own law); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96 COLum. L. REv. 612 (1996) (arguing that current Supreme Court
deference toward agency interpretations, which allows the agencies to create their own law, raises a
separation of powers problem).
73. For cases where the Court explicitly declined to accord Seminole Rock deference because the
agency "interpretation" had changed, see Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356
(2000); Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 334 n.7 (1995); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 212-13 (1988); and Huffinan v. Western Nuclear Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 673 n.9 (1988). In Gonzales
v. Oregon, the Court rejected the government's argument that the Ashcroft Directive was entitled to
Seminole Rock deference on the odd ground that the regulation simply "parroted" the statute. 549 U.S.
243, 256-61 (2006); cf id. at 277-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (wittily critiquing the majority's "antiparrot-
ing canon"). A stronger ground for rejection would have been that because Attorney General Ashcroft's
interpretation was adopted thirty years after the regulafion in question and had been previously
considered and rejected, Seminole Rock was not appropriate to apply.
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3. Beth Israel Deference for Agency Elaborations of Statutory Schemes
Prior to Chevron, the Court had articulated numerous agency-specific defer-
ence regimes that in form and substance foreshadowed the Chevron test.
Invocation of these cases, which resemble and presage Chevron's reasonability
review of agency interpretations when statutes are ambiguous, has continued
during the Chevron era.
Consider an example. Settling a strike by its union, Auciello Iron Works
agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement. Right after the workers
returned to their jobs, however, Auciello renounced the agreement on the
ground that it reasonably believed that the union no longer represented a
majority of the workers. Although this action violated no specific provision of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) ruled that Auciello's disavowal was an unfair labor practice because it
violated the Board's long-established precedents regulating employer contract-
disavowals and undermined the Act's policy of encouraging labor stability and
peace.74 The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's interpretation in 1996-more
than a decade and dozens of law review articles after the "Chevron Revolu-
tion."75 Although the Court has sometimes invoked Chevron deference for
NLRB orders, it did not do so in Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB. Nor did it
apply Chevron's distinctive two-step formula. Instead, the Court briefly noted
the "considerable deference" it has long accorded the Board's judgments pursu-
ant to "its charge to develop national labor policy."'76 Its primary citation was to
Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB. 7
At issue in Beth Israel was the NLRB's interpretation of the 1974 health field
amendments to the NLRA. In affirming the Board's interpretation, the Court
opined that "[elven if the legislative history arguably pointed toward a contrary
view, the Board's construction of the statute's policies would be entitled to
considerable deference. 78 The Court further said that "[t]he judicial role is
narrow," and that "[t]he rule which the Board adopts is judicially reviewable for
consistency with the Act, and for rationality.,79 Notice the rhetorical similarities
not only between Beth Israel and Chevron, but also between Beth Israel and
74. Auciello Iron Works, Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 364 (1995). There was a technical issue not settled by
the Board's precedents, namely, whether Auciello lost the ability to disavow because it had all the facts
concerning union membership at hand before it signed the contract. The Board ruled that that conduct
was in bad faith.
75. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781 (1996).
76. Id. at 787-88.
77. See, e.g., id. at 788 (citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978)). The
Auciello Court also invoked NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990), another
NLRB deference case which ignored Chevron and relied on NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251
(1975), another pre-Chevron NLRB deference case similar to Beth Israel.
78. Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 500 (citing Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266-67; NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434
U.S. 335, 350 (1978)).
79. Id. at 501 (emphasis added); accord Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 265-66 (deference even when
Board is changing interpretations).
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other Supreme Court deference opinions in the 1970s.8° We, therefore, use the
term Beth Israel deference to represent the continuing invocation of all of these
tests that precede and anticipate Chevron.
The conceptual basis for deference in these pre-Chevron cases is a blend of
formal and functional themes. That is, Congress has given an agency responsibil-
ity (and sometimes lawmaking authority) to fill in the "interstices" of a statutory
scheme that the statute lays out in general terms. 81 "That delegation helps
ensure that in 'this area of limitless factual variations,' like cases will be treated
alike. It also helps guarantee that the rules will be written by 'masters of the
subject,' who will be responsible for putting the rules into effect. '82 To carry out
the congressional purpose, the agency needs discretionary breathing room, and
so courts should not second-guess their decisions unless inconsistent in some
important way with the statute as Congress devised and wrote it. Finally, the
agency decisions constitute a body of law that renders the statutory scheme both
transparent and predictable to the persons and entities subject to it.
83
Given the similarities between the deference tests found in Beth Israel-type
cases and the Chevron test itself, one would have expected Beth Israel defer-
ence to have died in Chevron's wake. Our data show, however, that this has not
been the case. In forty-nine post-Chevron cases, the Court invoked Beth Israel
deference and refrained from mentioning Chevron, any of the post-Chevron
cases, or the famous two-step formula. Further, the application of Beth Israel
deference is found not only in labor law (the area in which the Beth Israel
decision was grounded),84 but also in immigration,85 treaty interpretation,
80. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) (when Congress delegates lawmaking
authority to an agency, that agency, and not the courts, has "primary responsibility" for interpreting the
statute, and the "reviewing court is not free to set aside [agency] regulations simply because it would
have interpreted the statute in a different manner"); see also Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). The Court in National Muffler deferred to a Treasury Department
interpretation of the charitable contribution provision of the tax code. When the relevant statutory term
is undefined or unclear, "this Court customarily defers to the regulation, which, 'if found to "implement
the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner," must be upheld."' Id. at 476 (quoting United
States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973), in turn quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299,
307 (1967)).
81. See Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 500-01; accord Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477.
82. Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477 (quoting Correll, 389 U.S. at 307; United States v. Moore, 95 U.S.
760, 763 (1878)) (internal citations omitted).
83. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 691-92 (1990) (deferring to Solicitor of Department of the
Interior opinions for this reason).
84. See, e.g., Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 787-88 (1996) (applying Beth Israel
deference).
85. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 309, 312 n.8 (1993) (invoking the "reasonable
foundation" deference rule of Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314,
323 (1992) (respecting Attorney General's "broad discretion" whether to re-open immigration proceed-
ings (quoting INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444,449(1985))).
86. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006) (following Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 187, 194 (1961), which accords "great weight" to executive branch treaty interpretations); El Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (applying similar,deferential
approach of Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)).
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sentencing,87 education,88 and regulated industries."
In 75.5% of the Beth Israel cases, the agency was acting pursuant to
delegated lawmaking authority, and so invocation or at least mention of Chev-
ron would have been appropriate. Why did the Court not follow or even
mention Chevron? One possible answer is that Beth Israel deference died a slow
death, gradually petering out after Chevron instead of ceasing immediately. This
theory holds that Beth Israel deference might have continued to exist into the
1980s, but that once Chevron became established as the meta-test, the Justices
would cite to it if they cited anything. Auciello Iron Works, of course, is a
counter-example, and our data demonstrate that Auciello was not an aberration.
More than half (51.0%) of the Beth Israel cases came after January 1, 1990,
when Chevron had clearly become the prevailing approach.
Another theory is that because the Beth Israel deference tests are analogous
to Chevron's two-step test, and in one case virtually identical," some Justices
(or their law clerks) have considered them interchangeable as a matter of
citation. While Chevron is the more recognizable test, it is also more controver-
sial and sometimes polarizing. It is possible that some Justices (or their clerks)
cite pre-Chevron regimes in order to avoid a messy debate as to the "meaning"
of Chevron, which remains a source of sharp debate among the Justices.
Perhaps the most likely reason is that specialized practices-such as labor,
immigration, treaty interpretation, and criminal sentencing-prefer their particu-
lar deference precedents and continue to cite them, often leading the Court to
follow suit. The best example of this phenomenon is tax (always a special case,
concededly). There is a long-standing consensus among the tax bar that the
Internal Revenue Code's general delegation of authority to the Internal Revenue
Service (section 7805) is not a general lawmaking delegation, in contrast to the
many particular delegations.91 Hence, the Court rarely applies Chevron to IRS
interpretations. If a deference regime is applied, it is usually the pre-Chevron
87. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S.
751, 757 (1997) (dodging the Chevron issue and ,giving general deference to the Commission);
Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 129-30 (1996) (applying an unspecified but deferential mode
of review to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of its Guidelines); United States v. Dunnigan,
507 U.S. 87 (1993).
88. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326 (1988) (adopting an approach of deference toward
Department of Education's interpretations of relevant statute because it is the "agency charged with
monitoring and enforcing the statute" (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)).
89. See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n [FERC], 535 U.S. 1, 28 (2002)
(energy); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (securities); City of New York v. Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n [FCC], 486 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1988) (communications).
90. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) (when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to
an agency, that agency and not the courts has "primary responsibility" for interpreting the statute, and
the "reviewing court is not free to set aside [agency] regulations simply because it would have
interpreted the statute in a different manner").
91. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV.
51, 56-57 (1996); Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72
B.U. L. REv. 841, 849 & n.53 (1992).
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regime associated with National Muffler Dealers v. United States.92 The Court
in National Muffler ruled that IRS regulations developed under its general
rulemaking authority are entitled to deferential consideration, but not as much
as rules developed under one of the specific grants of rulemaking authority.93
4. Skidmore Deference for Expert Agency Judgments
Under the Skidmore standard of deference, an agency interpretation is entitled
to "respect proportional to its power to persuade," with such power determined
by the interpretation's "thoroughness, logic and expertness"; its "fit with prior
interpretations"; and "any other sources of weight" the court chooses to con-
sider.94 This standard of review is not as generous to the agency as Chevron's
reasonability standard, and it places potentially more discretion in the hands of
judges. Indeed, according to Justice Scalia's Mead dissent, the Chevron Revolu-
tion rendered Skidmore obsolete.95 The Mead majority, however, pronounced
Skidmore alive and well, holding that the Court limited Chevron deference to
those instances when there was a congressional delegation of lawmaking author-
ity to the agency, and maintaining that when Congress has not delegated
lawmaking authority to the agency, Skidmore deference governs. 96
Our data both confirm and question Mead's position on Skidmore. On the one
hand, it is correct that Skidmore was still an important part of the Court's
deference jurisprudence when Mead was decided.97 By our count, the Court had
invoked the Skidmore deference regime fifty-four times between the Chevron
decision and the Mead decision.
Many of these decisions were headline-grabbing interpretations of landmark
statutes. For example, the Court handed down an important interpretation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in Bragdon v. Abbott.98 The issue was
whether HIV infection or non-symptomatic AIDS was a "disability" covered by
the public accommodations title, which concededly applied to the defendant's
92. 440 U.S. 472 (1979). The leading case is Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554
(1991), following the deference regime of National Muffler Dealers. Id. at 560-61. See also United
States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219(2001) (also following Muffler). Cottage
Savings has, in turn, been followed and applied in Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448
(2003) and Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382 (1998).
93. Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 476; accord United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24
(1982).
94. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), followed and quoted in United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001); see Hickman & Krueger, supra note 32, at 1281-91 (engaging
in a thorough examination of the Skidmore factors, as expanded in Mead and applied post-Mead by the
courts of appeals).
95. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241, 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. The rationale for permitting Skidmore deference when there has not been a congressional
delegation of lawmaking authority is grounded in agencies' expertise, broad investigative powers, and
understanding of national issues and also in a desire to create uniformity in administration. Id. at 234
(majority opinion).
97. For empirical evidence that Skidmore remains an important deference approach among the courts
of appeals, see Hickman & Krueger, supra note 32, at 1259-81.
98. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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dental practice. The claimant, Sidney Abbott, relied on regulations adopted by
several federal agencies applying the Rehabilitation Act's AIDS-inclusive under-
standing to the ADA. Justice Kennedy's opinion for a closely divided Court
invoked these opinions as "confirmation" of the medical evidence that HIV-
infection is a disability as the ADA defines the term. He invoked Chevron
deference for the view of the Department of Justice (with delegated authority to
interpret that part of the ADA)99 and Skidmore deference for the views of other
federal agencies under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.I°° The unanim-
ity of the agency views, Congress's awareness of them when it enacted the
ADA, and their grounding in medical understandings gave the agency views
unusually powerful cogency under Skidmore and justified Justice Kennedy's
unwillingness to rest upon Chevron alone.'
On the other hand, the Court's own post-Mead jurisprudence has not fol-
lowed the rules laid down by the Mead decision. The Court relied on Skidmore
fourteen times in the 203 cases between Mead and Hamdan; in other words, in
the post-Mead era, the Court invoked Skidmore in 6.9% of its cases involving
agency interpretations of federal statutes. This rate of invocation is nearly
identical to the rate at which Skidmore was invoked in the pre-Mead era, 6.7%.
On first glance, this data would seem to support Mead, if that case was taken to
stand merely for the proposition that Skidmore was, and would continue to be, a
part of the Court's deference jurisprudence. Yet Mead did more than that; it
claimed to establish a formula for delineating between Skidmore's and Chev-
ron's domains, with the latter case governing when there had been a congres-
sional delegation of lawmaking authority to the agency and the former governing
when there had not. When one examines whether this formula has been com-
plied with, one finds that Mead's directives have not been played out in a
predictable manner.
In the pre-Mead era, there was a congressional delegation of lawmaking
authority to the agency in 33.3% of the Skidmore cases, but in the post-Mead
era the fraction of Skidmore cases involving a congressional delegation of
lawmaking authority skyrocketed to 57.1%. Presumably, had the Mead formula
been followed, the opposite would have occurred. Even more troubling is that
the percentage of Skidmore cases involving formal congressional delegations
(strictly defined) jumped from 20.4% in the pre-Mead era to 42.9% in the
post-Mead era. In other words, not only has post-Mead Skidmore deference
been more heavily tilted towards cases where there has been a congressional
delegation of lawmaking authority, it has been tilted towards those cases where
this delegation is of the most formal sort-that is, the sort easiest to parcel off to
Chevron under Mead. Moreover, the problem is not just that cases where there
99. Id. at 646.
100. Id. at 642-45 (pre-ADA agency interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act to include HIV-
infection); id. at 647 (agency interpretations of the ADA).
101. See id. at 642.
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has been a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority are making up an
ever larger percentage of Skidmore cases, but that Skidmore deference is being
invoked in an ever larger percentage of those cases where there has been a
congressional delegation of lawmaking authority-15.4% of such cases post-
Mead, as opposed to 8.4% in the pre-Mead era.
Here, contrasting Skidmore cases post-Mead with Chevron cases post-Mead
is instructive. After Mead, the percentage of Chevron cases involving a congres-
sional delegation of lawmaking authority increased slightly, from 88.7% pre-
Mead, to 92.3% post-Mead. Yet, during that same period, the frequency with
which Chevron was invoked in cases involving a congressional delegation of
lawmaking authority fell from 29.3% to 23.1%. In other words, while the
internal composition of Chevron cases started to change in line with the Mead
directive, overall the Court's deference jurisprudence moved in the opposite
direction. Given the data above, we can certainly attribute some of this move-
ment to the Court's practice of applying Skidmore, which has run contrary to
Mead in some striking ways.
5. Consultative Deference for Agency Inputs Where the Court Does Not
Announce a Deference Regime
To this point, we have discussed deference regimes grounded in particular
standards of deference, such as the "respect proportional to its power to
persuade" standard in Skidmore or the "controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation" standard in Seminole Rock. It follows that
cases fall under these deference regimes when they explicitly invoke the
relevant deference standard. In a large number of cases, however, the Supreme
Court does not invoke a specific standard of deference-it does not name or
seem to follow one of the regimes we have mentioned-yet it appears that the
Court is expressing a deferential attitude. In these cases, the Court relies on
some input from the agency-an amicus brief, a manual, an interpretive rule, or
the like-to shape its reasoning and influence its decision. But it does so
without explicitly stating that it is deferring to the agency, and without invoking
any standard by which these inputs are weighed. It is this category of cases that
we refer to as involving a regime of consultative deference.
For example, in Hamdan, the Military Commissions Case, the Court declined
to follow Justice Thomas's invocation of Curtiss-Wright deference, but did not
treat the President's judgment as irrelevant to the issue whether the procedures
mandated for those commissions violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). Section 836(a) of the UCMJ authorized the President to issue regula-
tions which, "so far as he considers practicable," comport with process accorded
defendants in criminal cases; section 836(b) required that procedures in courts
martial and military commissions be "uniform," again "insofar as practi-
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cable."1 2 The Court stated that it would accord "deference" to the President's
judgment as to practicability, but found that the President had reached no public
judgment as to the section 836(b) uniformity requirement. 10 3 There was also
indication in Justice Stevens's opinion that the Court majority was very atten-
tive to the President's precise arguments. In rejecting some of the arguments
made by Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens relied on the President's failure to
make the Thomas arguments.' °4 This last point was not enough (standing alone)
to justify coding Hamdan as a consultative deference case, but it confirmed our
inclination to code it as such based on the explicit statement that deference of
some sort was owed.
Foreign affairs and national security are far from the only areas where the
Court gives what we are calling consultative deference to agency inputs. In
antitrust law, the Court is often moved by the Department of Justice (DOJ)/
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Guidelines, 10 5 and has followed agency leads
in recent cases that have overruled longstanding interpretations of the Sherman
Act.' ° In the civil rights area, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Department of Education sometimes influence the Court with
their interpretive guidances; we coded these cases as consultative deference
when there was no citation to Skidmore or a Skidmore case.
10 7
The Court also applies what we are calling consultative deference when it
clearly relies on amicus briefs filed by the Solicitor General as quasi-
authoritative on points of fact or even law.10 8 These briefs are the product of
work by the Solicitor General's brainy young associates and inputs from the
relevant agencies. To be sure, agency attorneys bitterly complain that the
Solicitor General does not always represent their perspectives as their own
counsel would and sometimes even marginalizes them. But that may be a "plus"
from the Court's point of view. The Justices understand that the Solicitor
General is providing agency-based inputs that no one else is providing, while at
the same time remaining free from the agency's sometimes blindered (or
captured) point of view. It is perhaps for this reason that the Court often
requests that the Solicitor General submit an amicus brief.
102. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a)-(b). Even though the statute explicitly authorized the President to issue
procedural regulations, neither the Court nor Justice Thomas even mentioned Chevron as a possible
deference regime. This strikes us as anomalous.
103. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2791 & n.51 (2006) (Stevens, J., for the Court); id. at
2811 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
104. See id. at 2778 n.31, 2779 n.32 (Stevens, J., for the Court).
105. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
106. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007)
(overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and closely following
the reasoning suggested by the Department of Justice's amicus brief).
107. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 179 (2005); Penn. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 142-43 (2004); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799-800, 806, 809 (1998).
108. In 314 cases, the "agency" interpretation of the statute was presented only in the Solicitor
General's amicus brief.
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In bankruptcy cases, there is no agency to which the Court can defer; there is
no Bankruptcy Commission. Yet the Court often requests amicus briefs from the
Solicitor General in bankruptcy cases. The attorneys who work on bankruptcy
cases for the Solicitor General come to know their subject matter more deeply
than the Justices could be expected to, consulting bankruptcy experts and
drawing on the resources of the office of the United States Trustee, located in
the Department of Justice.' °9 The analysis in these briefs often influences the
Court's judgment in ways that resemble Skidmore deference. In Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash," ° for example, the Court cited, relied on, and
closely followed the Solicitor General's analysis of how to value property
retained by a debtor in bankruptcy and not turned over to secured creditors. The
Court rejected not only the valuation approach of the lower court under review,
but also a compromise approach followed by the respected Second and Seventh
Circuits."' The words of the statute ultimately answered the interpretive issue
but only after they were understood in the context of bankruptcy policy. For
both textual and policy analyses, the Solicitor General's amicus brief proved
dispositive. It is not uncommon for the Court's bankruptcy opinions to closely
follow the analysis of Solicitor General amicus briefs, as it did in Rash. 1
2
Unlike bankruptcy, federal pension law (the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act, or ERISA1 13) is not only overseen by an agency, but by two
agencies: the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service, both of
which have promulgated regulations. The regulations answer few of the liti-
gated ERISA issues, especially preemption issues that have dominated the
Court's ERISA docket. Hence, the Court regularly solicits the Solicitor Gener-
al's views and almost as regularly relies on those amicus briefs for facts and
predictions, policy analysis, and legal materials." 4 Amicus briefs filed by the
Solicitor General are particularly influential in other areas of law as well,
particularly technical areas such as patents, transportation, and communications.
Even though it is not an officially named and recognized deference category,
consultative deference is by far the most frequent deference regime actually
followed by the Court. These cases constitute 17.8% of all cases where an
agency interpretation of a statute was at issue. They are eclipsed only by the
109. Charged with representing the interests of the United States (often a creditor in bankruptcy), the
Trustee collects and analyzes bankruptcy filings and adjudications. As the top official, the Trustee is'
quite knowledgeable about the policy as well as legal issues. Our generalizations about the Solicitor
General's handling of bankruptcy cases comes from conversations with leading appellate counsel in
bankruptcy cases.
110. 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
111. The majority and concurring opinions in In re Hoskins, 102 F3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996), are
particularly illuminating analyses of bankruptcy policy. See Rash, 520 U.S. at 966-67 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
112. See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004); Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541
U.S. 465 (2004); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,417 (1992).
113. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and the
Internal Revenue Code).
114. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
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category of cases in which no deference regime is invoked at all. It is worth
considering why this might be the case.
It is not difficult to see why the Court would rely on agency inputs in its
reasoning and decisionmaking. The agency typically provides the Court with
useful information-including the legislative history and background of the
statute; pertinent regulatory history and notation of agency actions that might be
relevant; data and facts relating to the regulatory regime and the issue before the
Court; and experience-based analysis of how different interpretations fit with
the purpose and evolution of the statutory scheme. This information is often not
found in other legal sources or briefs. Additionally, agency inputs are normative
focal points that exercise a kind of gravitational pull for issues on which the
Justices have no strong opinion. In Rash, Justice Ginsburg and her colleagues
probably felt bewildered by the array of well-reasoned but conflicting circuit
court decisions on the valuation issue. The Solicitor General's view was sen-
sible enough, but its chief virtue was that it settled an issue vexing the lower
courts and was tendered by attorneys the Court trusted to be judicious. 1 5 The
agency input provided a basis for decision that the Court, reasoning on its own,
would not have had.
Still, even if it is easy to see why the Court would rely on agency inputs in its
reasoning and decisionmaking, it is not obvious why the Court would do so
without invoking any of the applicable deference standards the other regimes
provide. Why suggest the .persuasiveness of a brief by citing it, when Skidmore
could be invoked as a basis for relying on briefs that are persuasive? Why credit
an agency's interpretation of its own regulation without citing Seminole Rock?
These are vexing questions our data cannot answer. The reasons are probably
practical as well as doctrinal. In the bankruptcy cases, for just one area, there is
no single agency to which Congress has delegated authority. In other cases,
such as ERISA, there are two agencies, and the Court may find it convenient
simply to draw from an amicus brief rather than announce that it is following
Skidmore or another deference regime. Justice Ginsburg and perhaps others may
prefer as a matter of style to incorporate agency reasoning into their opinions
rather than to announce a formal deference test-especially if such an announce-
ment would trigger a special concurring opinion or become a target for dissent-
ers. Sometimes, Justices may not even notice how much their clerk-drafted
opinions draw from and rely on government submissions in a manner strikingly
similar to what Skidmore advocates. Justice Scalia believes that Skidmore is
invalid, and so he would not cite it for that reason.
It is possible that Justices sometimes assume that their reasoning so closely
adheres to the standard set out by a particular deference regime that there is no
115. We add this important qualification: The United States does have a bias, for it is often a creditor
in bankruptcy. Hence, it may be no coincidence that its valuation rule in Rash was the most pro-creditor
rule, and one that no less a staunch capitalist as Frank Easterbrook maintains will grant a windfall to
undersecured creditors (like banks) at the expense of unsecured creditors (like small businesses and
personal creditors). Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 320 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
1114 [Vol. 96:1083
HeinOnline  -- 96 Geo. L.J. 1114 2007-2008
THE CONTINUUM OF DEFERENCE
need to cite the regime itself. This inverts the questions above: Why cite
Skidmore when it is clear you are giving agency inputs "respect proportional to
[their] power to persuade"? t t6 Why cite Seminole Rock when you are giving
credit to an agency interpretation of its own regulations that is not "erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation"? 1 7 The standard answer would be that the role
of precedent in the Court's decisionmaking process requires that the Court
constantly, and explicitly, re-indicate which decision rules it considers alive and
well. The Court's practice, however, seems to indicate that the Justices do not
find this necessary.
Regardless of the reasons for the Court's practice, which we explore further
below, it is clear that the consultative deference category sheds new light on
how the Court defers. Our study demonstrates that deference without the
invocation of a named deference regime is a commonly used method of
decisionmaking-one more common, in fact, than any named deference regime.
6. Anti-Deference
To this point, we have described deference regimes under which the agency
interpretation is afforded some presumption of correctness. However, anti-
deference (that is, a presumption running against agency interpretations) also
has a place in the Court's practice. Anti-deference, as invoked by the Court, has
several interconnected threads, all illustrated or suggested in Gonzales v. Or-
egon.t 8 The most obvious is the rule of lenity, which requires that ambiguous
statutes be construed in favor of criminal defendants." 9 A related doctrine is the
avoidance canon, the presumption or rule that, when a statute is ambiguous and
one interpretation would present serious constitutional difficulties, the Court
should avoid those difficulties by choosing the clearly constitutional alternative
interpretation. 20 While cases invoking the rule of lenity can usually be consid-
ered to be invoking a regime of anti-deference,1 2' cases invoking the avoidance
116. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945).
118. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
119. Id. at 263-64 (expressing reluctance to read the law to vest discretion in the Department of
Justice to expand criminal liability). For lucid explications of the rule of lenity and strong support for it,
see, for example, United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) and United States v. Granderson, 511
U.S. 39 (1994).
120. Oregon, 546 U.S. at 268-69 (expressing reluctance to vest the Department of Justice with
discretion to apply the statute in the teeth of constitutional problems with denying any and all
aid-in-dying). On the avoidance canon, see generally NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490 (1979); John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1495
(1997); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997).
121. In matters of substantive criminal law, the agency is almost always aligned against the criminal
defendant; the rare exceptions are when the Solicitor General confesses error at the Supreme Court
level. In matters of criminal sentencing, however, the agency (the Sentencing Commission, not the
Department of Justice) is often on the side of the criminal defendant. See, e.g., Neal v. United States,
516 U.S. 284 (1996).
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canon can only be considered to be invoking a regime of anti-deference when
the canon is used to provide a presumption against the agency, as in Oregon.
122
Also illustrating the anti-deference regime is McNally v. United States. 123 The
federal mail fraud statute makes it a crime to use the mails for the purpose of
executing "any scheme or artifice to defraud., 124 The government prosecuted
several state officials and a private associate for creating a kickback scheme
from firms doing business with the state. Although the lower courts had applied
the statute to include such conduct as a "scheme to defraud," the Supreme Court
construed it more narrowly to cover only those fraudulent schemes depriving
the public of tangible losses (therefore, not just loss of good government).
125
Justice White's opinion for the Court concluded:
Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries
ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of
disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read [the mail
fraud law] as limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress
desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.'
26
In reaching this conclusion, he invoked both the rule of lenity and the avoidance
canon.
McNally was by no means a rare case. In 6.8% of the cases we coded
(sixty-nine cases, in absolute terms), the Court invoked an anti-deference
regime. This is slightly more than three-quarters the number of cases in which
Chevron was invoked (eighty-four) and about the same number in which
Skidmore was invoked. It is more than six times as many cases as mentioned
Seminole Rock (eleven). The percentage of cases that invoke anti-deference
seems even more significant when one is reminded that the Court in the
overwhelming majority of cases opts to invoke no deference regime at all.
Predictably, the anti-deference cases present a much lower win rate for the
agency than any other deference regime. In anti-deference cases, the agency
wins only 36.2% of the time. Yet it is questionable whether invocation of an
anti-deference regime leads to outcomes that disfavor the agency or whether the
Court is simply more wont to invoke the anti-deference regime when it is
already inclined to rule against the agency. Our data support the latter hypoth-
esis. In theory, the anti-deference regime can be invoked in all criminal cases. In
practice, however, the Court only invoked the anti-deference regime in 32.5%
of criminal cases (37 of 114). The win rate for those criminal cases where
122. In our coding schema, we did not code cases as "anti-deference" if the constitutional problem
did not cut against the agency interpretation or if the Court did not mention the rule of lenity or the
avoidance canon.
123. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
125. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360-61.
126. Id. at 360.
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Table 3. Anti-Deference and Agency Win Rates in Criminal Cases
Percentage of
Cases in Agency Win
Population Rate
Non-Criminal Cases 88.8% (900) 69.6%
Criminal Cases 11.2% (114) 62.2%
Criminal Cases in Which 3.6% (37) 37.8%
Anti-Deference Is Invoked
Criminal Cases in Which 7.6% (77) 74.0%
Anti-Deference Is Not Invoked
anti-deference was invoked was 37.8% (about the same as the overall win rate
for anti-deference cases), but the win rate for those criminal cases where
anti-deference was not invoked was 74.0%. This vast disparity in win rates
between subsets of the criminal cases suggests that the Court invoked anti-
deference when it was especially ready for the agency to lose.
7. No Deference Regime Invoked
For us, the most striking finding of our study was that in the majority of all
cases-53.6% of them-the Court invoked no deference regime at all. This
finding is especially notable in light of the fact that we searched hard for signs
of deference and counted quite liberally (including Supreme Court reliance on
amicus briefs, which formed the bulk of our consultative-deference category).
This striking finding is also conceptually significant. It is contrary to both the
Court's statements about its own deference practice and the academic literature
on the topic. Indeed, in a legal culture where the Court and commentators are
obsessed with delineating the distinct domain of Chevron, and arguing over
whether the Court's jurisprudence has room for Skidmore, the idea that, more
often than not, the Court would not invoke a deference regime is highly
counterintuitive.
Not surprisingly, the Court's methodology in these no-deference cases matches
what has long been the Court's standard methodology for interpreting statutes.
Under this "independent judgment of judges" methodology, the Court normally
considers statutory text and the whole act; legislative history and statutory
purpose; the evolution of the statute through judicial and other precedents; and
substantive policy canons when it interprets statutes. The cogency of these
various factors will vary from case to case, and their respective weights depend
on their relative concreteness. Indeed, while the statute's plain meaning is both
the most authoritative and usually the first-analyzed evidence, the Court almost
never stops without checking plain meaning intuitions against other contextual
evidence (including the whole act, legislative history or purpose, precedent, and
canons of statutory construction). This pragmatic, multi-factored methodology
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is what we have elsewhere called the "funnel of abstraction" approach to
statutory interpretation, 127 and our data provide strong empirical support for the
fact that this ad hoc method of statutory interpretation exists and thrives in the
administrative realm.
A typical no-deference case is PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin. 28 The Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) bars disability-based discrimination by
"public accommodations," which the statute defines broadly.129 Casey Martin
was a professional golfer whose degenerative circulatory disorder required him
to use a golf cart in order to compete in tournaments. The PGA's no-cart rule
prevented Martin from competing, and the Association declined to waive its
rule. The Supreme Court ruled that the ADA required the PGA to accommodate
Martin.1 30 The PGA's main argument was that the ADA's anti-discrimination
rule is, by its terms, not applicable if accommodating the disabled person
"would fundamentally alter the nature" of the PGA's services, namely, the game
of highly competitive golf.13' Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens (an avid
golfer) rejected that interpretation. His opinion relied on the statutory language,
as applied by the trial court after extensive testimony about the nature of the
game;'3 2 the purpose and structure of the ADA, which broadly sought to abolish
disability-based discriminations and created careful exceptions for religious, but
not athletic institutions, where Congress felt there should be a blanket allow-
ance; 133 and Congress's specific intent, previously recognized by Supreme
Court precedent, to impose an individualized inquiry and not allow blanket
rules such as the PGA's."' Although agreeing with the EEOC's bottom line, the
Court crafted its own interpretation of the statute's public accommodations
provisions, relying on a pragmatic, multi-factored approach to statutory interpre-
tation, rather than deferring to the EEOC's judgment or even mentioning its
distinctive factual and legal inputs.
As in the PGA case, the Court's failure to apply a specific deference test to
53.6% of agency statutory interpretation cases did not mean that the agency
fared badly in these cases. In those cases where no deference regime was
invoked, the agency won 66.0% of the time, a figure significantly but .not
dramatically lower than the agency win rate in Chevron cases (76.2%) and
Skidmore cases (73.5%). The gentle reader might find this result most surprising
127. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990). For an early empirical test confirming the multi-factored approach we
describe, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 Tax. L. REv. 1073 (1992).
128. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability in public
accommodations); id. § 12181(7) (defining "public accommodation").
130. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 690-91.
131. Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.10, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (No. 00-24).
132. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 676-88.
133. Id. at 674-76 (legislative history and purpose); id. at 689 n.51 (statutory structure).
134. Id. at 688 (citing a committee report and Supreme Court precedent).
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of all, but it is easily explained. Our data are consistent with the conventional
wisdom that the Solicitor General's office does an excellent job screening and
then arguing cases.'35 The Solicitor General usually declines to appeal govern-
ment lower-court losses when the agency interpretation is hard to sustain and
sometimes even confesses error when that weakness becomes apparent only
after the Court has granted review. 136 And when the Solicitor General does stick
up for an agency interpretation, the office's attorneys write almost uniformly
excellent briefs defending it. The conventional wisdom that the Solicitor Gener-
al's office understands the Court better than any private law firm and, in turn, is
trusted by the Justices helps explain why the government wins a large majority
of Supreme Court cases even when no formal deference regime is invoked. 137
Still, it is worth asking why the Court so often opts not to invoke a deference
regime, especially given the range of deference regimes available and the
Court's strong rhetorical support for them. We offer a few tentative explanations
for this silent, but pervasive, reliance on ad hoc judicial reasoning. First, and
most important, the Solicitor General in a large minority of cases (including
Martin) fails to ask the Court to defer to informal agency interpretations or to
the government's views presented in his briefs; without a formal request, the
Justices might consider it inappropriate to go out of their way to announce a
deference regime. Indeed, the Justices may believe that constant invocation of
deference regimes would be inconsistent with the role of an independent
judiciary at the heart of Article III. The 1014 cases in our dataset represent a
large majority of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases decided between
Chevron and Hamdan. To admit, in case after case, that they are "deferring" to
agencies rather than forming their own independent judgments about the law,
would announce a greatly diminished judicial role in statutory interpretation.
Some Justices may feel that their role as judges, and their responsibility to justly
adjudicate cases, trumps the requirements of formal deference tests, even ones
they have painstakingly laid out.
One of us thinks it possible that the Court or most of the Justices consider
deference tests as a signaling device for lower courts-which handle the vast
majority of routine cases of agency interpretation-rather than a binding con-
straint on their own practice-which is limited to a minute fraction of the most
difficult cases. Under this view, the Court may perceive Chevron, Skidmore, and
the other formalist deference regimes as guides for lower court judges, which
135. See generally LINCOLN CAPLAN, The TbH JusTicE (1988).
136. See generally Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage:
Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 391 (2000).
137. It is also possible that there is often a generally deferential attitude among the Justices and their
law clerks toward Solicitor General briefs, which may permeate the Court's docket, affecting many of
the cases we have coded as "no deference." We have not tried to test or unpack the effects of this
generally deferential attitude in this Article.
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are not needed by their most learned (and creative) bench. 138 The other of us
sees little evidence for this proposition but thinks that any jurist would tend to
escape from pre-existing deference tests when important issues of national
policy present themselves to the Court, as they did in the Military Commissions
Case, the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case, and the Kentucky Kickback Case.
139
A final hypothesis, and one we both find probably true, is that the Justices and
their law clerks (who write the initial drafts of most opinions) wield deference
regimes like they wield canons of statutory interpretation-invoked when they
align with the outcome the authoring Justice wishes to reach, but jettisoned
when they are not useful in reaching that result. Notice that the Court actually
invokes Curtiss-Wright, Seminole Rock, and Skidmore in a small minority of
cases where those regimes are applicable-and the Court's invocation is strongly
correlated with its agreement with or acquiescence in the agency's interpreta-
tion. (In the next section, we make the same finding for Chevron.) The converse
applies for the rule of lenity even more strongly: the Court rarely mentions it in
the large majority of cases, where it agrees with the prosecutors, but frequently
mentions it when it is disagreeing.
These explanatory theories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessar-
ily exhaustive. The sheer breadth of cases in which the Court invokes no
deference regime, and the seemingly unsystematic differentiation between cases
where it invokes a deference regime and those where it does not, indicate that
multiple, complex factors are likely at play. At this point we are satisfied
identifying this anomaly and making an effort at description, fully expecting
that better explanation will follow with further study.
B. CHEVRON AS APPLIED (OR NOT) BY THE COURT
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Chevron is not the alpha and the
omega of Supreme Court agency-deference jurisprudence. Although the "revolu-
tionary" nature of Chevron seems accepted by lawyers, lower court judges, and
academics, at the level of Supreme Court practice, and even doctrine, Chevron's
status strikes us as something short of that.
First, the Court was highly deferential to agency interpretations before Chev-
ron.14 By 1984, the Court had already announced Chevron-like or Chevron-lite
deferential approaches in labor law, tax law, treaty interpretation, securities law,
138. Note that proving this hypothesis would require an empirical study of deference at the Court of
Appeals level, an object which is beyond the scope of this Article. However, we note that the best
recent empirical study of deference among courts of appeals found much lower win rates in Skidmore
deference cases (60.4%) than we found at the Supreme Court level (73.5%). Compare Hickman &
Krueger, supra note 32, at 1275-79, with Table 1, supra.
139. Respectively, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
259 (2006); and McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
140. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 981-84 (1991) (reporting that agency interpretations prevailed at
the Supreme Court 75% of the time in the three years before Chevron, while only 70% of the time in
the six years after Chevron).
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environmental law, and other areas.' 4' Beth Israel and National Muffler sound a
lot like Chevron, and at least one other case is an almost perfect fit. Anticipating
Mead by a quarter century was the Court's opinion in Batterton v. Francis.
42
The Court held that when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to an agency
(the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [HEW] in Batterton),
"Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary
responsibility for interpreting the statutory term." 143 Once the agency has
authoritatively construed the statute through legislative rules, the "reviewing
court is not free to set aside [agency] regulations simply because it would have
interpreted the statute in a different manner."1' With cases like Batterton fresh
in their minds, it is easy to see why the Justices themselves did not understand
their decision in Chevron as revolutionary.
Nor did Chevron sweep the field after 1984. Of the 1014 cases included in
our study, Chevron (or a Chevron precedent) was cited in only 120. In only 84
cases (8.3% of the population) did the Court apply the Chevron two-step test.
Further, as we have seen above, Chevron is but one of an array of deference
regimes invoked by the Court. Deference regimes that pre-existed Chevron-
such as Beth Israel and Seminole Rock-continue to thrive. Further, both before
and after Mead, the Justices respected and followed Chevron's allegedly obso-
lete sibling, Skidmore. Likewise, Chevron deference is sometimes sidelined in
order to invoke subject-area-specific concerns, like the rule of lenity in criminal
cases and super-deference in cases involving foreign affairs. In many other
cases, the Court avoids any named deference regime and utilizes what we have
called consultative deference. Most important, however, is that the Court in a
majority of its agency-interpretation cases (53.6% of them) applied no defer-
ence regime at all. The old "independent judgment of judges" approach that
predated the modem administrative state remains the overwhelmingly dominant
approach taken by the Justices in cases involving agency inputs. If you add the
consultative deference cases, where the Court did not cite or advert to any
deference regime, then the no-deference cases would amount to more than 70%
of the 1014 cases in our dataset.
Even if Chevron has not colonized the entire deference landscape as much as
some lawyers and experts believe, it may have marked an important shift in
judicial attitudes toward agency interpretations. We cast no doubt on the
literature finding that lower court judges frequently defer to agencies under
Chevron or even Skidmore in the post-Chevron era, perhaps at heightened
141. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
142. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
143. Id. at 425.
144. Id.; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (citing both Chevron and
Batterton for the proposition in text).
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rates. 145 Nor do we draw any conclusions from the fact that agency win rates
did not significantly increase at the Supreme Court level in the wake of Chevron. The
reason is that as many as three selection biases are probably at work.
To begin with, it is likely that agencies are pressing more aggressive statutory
interpretations and getting away with them among lower courts attentive to the
government's aggressive deployment of Chevron in its briefs. 14 6 As a result,
agency interpretations, including some legally shaky ones, routinely prevail on
circuit court appeal, and those weak cases are often appealed to the Supreme
Court. Conversely, losing parties abandon those cases where the agency has a
pretty good legal case and prevails in the court of appeals; Chevron-talk surely
discourages some potentially meritorious appeals. This phenomenon, alone,
would offer the Justices a sample of appeals where weaker agency interpreta-
tions are more prevalent than they would have been absent Chevron. There also
may be selection effects in the Justices' screening of appeals.
14 7
Another kind of bias precludes us from concluding that Chevron actually
marks a more deferential approach by the Court. It is true that, in cases where
Chevron was the deference regime invoked by the Court, the agency won 76.2%
of the time, as compared to the overall agency win rate of 68.8% (and the
68.2% win rate in non-Chevron cases). This significant differential might signal
that the Justices are making a more concerted effort to give agencies the benefit
of the doubt in close cases or for broadly written statutes. On the other hand, it
might be the case that the Court is more likely to cite Chevron and follow its
two-step approach when the majority is prepared to uphold the agency ac-
tion. 148 We tend toward the latter explanation, which replicates the pattern we
saw for Curtiss-Wright, Seminole Rock, and Skidmore deference.
The clearest effect of Chevron at the Supreme Court level is that it has
created an increasingly complicated set of doctrinal debates about when this
145. See, e.g., Hickman & Krueger, supra note 32, at 1271-79 (Skidmore applied liberally by lower
courts and generating considerable deference to agencies); Kerr, supra note 32, at 30-31 (Chevron
applied liberally by lower courts and generating considerable deference to agencies).
146. Donald Elliott, a former General Counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), says
that Chevron allowed the EPA to be more aggressive in pursuing a policy-oriented approach to
environmental statutes, at the expense of a legalistic approach, with some confidence that the D.C.
Circuit would go along with the agency's interpretations. See E. Donald Elliot, Chevron Matters: How
the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16
VmL. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 11--12 (2005).
147. The Justices might not seriously consider most of the cases where the agency has prevailed, so
that lower courts will absorb the Chevron message that agencies should usually receive the benefit of
the doubt. If the Justices disproportionately homed in on petitions from the Solicitor General, appealing
cases where a shaky (but under Chevron possibly winning) agency view has not prevailed (as in
Oregon), and on petitions from private parties with strong challenges to shaky agency views that have
prevailed in the lower courts (as in Hamdan), the few Chevron-eligible cases that the Court chooses to
take would represent a relatively weaker sample of cases than those that are at most Skidmore-eligible.
148. For example, in both Oregon and Hamdan, the Court declined to apply the Chevron framework,
notwithstanding strong arguments that the Attorney General (Oregon) and the President (Hamdan) were
acting pursuant to congressional delegations of lawmaking authority. That refusal to apply Chevron
may have been a product of the Court's skepticism about the executive views in those cases.
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deference regime is applicable (what is now called Chevron Step 0), the
approach the Court should take and the evidence it ought to consider to
determine whether Congress has directly addressed'an issue (Step 1), and the
relationship of Chevron to other deference regimes. Mead resolved some of
these debates while creating new ones. If Chevron is only dubiously considered
a Revolution, it is certainly a Cottage Industry.
Our goal is to deploy our dataset to help understand what the Court has
actually been doing in its Chevron cases and Chevron-eligible cases. This is
important, because the Court's practice has authoritative weight, binding on
lower courts and exercising some stare decisis authority for the Justices them-
selves. 149 Based upon our reading of the leading cases and commentaries, our
hypotheses were that the Court: (1) regularly applies Chevron to agency interpre-
tations pursuant to congressionally delegated lawmaking authority (Mead); (2)
does not give Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
jurisdiction or authority or to a major change in the statutory policy (Oregon);
and (3) considers the standard statutory interpretation sources, including legisla-
tive history, when engaged in the Chevron inquiries (Chevron itself, as well as
Oregon and Hamdan). The data provide some general support to all three
propositions but also demonstrate that the Court's practice has been inconsis-
tent, at the very least.
1. Chevron and Agency Interpretations Pursuant to Congressionally Delegated
Lawmaking Authority
Joined by all the Justices except Scalia, Mead appears to have partially settled
the debate within the Court about the conditions for triggering Chevron defer-
ence: Chevron is appropriately applied when the agency interpretation has been
made pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority.' 50 What
has remained unanswered, however, is whether this had been the approach the
Court has followed since Chevron, as Justice Souter's opinion for the Court
suggested, and whether the Court has faithfully followed this methodology
since Mead. To answer these kinds of questions, we identified cases where an
agency was acting pursuant to a congressional authorization to promulgate rules
and orders having the force of law. This proved to be a surprisingly difficult
enterprise.
As Professors Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts have demonstrated,
for most of the twentieth century there was a particular convention that Con-
gress followed when it intended to give agencies lawmaking authority: Grants
149. For example, Mead rested in part on the Court's characterization of what it had been doing with
Chevron since 1984. In Oregon, the debate between the majority and dissenting opinions involved
dueling characterizations of how the Court had been applying Chevron.
150. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-31 & n.ll (2001), closely following (and
citing) Merrill & Hickman, supra note 31. The Court followed and reaffirmed the Mead formulation in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773-75 (2006); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-75
(2006); and Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,980-81 (2005).
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of rulemaking or adjudication power were not "lawmaking authority" unless
accompanied by a statutory provision directly imposing sanctions against those
violating those rules or orders.' 5 ' This conventional wisdom has persisted in the
tax area, but has been ignored by judges in other areas, such as labor law. 152 By
1973, if not earlier, even Congress had "forgotten" about the Merrill-Watts
formula and might be understood to have been operating under the assumption
that grants of substantive rulemaking or formal adjudicatory power constituted
delegation of lawmaking authority.153 Thus, it may be fair to say that legislative
rulemaking and formal adjudication powers typically reflect a congressional
delegation of "lawmaking" authority in laws enacted in 1973 and afterwards,
but it is not clear that pre-1973 non-formula delegations should be treated as
lawmaking for Chevron purposes. Hence, in the cases we coded as having
included a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to the agency, we
further distinguished between those cases where delegation was granted under
the Merrill-Watts formula and those cases where delegation was granted only
because of the broader approach adopted by the lower courts in the 1970s. That
broader "Petroleum Refiners" approach (named after the leading case) pre-
sumed that a general grant of rulemaking power was legislative in nature, even
when there were no sanctions. 1
54
Between Chevron and Hamdan, we identified 267 cases in our population
where the agency interpretation was pursuant to a congressional delegation of
lawmaking authority to the agency under either the more stringent Merrill-Watts
convention or the more inclusive Petroleum Refiners presumption. As explained
in Mead, the Chevron two-step inquiry would theoretically govern those ap-
peals. 55 Yet, as Table 4 reports, of those cases where there was congressional
delegation of lawmaking authority, we identified only seventy-six cases where
151. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 526-27 (2002).
152. Id. at 528-45, 570-75. For example, the Supreme Court has assumed that the National Labor
Relations Board's adjudicative orders constitute delegated law, see NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994), but such orders clearly do not under this formula (which everyone
would have known in 1935, when Congress passed the NLRA), because the winning party needs to go
to court to have the order enforced. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 151, at 511.
153. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 151, at 545-70 (the convention was "erased" by federal
judges); id. at 577-78 (a reasonable legislative counsel would, after the judicial erasure, have opined
that a general rulemaking or adjudication grant was a "lawmaking' delegation). I asked Professor
Merrill: If you had to choose a year by which even congressional drafters would have surely ignored
the Merrill-Watts formula and followed a broader approach, what year would you choose? Conceding
that an earlier date could be defensible, Merrill felt that the formula would have clearly been obsolete
by 1973.
154. Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Skelly Wright, J.); see
Merrill & Watts, supra note 151, at 545-70 (providing a broader context for the Petroleum Refiners
revolution in the meaning of these general rulemaking grants).
155. Unless the Court for some reason found a technical exception, such as an agency rulemaking
that was actually undertaken in response to litigation or the agency was acting in some way beyond the
apparent authorization. (We are assuming that the Justices were not following the Merrill-Watts
formula.)
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Congressional No Count 738 9 747
Delegation of % Within Congressional 98.8% 1.2% 100.0%
Lawmaking Authority Delegation of
Lawmaking Authority
% Within Chevron Step 0 79.4% 10.6% 73.7%
% of Total 72.8% .9% 73.7%
Yes Count 191 76 267
% Within Congressional 71.5% 28.5% 100.0%
Delegation of
Lawmaking Authority
% Within Chevron Step 0 20.6% 89.4% 26.3%
% of Total 18.8% 7.5% 26.3%
Total Count 929 85 1014
% Within Congressional 91.6% 8.4% 100.0%
Delegation of
Lawmaking Authority
% Within Chevron Step 0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 91.6% 8.4% 100.0%
the Court applied the Chevron framework. In short, the Court does not apply the
Chevron framework in nearly three-quarters of the cases where it would appear
applicable under Mead.
Moreover, whether the delegation was according to the strict Merrill-Watts
approach or the more lenient Petroleum Refiners approach appears to make a
small difference in how likely the Court is to invoke Chevron. As Table 5
indicates, in Petroleum Refiners delegations Chevron is invoked 23.6% of the
time, while in Merrill-Watts delegations it is invoked somewhat more fre-
quently, in 30.9% of the cases.
We were quite surprised by these findings. There are some factors that the
Justices can plead in amelioration of this astounding inconsistency: the Court in
some Chevron-eligible cases did not apply Chevron because the majority believed the
agency's proposed rule or interpretation is merely a "litigating position" that no one
finds an acceptable basis for Chevron deference, 156 because the statute so clearly
156. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (declining Chevron deference
for a proposed agency regulation, but agreeing with Solicitor General amicus on most matters); Wis. Dep't of
Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (2002) (declining Chevron deference to HHS's proposed rule
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Table 5. Type of Delegation and Invocation of Chevron
Chevron Step 0
No Yes Total
Type of Delegation According Count 123 55 178
Delegation to Strict (Merrill-Watts) % Within Type of 69.1% 30.9% 100.0%
Approach Delegation
% Within Chevron 64.4% 72.4% 66.7%
Step 0
% of Total 46.1% 20.6% 66.7%
Delegation According Count 68 21 89
to Lenient (Petroleum % Within Type of 76.4% 23.6% 100.0%
Refiners) Approach Delegation
% Within Chevron 35.6% 27.6% 33.3%
Step 0
% of Total 25.5% 7.9% 33.3%
Total Count 191 76 267
% Within Type of 71.5% 28.5% 100.0%
Delegation
% Within Chevron 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Step 0
% of Total 71.5% 28.5% 100.0%
supported the agency that invoking a deference regime was unnecessary, 57 or be-
cause the Justice authoring the opinion for the Court chose to apply another deference
regime, such as Seminole Rock or Beth Israel.
158
We subjected the last plea in mitigation to examination under the lens of our
dataset. As Table 6 demonstrates, the Court applies a broad range of deference
regimes to cases where the agency claims to be operating under a congressional
delegation of lawmaking authority, broadly understood. Notably, in nearly as
many cases as it chooses to invoke Chevron (seventy-five cases), the Court
chooses not to invoke any deference regime at all (sixty-six cases), instead
deciding the case based upon ad hoc judicial reasoning. This deepens rather
and its manual); Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 340 (1999) (refusing
Chevron deference because agency had been so inconsistent over time).
157. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 765-66 (1999).
158. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 248 (2005) (deferring to
INS under foreign affairs super-deference approach, citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976));
Blumer, 534 U.S. at 473 (deferring to HHS under Skidmore rather than Chevron); Auciello Iron Works,
Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781 (1996) (deferring to NLRB under Beth Israel, even though Chevron would
have been appropriate as well).
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than ameliorates our sense of surprise.
As Table 6 shows, the Court also applied the Chevron framework nine times
when there was no congressional delegation of lawmaking authority under
either the Merrill-Watts convention or the Petroleum Refiners presumption; this
represents 10.7% of all the Chevron cases in our study. Most, if not all, of these
cases are misapplications of Chevron even under the Mead formulation.' 59 For
example, Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc. found the Justices Chevron-deferring
to an agency's interpretation of another agency's regulations. 60 In Presley v.
Etowah County Commission, a clearer mistake under Mead, the Court applied
the Chevron framework to the Department of Justice's interpretation of the
Voting Rights Act, even though the statute gives the Department no lawmaking
authority and the Department's interpretation was essentially just an advisory
opinion to the Court.'
6 1
Given that Mead clarified the standard for when Chevron is applicable, one
might have thought (though we did not) that the Court's practice would become
more consistent after Mead. This is not the case. In the pre-Mead period, the
Court invoked Chevron in 29.3% of the cases where there was congressional
delegation of lawmaking authority under either Merrill-Watts or Petroleum
Refiners. However, after the supposedly clarifying opinion in Mead, the Court
invoked Chevron in 23.1% of such cases, a significantly smaller percentage.
Furthermore, the post-Mead Court still applied Chevron to cases where there
was no congressional delegation of lawmaking authority under either formula.
Our data show this backwards result in 11.3% of the pre-Mead cases where
there was no congressional delegation of lawmaking authority- and 7.7% of the
post-Mead cases where there was no congressional delegation of lawmaking
authority.
In sum, disaggregating the cases into the pre-Mead and post-Mead periods
does not show an era of haphazard application of Chevron before Mead and an
era of application according to clearly delineated rules afterwards. Instead, it
shows haphazard application over a more than twenty-year period, with the
post-Mead era producing results exactly contrary to what the Mead decision
announced.
The data on congressional delegation can also be examined through the lens
of agency win rates, as we do in Table 7. Overall, the agency win rate for all
1014 cases was 68.8%. The win rate varies moderately depending on whether or
159. Please note that we did not code cases for Mead's dictum that there can be an "implicit"
lawmaking delegation to agencies. Even after re-reading Mead countless times, we were able to make
no more sense of its standard than was Justice Scalia, who accurately predicted that Mead would
produce chaos among lower court judges. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. 501 U.S. 680, 696-706 (1991). But see id. at 707-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court cannot invoke Chevron under these circumstances).
161. 502 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1992); see id. at 511-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (also applying strong
deference to the Department's interpretation). The Court followed Presley in Reno v. Bossier Parish
Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471,483 (1997).
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Table 7. A Comparison of Agency Win Rates
Overall 68.8%
Delegation of Lawmaking Authority 71.9%
Delegation According to Merrill-Watts 74.2%
Delegation Only According to Petroleum Refiners 67.4%
No Delegation 67.7%
Chevron Cases 76.2%
Chevron Cases with Congressional Delegation 78.7%
According to Merrill-Watts 81.5%
Only According to Petroleum Refiners 71.4%
Chevron Cases Without Congressional Delegation 55.6%
not there is a delegation of lawmaking authority and, if so, what type. The Court
upholds the agency interpretation more than the aggregate average (74.2% of
the time) when there has been Merrill-Watts delegation and slightly less than
average when there has just been Petroleum Refiners but not Merrill-Watts
delegation (67.4% of the time) or no delegation (67.7% of the time).
As noted above, the Chevron cases display a significantly higher win rate
(76.2%) than the overall win rate (68.8%). However, in those Chevron cases
where there has not been a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority, the
win rate is significantly lower than the average (55.6%). Thus, while the Court
may be willing to apply Chevron to cases where the agency has not been
delegated lawmaking authority, it does not appear as likely to let the agency win
those cases. Additionally, in those Chevron cases where there has been a
delegation of lawmaking authority, there is significant variation between those
cases with Merrill-Watts delegation (which win 81.5% of the time) and those
cases with only Petroleum Refiners delegation (which win 71.4% of the time).
Thus, a case where the Court applies Chevron when there has been just a
Petroleum Refiners delegation of lawmaking authority (which typically has no
connection with original congressional expectations) will fare not much better
than the average case in our 1014 case population, but a case where the Court
applies Chevron in the presence of Merrill-Watts delegation (which is much
more likely to reflect congressional expectations) will fare significantly better.
Thus, although the Court pays lip service to a broader understanding of delega-
tion of lawmaking authority in Mead, it appears that a formal, strict delegation
is associated with higher agency win rates in Chevron cases.
In sum, congressional delegation is not a solid predictor of when the Court
will invoke Chevron, but it is correlated with, and may influence, the agency's
chances of prevailing once Chevron has been invoked.
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2. Chevron and Agency Interpretations Involving Jurisdictional and
"Fundamental Policy" Issues
Justice Scalia maintains that Chevron deference fully applies to an agency
interpretation of its own jurisdiction or authority. 162 His main argument is that
there is "no discernible line between an agency's exceeding its authority and an
agency's exceeding authorized application of its authority."'16 3 In other words,
any test asking the Court to differentiate between when the agency is interpret-
ing its own jurisdiction or authority and when it is merely exercising delegated
lawmaking authority would be too difficult to administer; hence, Chevron
deference should apply to both contexts.
We are not so sure about that. Contrast wholesale and retail applications of a
statute. When an agency expands its regulations to a new category of applica-
tions, it is interpreting its own jurisdiction or regulatory authority; this is a
wholesale application of a statute. When the agency applies its regulations to a
matter of detail, it is not interpreting its own jurisdiction or regulatory authority;
this is a retail application of a statute. For an example from the Oregon
Aid-in-Dying Case, whether the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) gives the
Attorney General preemptive authority over the use of drugs for aid-in-dying is
a question about a wholesale application of a statute, while the issue of how the
Attorney General can regulate drugs over which he is known to have jurisdic-
tion is a question about the retail application of a statute.164 As a matter of
capacity, we believe that the Court is capable of distinguishing between whole-
sale and retail applications of a statute. Unlike Justice Scalia, we do not find this
to be outside the realm of judicial competence.
More importantly, Justice Scalia's position is in some tension with Mead's
holding that Chevron rests upon Congress's delegation of lawmaking authority
to the agency; in that event, one would expect the Court to take care that there
actually has been such a delegation.165 Reflecting this logic, there are in fact a
number of precedents where the Court has taken a non-deferential approach to
agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction or authority. For example, the
Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 166 ruled that Congress did
not delegate to the FDA statutory authority to regulate nicotine as a "drug" and
cigarettes as "drug delivery devices." 167 Even though the statutory text defined
162. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381-82 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment), responding to id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that no
deference should be afforded agency interpretations of "the scope of their jurisdiction").
163. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
164. Are some pain-ameliorating drugs prone to cause early death, such that they should be included
in the regulation? Or should they be regulated in a more subtle way? What penalties should be used
against doctors violating the Attorney General's directive?
165. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CAR-
Dozo L. REv. 989, 1006-17 (1999); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 31, at 909-11. But see Kevin M.
Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IowA L. Rav. 539, 594-95 (2005) (agreeing with the Scalia position).
166. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
167. Id. at 142-43.
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Table 8. Invocation of Chevron when an Agency Interpretation of Its Own
Jurisdiction and Regulatory Authority Is at Issue
Chevron Step 0
No Yes Total
Jurisdiction & Agency Jurisdiction of Count 889 64 953
Regulatory Regulatory Authority % Within Jurisdiction & 93.3% 6.7% 100.0%
Authority at Not at Issue Regulatory Authority at
Issue Issue
% Within Chevron Step 0 95.7% 75.3% 94.0%
% of Total 87.7% 6.3% 94.0%
At Issue Count 40 21 61
% Within Jurisdiction & 65.6% 34.4% 100.0%
Regulatory Authority at
Issue
% Within Chevron Step 0 4.3% 24.7% 6.0%
% of Total 3.9% 2.1% 6.0%
Total Count 929 85 1014
% Within Jurisdiction & 91.6% 8.4% 100.0%
Regulatory Authority at
Issue
% Within Chevron Step 0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 91.6% 8.4% 100.0%
"drug" broadly enough to include nicotine, the Court did not defer to the FDA's
assertion of jurisdiction over a broad new category of applications (that is, its
wholesale decision). 
168
Indeed, our data suggest that the Court may in fact be drawing such lines in
its Chevron jurisprudence. We identified sixty-one cases (including the Oregon
Aid-in-Dying Case and the FDA Tobacco Case) where the agency was interpret-
ing its own jurisdiction or authority, in the sense we suggest above. These are
broken down in Table 8.
The Court applied Chevron deference in only 34.4% of those cases. In the
other 65.6%, the Court applied another less stringent deference regime or no
deference Iregime at all; these are reported in Table 9.
On the other hand, the twenty-one cases in which the Court applied Chevron
to an agency interpretation of its own jurisdiction or regulatory authority
represent 25% of all of the cases in which the Court applied Chevron. This is a
sizeable chunk of the Court's Chevron jurisprudence. Thus, in the end, the
evidence is mixed as to whether an agency interpretation of its own jurisdiction
or regulatory authority is a matter for Chevron deference.
A related question (and one raised in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case) is
whether Chevron deference should apply when the agency is making a major
change in statutory policy. Although it is now an important moral and policy
issue at the national as well as state level, the aid-in-dying issue was not one
168. Id. at 159-60.
20081 1131
HeinOnline  -- 96 Geo. L.J. 1131 2007-2008
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 96:1083
3 1 T e e, e1 *Z










.!I j 0: * - e0 0 * e- *
I-0 "0* q C4e -i.o ui o .o ell ad 00





W) ;; a, 0 6
0 00 w 0 G0
0 u
00





HeinOnline  -- 96 Geo. L.J. 1132 2007-2008
2008] THE CoNTINuuM OF DEFERENCE 1133
Table 10. Continuity of Agency Position and Invocation of Chevron
Chevron Step 0
No Yes Total
Continuity of Longstanding and Count 295 60 355
Agency Fairly Stable % Within Continuity of 83.1% 16.9% 100.0%
Position Agency Position
% Within Chevron Step 0 31.8% 70.6% 35.0%
% of Total 29.1% 5.9% 35.0%
Evolving Count 41 2 43
% Within Continuity of 95.3% 4.7% 100.0%
Agency Position
% Within Chevron Step 0 4.4% 2.4% 4.2%
% of Total 4.0% .2% 4.2%
Recent Count 593 23 616
% Within Continuity of 96.3% 3.7% 100.0%
Agency Position
% Within Chevron Step 0 63.8% 27.1% 60.7%
% of Total 58.5% 2.3% 60.7%
Total Count 929 85 1014
% Within Continuity of 91.6% 8.4% 100.0%
Agency Position
% Within Chevron Step 0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 91.6% 8.4% 100.0%
Congress gave any thought to in 1970, when it adopted the CSA. The Oregon
majority felt that this was too big an issue to leave to administrative deci-
sionmaking without a clearer congressional delegation. "Congress ... does not
alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."'
' 69
We did not directly code for whether an agency interpretation altered funda-
mental details of a regulatory scheme, but we did code all agency interpretations
as either longstanding, recent, or evolving. We then broke down the category of
recent interpretations into those that arose because (1) the issue was new for the
agency; (2) there was a new administration; (3) the statute was new; (4) the
agency changed its mind based upon practical experience; and (5) the agency
developed the interpretation as a litigating position. The data, summarized in
Table 10, reveal that the overwhelming majority of the cases in which the Court
invokes Chevron (70.6%) involve a longstanding or fairly stable interpreta-
tion. 170 Indeed this category dwarfs applications of Chevron where the agency
169. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (Scalia, J.)). In Oregon, Justice Scalia responded that Congress made a clear
judgment that controlled substances cannot be used for harmful purposes, such as he considered
"assisted suicide" to be. Id. at 285-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. We took a practical view of what agency interpretations are "longstanding." We included
agency positions publicly taken contemporaneously with or soon after the enactment of the relevant
statute but by no means limited the category to such situations. Thus, we included current agency
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Table 11. New Agency Interpretations and Invocation of Chevron
Chevron Step 0
No Yes Total
If Agency Position New Issue for Agency Count 543 17 560
Is Recent, Why % Within if Agency 97.0% 3.0% 100.0%
Position Is Recent, Why
% Within Chevron Step 0 91.4% 73.9% 90.8%
% of Total 88.0% 2.8% 90.8%
New Administration Count 34 5 39
% Within if Agency 87.2% 12.8% 100.0%
Position Is Recent, Why
% Within Chevron Step 0 5.7% 21.7% 6.3%
% of Total 5.5% .8% 6.3%
New Statute Count 5 0 5
% Within if Agency 100.0% .0% 100.0%
Position Is Recent, Why
% Within Chevron Step 0 .8% .0% .8%
% of Total .8% .0% .8%
Practical Experience Count 10 1 11
% Within if Agency 90.9% 9.1% 100.0%
Position Is Recent, Why
% Within Chevron Step 0 1.7% 4.3% 1.8%
% of Total 1.6% .2% 1.8%
Litigating Position Count 2 0 2
% Within if Agency 100.0% .0% 100.0%
Position Is Recent, Why
% Within Chevron Step 0 .3% .0% .3%
% of Total .3% .0% .3%
Total Count 594 23 617
% Within if Agency 96.3% 3.7% 100.0%
Position Is Recent, Why
% Within Chevron Step 0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 96.3% 3.7% 100.0%
interpretation is recent (27.1%) or evolving (2.4%).
Note, however, that within those decisions that apply Chevron to a recent
agency interpretation, the overwhelming majority (73.9%) are interpretations
that are new because they represent new issues for the agency; the data are
summarized in Table 11. These seventeen cases represent 20.2% of all of the
cases where the court applies Chevron, which is not an insignificant number.
That is to say, when the Court chooses to apply Chevron to recent opinions, it
most frequently does so when those opinions are new issues for the agency.
Nevertheless, when reading these figures one should remember that Chevron
interpretations that no one in the case denied were consistent over time; federal prosecutors' interpreta-
tions of criminal statutes that had been advanced (successfully in most cases) in previous reported
cases; and even amicus brief positions that were supported by prior administrative guideposts, includ-
ing informal ones such as letters, publications, and the like.
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is only being applied in 84 of 1014 cases. 171 Thus, the overwhelming majority
of all cases-new, recent, or otherwise-do not receive deference under the
Chevron regime.
3. Chevron and Interpretive Methodology: The Use of Legislative History
In determining whether Congress had delegated lawmaking authority to the
Attorney General on the aid-in-dying issue, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Oregon Court considered the legislative history of the CSA, including commit-
tee reports that explained what Congress was up to. 172 The dissenters did not.
The different approaches in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case mirror a larger
debate in the Court over whether legislative history is applicable to the Chevron
inquiry. The Court's main critic of legislative history is Justice Scalia. Support-
ing Justice Scalia's approach, some of the leading Chevron opinions-including
one by Justice Kennedy-pointedly ignore relevant legislative history and
determine deference issues only by reference to statutory text and structure. 
173
If one examines the Court's overall practice, however, it is all but settled that
relevant legislative history is admissible in the Chevron inquiry. To begin with,
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in Chevron itself examined legislative
history to determine whether Congress had addressed the interpretive issue
resolved by the agency.1 74 The Court explicitly confirmed this practice after
Chevron. In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,175 the Court Chevron-
deferred to an agency interpretation that the federal pesticide law did not
preempt state law. In determining whether Congress had directly addressed this
question (Chevron Step 1), the Court examined the legislative history as well as
the statutory text. 176 Mortier is particularly illuminating, because Justice White's
opinion marshalling legislative history won over the votes of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, who had originally thought that the statutory
scheme "occupied the field" and therefore preempted state law.177 That case is
also significant because it saw Justice Scalia mount a full-scale assault on the
Court's reliance on legislative history-an assault that drew no support from
any other Justice.
17 8
171. Note that the Court actually applies the Chevron two-step in eighty-five cases. However, in one
of those cases the Court used Curtiss-Wright deference as the actual basis for its decision. Hence, we
use eighty-four as the baseline for the number of Chevron cases in our study.
172. See Oregon, 546 U.S. at 265-66.
173. Compare, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
delivering the judgment of the Court) (affirming two agency rules and abrogating a third, based upon
the statutory text), with id. at 300-09 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing
with Kennedy on two regulations, based upon detailed examination of legislative history).
174. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862--64 (1984).
175. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
176. Id. at 609-1 4 .
177. See Conference Notes for Mortier, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 6, Box 573, Folder 1.
178. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 616-23 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Ironically, Justice Scalia
joined Justice O'Connor's opinion in Brown & Williamson, where the Court's rejection of the FDA's
interpretation rested upon twenty-five pages of lavish attention to legislative history of various
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Table 12. Invocation of Chevron and the Use of Legislative History
Legislative History in Majority
Genuine
Some Positive
Reference in Reliance in
Analysis but Reasoning Source Is
Without That Helps "a" or "the"
Meaningful Bring Determining
Reliance To About the Factor in the
No Advance Result Reasoning
Reference Reasoning Reached Process Total
Chevron No Count 413 129 213 174 929
Step 0 % Within Chevron Step 0 44.5% 13.9% 22.9% 18.7% .100.0%
% Within Legislative 92.8% 89.6% 89.9% 92.6% 91.6%
History in Majority
% of Total 40.7% 12.7% 21.0% 17.2% 91.6%
Yes Count 32 15 24 14 85
% Within Chevron Step 0 37.6% 17.6% 28.2% 16.5% 100.0%
% Within Legislative 7.2% 10.4% 10.1% 7.4% 8.4%
History in Majority
% of Total 3.2% 1.5% 2.4% 1.4% 8.4%
Total Count 445 144 237 188 1014
% Within Chevron Step 0 43.9% 14.2% 23.4% 18.5% 100.0%
% Within Legislative 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
History in Majority
% of Total 43.9% 14.2% 23.4% 18.5% 100.0%
Our dataset supports Mortier's suggestion that legislative history is relevant
at any stage of the Chevron inquiry. In 62.3% of the cases that apply the
Chevron test, the Court provides at least some reference to legislative history. In
44.7% of the Chevron cases, there is either a genuine positive reliance on
legislative history, or it is a determining factor in the Court's reasoning process.
Moreover, as Table 12 demonstrates, the Court actually references legislative
history more often in Chevron cases than in non-Chevron cases (44.5% of
non-Chevron cases fail to mention legislative history while only 37.6% of
Chevron cases make this omission). Thus, there can no longer be serious debate
whether Supreme Court precedent instructs judges to consider relevant legisla-
tive history in applying Chevron deference. It does.
C. PREDICTING SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR
1. Predicting Deference Regime Invoked
To this point, we have discussed the deference regimes on the Court's own
tobacco-regulatory statutes. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 130-55 (2000)
(examining committee hearing testimony and colloquy, as well as committee reports, for tobacco-
regulatory statutes). Further, Justice Scalia has in some prominent Chevron cases cited and relied on
legislative history himself in arguing Step 1 issues. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys.
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 726-32 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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terms. That is, we have examined whether the factors laid out by the Court in its
own opinions accurately predict when particular deference regimes will be
invoked. Does the Court apply Chevron to cases where there has been congres-
sional delegation of lawmaking authority? Does the Court regularly invoke
Skidmore when an agency is interpreting its own regulations? And so on. The
data presented above demonstrate that the Court's actual deference practice
bears little resemblance to the orderly and predictable deference practice out-
lined by the Court's seminal opinions. The Court does not apply deference
regimes in a foreseeable manner, with the regime invoked tightly correlated to
the cues for invocation described by the Court. Rather, the Court invokes
deference regimes in a manner that is seemingly sporadic and haphazard. In
practice, deference regimes, as applied by the Court, do not capture nearly all of
the cases that they are supposed to and often times ensnare cases that ought to
be resolved by other deference tests.
Thus, in this subpart, we examine whether factors other than those laid out by
the Court might make more sense of the Court's deference practice. Is the
Court's deference practice actually being organized along lines not laid out in
the Court's opinions? In particular, we examine the influence of subject matter
on the deference regime invoked. Subject matter is certainly not the only
variable that could potentially drive the Court's choice of deference regime, but
it does possess certain features that make it well suited for analysis in this
context: (1) subject matter is easy to code objectively, meaning that our
categorizations reflect the manner in which the Justices themselves would have
seen the cases, (2) subject matter is not included as a trigger factor under any of
the Court's current deference regimes, meaning it presents a true alternative to
the doctrine that the Court ostensibly should be following, and (3) there are few
enough subject-matter groupings that most subject-matter subsets are of a size
large enough to draw inferences from (this is not the case with other variables,
such as the agency at issue, which result in numerous subgroups of cases with
fewer than five members).
We emphasize, however, that our conclusions are tentative, that they are
based on descriptive statistics and not predictive modeling, and that variables
other than subject matter may well be organizing the Court's deference practice.
Thus, further work in this area must certainly be done. Nonetheless, we offer
some interesting findings.
In order to investigate the influence of subject matter on deference regime
invoked, we grouped the cases into twenty-three general subject-matter areas.
Although many cases involved more than one subject area, for ease of analysis,
we identified cases only by the dominant subject area at issue. Thus, for
example, while there are more than ninety cases that touch on. foreign affairs
and national security, fewer than ten cases were coded under the foreign affairs
and national security subject area.
Assembled in Table 13, the data indicate that, regardless of subject area, ad
hoc judicial reasoning reigns. In eighteen of twenty-three subject areas, at least
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Table 13. Percentage of Cases Where No Deference Regime Is Invoked, by
Subject Area
<30% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% >70%
Entitlement Programs Criminal Law Business Regulation Federal Lands Bankruptcy
Foreign Affairs &
National Security* Energy Civil Rights Indian Affairs Federal Government
Housing* Environment Education* Maritime* Federal Procedure
Labor Relations Health & Safety* Intellectual Property
Transportation Immigration Pensions
Telecom* Tax
*Indicates subject area with fewer than ten cases.
the plurality of cases were disposed of by the Court without the invocation of a
deference regime. In twelve subject areas, the Court disposed of the majority of
all cases without invoking a deference regime.
What's more, in thirteen subject areas-bankruptcy, business regulation, civil
rights, criminal law, energy, federal procedure, federal lands, Indian affairs,
intellectual property, maritime, pensions, and tax-consultative deference was
the next most common means by which the Court disposed of cases. Hence, in
many subject areas, well over 75% of cases were disposed of through means
that did not involve the invocation of a named deference regime. For example,
in 52.5% of pensions (ERISA) cases the Court did not invoke a deference
regime, and in 32.5% the Court employed consultative deference, meaning that
87.5% of pensions cases were resolved without the aid of a named deference
test.
Indeed, a named deference regime was second to the failure to invoke a
deference regime in only three subject areas with more than ten cases. In these
areas-entitlement programs, environment, and labor relations-when the Court
chose to invoke a deference regime, it most often invoked Chevron, in 29.8%,
26.3%, and 21.3% of the cases respectively. Please recall that this does not
mean that Chevron will, or is even likely to, be invoked in cases falling under
these subject areas, for in each of them, the Court disposed of over 70% of the
cases without invocation of the Chevron two-step.
When one approaches the question in reverse-examining the subject-matter
makeup of cases under particular deference regimes rather than the deference
regimes invoked in cases falling under a particular subject matter-certain
illuminating facts emerge. These include the following:
e 18% of the cases where no deference regime is invoked are federal
procedure cases. This is the only subject area that makes up more than
10% of the no-deference category. It is also a logical finding given that
the Court should be expected to interpret federal procedural rules on its
own, rather than deferring to agency interpretations.
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or Anti- Consultative Skid. Beth Seminole Curiss-
Indirectly Deference Deference more Israel Chevron Rock Wright Total
Subject Bankruptcy Count







8 0 0 C
28.6% .0% .0% .0%
4.4% .0% .0% .0%
Business Count 47 1 18 2 4 11 0 0 83
Regulation % Within Subject 56.6% 1.2% 21.7% 2.4% 4.8% 13.3% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 8.6% 1.4% 10.0% 2.9% 8.2% 13.1% .0% .0% 8.2%
Defernce
Regime Invoked
Civil Rights Count 75 5 37 18 5 4 2 0 146
% Within Subject 51.4% 3.4% 25.3% 12.3% 3.4% 2.7% 1.4% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 13.8% 7.2% 20.6% 26.5% 10.2% 4.8% 18.2% .0% 14.4%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Criminal Count 51 37 14 5 5 1 1 0 114
Law % Within Subject 44.7% 32.5% 12.3% 4.4% 4.4% .9% .9% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 9.4% 53.6% 7.8% 7.4% 10.2% 1.2% 9.1% .0% 11.2%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Education Count 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
% Within Subject 50.0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within .2% .0% .0% 1.5% .0% .0% .0% .0% .2%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Energy Count 6 0 3 2 2 2 0 0 15
% Within Subject 40.0% .0% 20.0% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 1.1% .0% 1.7% 2.9% 4.1% 2.4% .0% .0% 1.5%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Entitlement Count 19 I 10 4 2 17 4 0 57
Programs % Within Subject 33.3% 1.8% 17.5% 7.0% 3.5% 29.8% 7.0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 3.5% 1.4% 5.6% 5.9% 4.1% 20.2% 36.4% .0% 5.6%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Environment Count 17 0 5 4 2 10 0 0 38
% Within Subject 44.7% .0% 13.2% 10.5% 5.3% 26.3% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 3.1% .0% 2.8% 5.9% 4.1% 11.9% .0% .0% 3.7%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Federal Count 52 6 4 2 1 3 0 2 70
Government % Within Subject 74.3% 8.6% 5.7% 2.9% 1.4% 4.3% .0% 2.9% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 9.6% 8.7% 2.2% 2.9% 2.0% 3.6% .0% 22.2% 6.9%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Federal Count 98 12 17 5 1 0 0 1 134
Procedure % Within Subject 73.1% 9.0% 12,7% 3.7% .7% .0% .0% .7% 100.0%
Matter
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or And- Consultative Skid- Beth Seminole Curtiss.
Indirectly Deference Deference more Israel Chevron Rock Wright Total
Foreign Count







3 0 0 0
500% .0% .0% 0%
1.7% .0% .0% .0%
16.7% 100.0%
11.1% .6%
Health & Count 4 0 I 0 0 4 1 0 1(Safety
% Within Subject 40.0% .0% 10.0% .0% .0% 40.0% 10.0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within .7% .0% .6% .0% .0% 4.8% 9.1% .0% 1.0%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Housing Count 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
% Within Subject .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 2.4% .0% .0% .2%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Immigration Count 13 4 2 2 4 1 0 5 31
% Within Subject 41.9% 12.9% 6.5% 6.5% 12.9% 3.2% .0% 16.1% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 2.4% 5.8% 1.1% 2.9% 8.2% 1.2% .0% 55.6% 3.1%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Indian Count 21 1 6 2 1 0 0 0 31
Affair % Within Subject 67.7% 3.2% 19.4% 6.5% 3.2% .0% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 3.9% 1.4% 3.3% 2.9% 2.0% .0% .0% 0% 3.1%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Intellectual Count 9 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 17
Property % Within Subject 52.9% .0% 41.2% 5.9% .0% 0% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 1.7% .0% 3.9% 1.5% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.7%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Labor Count 21 0 9 6 12 13 0 0 61
Relations % Within Subject 34.4% .0% 14.8% 9.8% 19.7% 21.3% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 3.9% .0% 5.0% 8.8% 24.5% 15.5% .0% .0% 6.0%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Maritime Count 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5
% Within Subject 60.0% .0% 40.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within .6% .0% 1.1% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .5%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Pensions Count 21 0 13 3 0 3 0 0 40
% Within Subject 52.5% .0% 32.5% 7.5% .0% 7.5% .0% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 3.9% .0% 7.2% 4.4% .0% 3.6% .0% 0% 3.9%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Tax Count 43 2 14 7 5 1 2 0 74
% Within Subject 58.1% 2.7% 18.9% 9.5% 6.8% 1.4% 2.7% .0% 100.0%
Matter
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or Anti- onsultative Skid. Beth Seminole Curtiss-
Indirectly Deference Deference more Israel Chevron Rock Wright Total
Transporta- Count 9 0 5 4 3 6 1 0 28
tion % Within Subject 32.1% .0% 17.9% 14.3% 10.7% 21.4% 3.6% .0% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 1.7% .0% 2.8% 5.9% 6.1% 7.1% 9.1% .0% 2.8%
Deference
Regime Invoked
Total Count 544 69 180 68 49 84 11 9 1014
% Within Subject 53.6% 6.8% 17.8% 6.7% 4.8% 8.3% 1.1% .9% 100.0%
Matter
% Within 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Deference
Regime Invoked
* Criminal cases and federal procedure cases are the largest subsets of
anti-deference cases, comprising 53.6% and 17.4% of those cases,
respectively. This is also unsurprising, because of the rule of lenity's
prominent role in both criminal law and the anti-deference regime.
* 20% of consultative deference cases and 26.5% of Skidmore cases are
civil rights cases. This is the only subject area that makes up more than
11% of the cases in these deference regimes.
* 24.5% of the Beth Israel cases are labor relations cases; this is the main
reason we named the residual category of Chevron-like deference cases
"Beth Israel," to reflect the primacy of labor cases in this category.
* About 60% of the Chevron cases fall into one of four subject areas:
business regulation (13.1%), entitlement programs (20.2%), environmen-
tal law (11.9%), and labor relations (15.5%).
Thus, in some cases, if the Court has invoked a particular deference regime,
our data offer a decent idea of what subject area that case might fall into. For
example, a Beth Israel case has about a 25% likelihood of having to do with
labor relations. Our data do not, however, offer guidance as to why named
deference regimes are applied to some cases and not others; the data do not
explain the decisionmaking process whereby very few cases get analyzed
through the lens of deference regimes while the overwhelming majority are
approached through ad hoc judicial reasoning. In the end, then, subject area
proves to be no more useful in predicting the deference regime the Court will
invoke than the oft-ignored factors the court lays out itself.
2. Predicting Agency Win Rates
In our analysis of the continuum of deference, we noted the win rates that
accompanied different deference regimes. Now we examine win rates in greater
depth, looking not only at the influence of the deference regime invoked, but
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No Deference Regime Invoked 66.0%







also at other variables-namely subject matter, the format of the agency interpre-
tation, and the ideology of the Justices on the Court. As with our analysis of the
impact of subject area on choice of deference regime, we do not claim that our
analysis in this section is exhaustive. There are certainly other variables at play
in determining agency win rates and certainly numerous complex interactions
exist both among the variables mentioned here and between these variables and
others that we do not explore. Still the analysis that we provide does offer some
indication of when agencies are likely to win at the Court, while also pointing
towards areas for potential future inquiry.
a. Influence of Deference Regime. The win rates for the various deference
regimes along the continuum of deference lay out in a rather predictable
manner. Unsurprisingly, and in line with its presumption against the agency
interpretation, the regime with the lowest win rate is anti-deference. This is the
only deference regime with a win rate lower than 50% and the only deference
regime with a win rate lower than the average win rate across deference
regimes. Indeed, every other deference regime produces win rates above the
average, indicating that, on the whole, invocation of a regime by the Court
bodes well for the agency.
There is, however, variation in the win rates produced by deference regimes.
On the high end of the spectrum, the rare invocation of either Seminole Rock
deference or Curtiss-Wright deference virtually assures the agency a legal
victory. Invocation of Skidmore, Beth Israel, Chevron, or consultative deference
offers more modest benefits, with win rates for all four deference regimes
hovering around 75% (still a pretty good record).
Further unpacking the data, the precise win rates of Skidmore, Beth Israel,
Chevron, and consultative deference prove to be illuminating. Justice Scalia's
concern about the Skidmore standard for weighing agency interpretations, which
1142 [Vol. 96:1083
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affords them "respect proportional to [their] power to persuade," is that it allows
more judicial discretion and permits less judicial deference to agency interpreta-
tions than the Chevron test. Our data indicate that this may be true, but only
marginally so. The agency win rate in Chevron cases (76.2%) is less than three
percentage points higher than the agency win rate in Skidmore cases (73.5%).
Both Skidmore and Chevron cases display a higher win rate than the agency
enjoys without deference-a result consistent with Kristin Hickman and Mat-
thew Krueger's study of agency win rates when courts of appeals apply
Skidmore.'79 Thus, based upon the data thus far assembled, Justice Scalia ought
to be less concerned that his colleagues are using Skidmore to impose their will
upon agencies-and more concerned that they (and he!) are applying Skidmore
and Chevron without any rhyme or reason.
Moreover, as noted above, many of the cases in which the Court utilized
consultative deference were Skidmore-eligible and differed only from Skidmore
cases in the Court's failure to invoke that case's name or its standard for
weighing evidence (hence the friendly appellation Skidmore-Lite). Interestingly,
though, the agency win rate for consultative deference was over seven percent-
age points greater than the win rate for Skidmore cases and over four percentage
points greater than the win rate for Chevron cases. The Skidmore-Lite cases, it
turns out, might have been better nicknamed Skidmore-Heavy. Indeed, the
Court's failure in consultative deference cases to explicitly state that it is
deferring to the agency, and failure to invoke any standard by which the agency
inputs on which it is relying are weighed, does not seem to have undermined its
ability to learn from the agency's submissions and side with the agency when
the legal materials do not strongly press the Justices toward a contrary construc-
tion.
There is a selection bias that contributes to the high agency win rate in
consultative deference cases. In most of those cases, the agency's interpretation
was presented in an amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General, often solicited
by the Court. We should expect higher agency win rates in those cases for three
reasons: the Court is signaling that it is uncertain and needs help, the agency
view comes only after the Solicitor General's lawyers have seen briefing and
decisions from the lower courts, and the Solicitor General can present the
agency's (or his) views as a neutral observer rather than as a party to the case.
The most important lesson of the consultative deference cases-and there are a
lot of them-is that the Supreme Court rewards agencies when they provide
179. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 32, at 1275-79 (finding an agency win rate of 60.4% among
courts of appeals decisions applying Skidmore-what the authors consider a higher-than-ordinary win
rate, but one lower than the agency win rate when courts of appeals apply Chevron). It is notable that
Hickman and Krueger's study of Skidmore win rates among courts of appeals judges is much lower
than our study of Skidmore's win rates at the Supreme Court level. In our view, the best explanation of
this variance is that the agency or the Solicitor General presented its full panoply of Skidmore reasoning
only at the Supreme Court level, with a much less impressive case-or none at all-at the court of
appeals level.
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useful information about the history of the statutory scheme, real-world facts
and context, and the consequences of different interpretations for the effectua-
tion of complicated congressional purposes.
Finally, note that the win rate for cases where no deference regime is invoked
is slightly less than the overall win rate, 66.0% as compared to 68.8%. This is
consistent with, but by no means proves, the notion that invocation of a
deference regime offers a certain boost to the agency. But it also confirms that
even when the Court is engaging in ad hoc judicial reasoning, which it does in
53.6% of all cases, the agency, on average, fairs very well. Indeed, it offers
strong support for the conclusion that even when it employs standard methods
of statutory interpretation, the Court is predisposed to find the agency in the
right, for the reasons suggested above.180
b. Influence of Subject Matter As with disaggregation by deference regime,
disaggregation by subject area reveals, first and foremost, that a bias towards
upholding agency interpretations prevails at the Supreme Court level. In none of
the twenty-three subject areas was the agency win rate below 50%. Indeed, it
was above 60% in twenty subject areas and above the average win rate of
68.8% in fourteen subject areas.
Still, there was wide variation in the win rates among subject areas. One way
to make sense of this variation is to think of win rates as a function of the
comparative institutional advantage of the Court vis-t-vis the relevant agencies
in particular subject areas. Table 16 groups the twenty-three individual subject areas
into six broader subject groups: foreign affairs and national security; technical or
economic regulations; procedural rules; socio-economic regulations; criminal law;
and federal governance. Across these groups, the Court's institutional competence is
not uniform. In the area of foreign affairs and national security, where interpretations
are often based upon sensitive political calculations, the Justices usually see them-
selves at an institutional disadvantage in comparison to the executive branch. Like-
wise for the field of technical and economic regulations, agency expertise leaves the
Justices less equipped to understand the issues than specialized agencies. In the area
of procedural rules, in contrast, the Justices know as much or almost as much as the
agency, usually the Solicitor General's Office, even when the issues are highly
technical. Still, it is only in the areas of socio-economic regulation, criminal law, and
federal govemance, where the issues are less likely to be highly technical and the
Justices see themselves as knowledgeable and friendly critics of agency interpreta-
tions, that the Court can claim a real (or perceived) institutional advantage.
To make this more concrete, contrast Gonzales v. Oregon,8 l which is exem-
plary of cases in the socio-economic regulations category, with a typical tax
treaty case, which is exemplary of cases in the technical or economic regula-
tions category. The issues in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case-determining the
180. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
181. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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Table 16. The Effect of Subject Area on Agency Win Rates 8 2
Specific Subject Area Win Rates
Agency Win Rate Less than Agency Win Rate Greater
Broad Subject the Overall Win Rate of than the Overall Win Rate of
Area Grouping 68.8% 68.8%
Foreign Affairs and Immigration (67.7%) Foreign Affairs and National
National Security Security (78.5%)
Technical or Environment (68.4%) Bankruptcy (75.0%)






Procedural Rules Federal Procedure (71.6%)
Socio-Economic Indian Affairs (51.6%) Entitlement Programs (71.9%)
Regulations Civil Rights (61.0%)
Labor (65.5%)
Criminal Law Criminal Law (62.3%)
Federal Federal Lands (50.0%)
Governance Federal Government (55.7%)
extent of the statutory delegation, applying the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) to aid-in-dying, and contemplating the federalism and individual rights
implications of preemption-involve moral and political considerations about
which the Justices know (or think they know) just as much or almost as much as
the Attorney General and about which they believe they have little to learn from
his Directive and the underlying memoranda. 183 In contrast, the issues in an
international tax treaty case-the meaning of textual provisions negotiated with
countries having a different legal tradition from ours, the context in which the
treaty was negotiated, -and the foreign affairs and commercial consequences of
different interpretations-involve difficult technical, economic, and political
judgments about which the Justices do not know nearly as much as the State
182. Table 16 excludes subject areas where there were fewer than ten cases because the small
sample size skews the results. Also, in order to present a more accurate picture of the Court's practice,
Table 16 presents the win rate for all ninety-three cases where foreign affairs and national security were
at issue, instead of the win rate for only those six cases where foreign affairs and national security was
the dominant subject area.
183. The typical federal jurisdiction issue, to take something from the intermediate category,
likewise involves legal, institutional, and practical considerations about which the Justices often do
have strong opinions, know as much as the Solicitor General, and believe they have little to learn from
his submissions.
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Department and the Solicitor General and about which they believe they have a
lot to learn from the executive branch submissions.
A complementary way of thinking about our findings in Table 16 focuses on
the role of statutory values and the relative intensity of (judicial) preferences to
explain different agency success rates. In the area of technical and economic
regulations, the congressional goal is usually instrumental efficiency, and the
role of the agency is to implement technical commands in a way that advances
Congress's economic or national-security purposes. Pension and tax law, environ-
mental law, and intellectual property law all have this feature. Given their
training, aptitude, and institutional constraints, the Justices not only feel they
have little to add to this normative enterprise, but whatever views they have on
the merits are not intensely held. Although critics often claim that agencies
pursue misguided policies that undermine statutory goals, it is hard for the
Justices to figure out who is right about that-and most of them do not have
strong feelings one way or the other about these policy debates. Chevron itself,
which involved a judgment call regarding the Clean Air Act's trade-off between
air quality and reasonable cost, boiled down to precisely this normative vacuum:
Justices voted without regard to their political preferences, which were thinly impli-
cated in the case, if at all, and were open to the EPA's arguments and judgment.
184
In contrast, socio-economic regulations, criminal law, and federal governance
laws tend to involve statutes whose congressional goal is substantially non-
instrumental or is instrumental in a broader socio-political way. Thus, the CSA,
at issue in Oregon, embodied values that are both punitive (non-instrumental)
and cultural-political (cleanse the community of polluting drugs). As applied to
the Oregon Death-with-Dignity Law, the CSA also raised moral questions about
aid-in-dying and political philosophy questions about the allocation of decision-
making authority in our federalism. These are not only questions about which
the Court has less to learn from the Attorney General but also ones about which
the Justices' own preferences are quite intense or strongly held. The Ashcroft
Directive and its supporting memoranda failed to demonstrate a comparative
institutional advantage in grappling with these moral and political issues, but
even a better-reasoned Directive would not have generated much deference
within the Supreme Court.
In short, our hypothesis is that the Court is more likely to side with the
agency in areas where the Court has a real (or perceived) institutional disadvan-
184. Evidence for this abounds in Justice Blackmun's Notes for the Chevron Conference. Blackmun
Papers, supra note 6, Box 397, Folder 7. The Conference vote was 4-3 to reverse the D.C. Circuit and
uphold the EPA. Justice Blackmun's Notes place little question marks by the "reverse" votes of Justices
White, Powell, and Stevens, indicating that their votes were tentative at best. "When I am so confused,
I go with the agency," Justice Stevens confessed. Justice O'Connor voted to affirm the D.C. Circuit but
candidly indicated that she found the bubble concept very attractive, especially in light of the
"suffering" of private industries. After Justice O'Connor recused herself, Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Brennan-the most unlikely ideological bedfellows-changed their minds and joined Justice
Stevens's opinion allowing the bubble concept. It is impossible to imagine this level of honest
disagreement, tentativeness, and vote-changing in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case.
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tage and where Justices do not have strongly held views, while the Court is
more likely to overturn the agency in areas where the Court has a real (or perceived)
institutional advantage and where the views of the Justices are particularly strong. Our
data do not prove the validity of this hypothesis but are generally consistent with it,
with some exceptions (for example, the win rate for entitlement programs is above
average). On the whole, though, the hypothesis fits the data well enough to indicate
that comparative institutional competence and intensity of the Court's opinions are at
least somewhat predictive of agency win rates.
c. Influence of Open Process. Agency interpretations reached through an open
process with input from public would, we hypothesized, possess greater legiti-
macy than those developed without public input and, therefore, might be more
frequently upheld by the Court. Our data unsettle this assumption. Almost
one-third of the agency interpretations in our sample (29.1%) were created
through an official, open process with input from the public, through either
informal (usually notice-and-comment) legislative rulemaking (21.5%) or for-
mal adjudication (7.7%). As Table 17 indicates, although legislative rules
enjoyed an above average win rate of 72.5%, formal adjudications won at the
rate of 65.4%, which is below the average win rate of 68.8% and also the
informal interpretation win rate of 68.1%.
We offer three possible explanations for the markedly higher win rates for
agency interpretations embodied in rulemaking as opposed to adjudications.
First, we suspect that an agency following notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures, pursuant to congressional authorization, might produce legal direc-
tives that are perceived of as relatively more legitimate than the typically ad hoc
directives issued in administrative adjudications.1 85 Adjudications may lose a
process point or two because they do not reflect wide public input. Second,
there may be a selection effect at work. Because legislative rules tend to affect
more people than adjudicatory directives, there might be more institutional
resources to fight agency interpretations, even solidly based ones, all the way to
the Supreme Court. Thus, legislative rules that reach the Court might be
relatively stronger than adjudicatory directives, as a legal matter. Finally, the
variation in win rates might be the product of the composition of cases. Almost
half of the formal adjudications reaching the Court come in labor cases (primar-
ily orders from the NLRB and the Federal Labor Relations Authority). As
detailed above, labor is an area where the Court feels that it has comparative
institutional competence vis-A-vis the agency, which might be driving the lower
agency win rates.
Yet even if these hypotheses hold, the win rates for informal interpretations
may still problematize the notion that higher win rates attach to agency interpre-
tations born of open processes. As Table 18, infra, indicates, informal agency
185. This argument is presented in HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMocRATic AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASON-
ING ABOUT THE ENDs OF POUCY 219-22 (2002).
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Table 17. Format of Agency Interpretation and Agency Win Rate
Decision with Respect to Agency
Case Decided
in Favor of Case Decided
Agency Against Agency Mixed
Interpretation Interpretation Decision Total
Format of Agency Legislative Rule Count 158 49 11 218
Interpretation (with Notice & % Within Format 72.5% 22.5% 5.0% 100.0%
Comment) or of Agency
Executive Order Interpretation




Formal Count 51 26 1 78
Adjudication % Within Format 65.4% 33.3% 1.3% 100.0%
of Agency
Interpretation




Informal Agency Count 489 205 24 718
Interpretation % Within Format 68.1% 28.6% 3.3% 100.0%
of Agency
Interpretation




Total Count 698 280 36 1014
% Within Format 68.8% 27.6% 3.6% 100.0%
of Agency
Interpretation




interpretations in the form of interpretive rules or guidances, agency manuals or
letters, or arguments in amicus briefs are all upheld at a rate higher than the
average agency win rate. What's more, the win rate for interpretive rules and
guidances and amicus briefs is actually higher than the win rate for legislative
rules. Indeed, it is only agency litigating positions, which suffer from the
appearance of having been made for the moment, that win at a rate less than the
average win rate. It follows, then, that there is not a tight fit between the process
by which an agency interpretation is created and the likelihood that that
interpretation will win.
d. Agency Consistency over Time. There is another process variable that plays
a significant role in predicting agency success: consistency in the agency
interpretation over time. Table 19 reports our data. The agency win rate for
longstanding and relatively stable interpretations is an impressive 73.2%. This
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Table 18. Informal Agency Interpretations and Agency Win Rate
Decision with Respect to Agency
Case Decided Case Decided
in Favor of Against
Agency Agency Mixed
Interpretation Interpretation Decision Total
Format of Agency Litigating Position Count 204 108 11 323
Interpretation, if % Within Format of 63.2% 33.4% 3.4% 100.0%
Informal Interpretation, if
Informal
% Within Decision 41.0% 52.2% 45.8% 44.4%
with Respect to
Agency
Interpretive Rule/Guidance Count 38 13 1 52
% Within Format of 73.1% 25.0% 1.9% 100.0%
Interpretation, if
Informal
% Within Decision 7.6% 6.3% 4.2% 7.1%
with Respect to
Agency
Agency Manual or Letter Count 27 11 1 39
% Within Format of 69.2% 28.2% 2.6% 100.0%
Interpretation, if
Informal
% Within Decision 5.4% 5.3% 4.2% 5.4%
with Respect to
Agency
Agency or Solicitor Count 228 75 11 314
General Amicus Brief % Within Format of 72.6% 23.9% 3.5% 100.0%
Interpretation, if
Informal
% Within Decision 45.9% 36.2% 45.8% 43.1%
with Respect to
Agency
Total Count 497 207 24 728
% Within Format of 68.3% 28.4% 3.3% 100.0%
Interpretation, if
Informal
% Within Decision 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
with Respect to
Agency
is both higher than the average win rate of 68.8% and the win rates for recent
and evolving agency positions, 66.9% and 60.5%, respectively. Indeed, the
association between continuity and agency win rate displayed by the data-with
longstanding interpretations having the highest win rate, followed by recent
interpretations, followed by evolving interpretations-indicates that the Court
has a preference for supporting interpretations that are stable, and ideally, ones
that have been stable for some time. We also crosstabulated the consistency
criterion with the delegation one. When the agency's interpretation is Chevron-
eligible both because it is pursuant to a congressional lawmaking delegation and
because it is longstanding, the agency win rate is 81.1%, among the highest we
found. In contrast, the win rates for recent or evolving interpretations that were
made pursuant to a congressional lawmaking delegation are 64.2% and 57.7%,
respectively, both of which are less than the overall win rate of 68.8%. Thus, it
is fair to say that agency consistency yields an extra win-rate bump in cases that
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Table 19. Continuity of Agency Position and Agency Win Rate
Decision with Respect to Agency
Case Decided Case Decided
in Favor of Against
Agency Agency Mixed
Interpretation Interpretation Decision Total
Continuity of Longstanding Count 260 84 11 355
Agency and Fairly % Within Continuity of 73.2% 23.7% 3.1% 100.0%
Position Stable Agency Position
% Within Decision 37.2% 30.0% 30.6% 35.0%
with Respect to Agency
% of Total 25.6% 8.3% 1.1% 35.0%
Evolving Count 26 17 0 43
% Within Continuity of 60.5% 39.5% .0% 100.0%
Agency Position
% Within Decision 3.7% 6.1% .0% 4.2%
with Respect to Agency
% of Total 2.6% 1.7% .0% 4.2%
Recent Count 412 179 25 616
% Within Continuity of 66.9% 29.1% 4.1% 100.0%
Agency Position
% Within Decision 59.0% 63.9% 69.4% 60.7%
with Respect to Agency
% of Total 40.6% 17.7% 2.5% 60.7%
Total Count 698 280 36 1014
% Within Continuity of 68.8% 27.6% 3.6% 100.0%
Agency Position
% Within Decision 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
with Respect to Agency
% of Total 68.8% 27.6% 3.6% 100.0%
are Chevron-eligible.
The foregoing analysis stands the Chevron Revolution on its head. Chevron
famously ruled that the EPA's change in interpretation was not relevant in
judging the reasonableness of its interpretation, 186 and Justice Scalia has touted
agency flexibility to abandon prior interpretations as the chief legal feature of
the Chevron Revolution. 187 Indeed, agency consistency was a deference-
enhancing feature of the supposedly obsolete or subordinated Skidmore re-
gime.1 88 Yet we found agency consistency to be positively associated with win
rates not only in the cases where the Court accorded Skidmore or consultative
(Skidmore-Lite) deference, but also for the cases where the court invoked
Chevron deference. In fact, agency consistency was positively associated with
186. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 853-58, 863-66 (1984).
187. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247-50 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADnrm. L. REV. 995, 1000-01 (2005). Cf.
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 32, at 1286-88 (finding that courts of appeals applying Skidmore gave
less emphasis to consistent agency policy than the authors expected).
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win rates across all deference regimes.
The most obvious explanation for this arresting phenomenon is that agency
consistency has a number of virtues that Justice Scalia and many scholars have
under-appreciated. A consistent agency interpretation is one that is relatively
more likely to have generated private as well as public reliance, usually bears
the legitimacy of support across politically different administrations, and has the
practical advantage of knowability, as ambiguities get ironed out over time. Flip
the analysis and the virtues of longevity may be even more apparent. An agency
interpretation that departs from a previously established agency understanding
-is more likely to be arbitrary in several senses: compared with a longstanding
interpretation, a new construction is more likely to unsettle reliance interests, is
more likely to reflect a partisan political judgment not carefully moored to
carrying out Congress's statutory purposes, and is more likely to raise new
interpretive difficulties for regulated interests. These risks are illustrated by the
Ashcroft Directive overridden in Oregon. The Attorney General's novel interpre-
tation would have reversed a decade's worth of popular deliberation in Oregon,
which had rested on the assumption that the CSA did not bar death-with-
dignity; was a partisan and controversial political judgment; and opened up the
possibility of further expansions of criminal liability by the Attorney General.
To be sure, the Supreme Court deferred to the agency volte-face in Chevron,
but the new agency interpretation there had come only after notice-and-
comment rulemaking. The process contrast between Chevron and Oregon was
telling: in the former case, a political judgment had come only after a process
that was open to public participation and scrutiny, that considered comments
from a variety of perspectives, and that included agency responses to arguments
offered by the public. In Oregon, the Attorney General's failure to involve the
agency (HHS) charged with medical determinations under the CSA was a
further process defect that suggested the possibility of arbitrariness.
e. Statutory Plain Meaning. The Supreme Court in the period from Chevron
to Hamdan has emphasized text-based sources for statutory interpretation more
often than previous Courts. (Justices Scalia and Thomas rarely consult legisla-
tive history.) We thought that such a Court would generally, and perhaps
overwhelmingly, defer to agencies when the Justices failed to find a statutory
plain meaning. Justice Scalia's approach to agency deference all but demands
this: he would apply Chevron very broadly to allow agencies to set rules
according to their own conception of the best policy in cases where the statute
has no plain meaning. But even under Justice Stevens's approach, which
examines legislative history as well, we should expect that agencies would get
something of a statistical bounce if the Court finds no plain meaning.
The data provide no support for this hypothesis, however. In the 414 cases
where the Court found the statutory text at least somewhat ambiguous, the
agency prevailed 69.1% of the time-virtually the same as the agency win rate
of 68.7% when the Court found the statute had a plain meaning. The latter
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figure reflects the conventional wisdom that agencies and the Solicitor General
do a very impressive job of anticipating or influencing the Court's textual
analysis of regulatory statutes. The former figure probably means that other
factors-legislative history, precedent, and substantive canons-might trump an
agency interpretation even when the statutory text does not.
A deeper exploration of the Court's plain-meaning jurisprudence suggests a
more robust variable. Text-based interpretation assumes an audience: a term has
a plain meaning if, as Justice Scalia once put it, you can use it that way "at a
cocktail party without having people look at you funny.' 8 9 An implication of
cocktail-party textualism is that "plain" meaning is a social product, for it will
depend on what kind of crowd the Justices party with. If you announce at a
Catholic parish cocktail party that the Attorney General has just barred the use
of drugs for "assisted suicide" under his authority to regulate the use of listed
drugs in the "public interest," no one will look at you funny; some will shake
your hand or hug you. In contrast, such an announcement at an ACLU cocktail
party would bring funny looks, frowns, expressions of alarm, and suggestions
that the proper term is "death with dignity," not "assisted suicide."
The Justices' performance in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case is consistent
with this social (cocktail party) understanding of plain meaning. In his dissent,
Justice Scalia found a plain meaning that supported the Attorney General, a
conclusion the majority rejected in favor of its reading of the statute. The
willingness of the dissenters to find a plain meaning is a product of a normative
rather than a neutral analysis of the statutory text, and the same factor, norma-
tive baseline, best explains why the majority Justices did not find a plain
meaning. Thus, the rhetoric and intensity of the dissenting opinion suggest a
sympathy to the pro-life philosophy of many religious fundamentalists, who
believe that what they (and Justice Scalia's dissent) call "assisted suicide" is a
form of murder and is morally reprehensible. In contrast, the majority demon-
strated the same moderately pro-choice philosophy that the five Glucksberg
concurring Justices (who were five of the six in the Oregon majority) argued
for: there is no general constitutional "right to die," but Americans do have a
liberty interest in setting some parameters on the conditions of their own
deaths-what the Oregon statute calls "death with dignity." 19 The "assisted
suicide" viewpoint of the Oregon dissenters made it hard for them to see the
CSA text as anything other than a ban against doctors using drugs to murder
people. The "death with dignity" viewpoint of the majority made it hard for
them to believe that Congress in 1971 wanted the Attorney General to have the
189. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Note that Justice Kennedy, the author of Oregon, joined the Chief Justice's opinion for the
Court in Glucksberg, which rejected a right to die in very broad language. Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997). The other five Justices in the Oregon majority wrote concurring opinions open to
a constitutional right to die under certain circumstances. See id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
738 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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power to cut off an important state experiment in allowing the regulated use of
drugs to hasten an impending demise.
f Ideological Voting. The hypothesis suggested by our thought experiment
involving cocktail-party textualism is that the willingness of a Justice to find a
plain meaning that supports or rejects an agency interpretation is influenced by
the Justice's normative community and, for ideologically charged issues, is not
determined entirely by a neutral analysis of the statutory text.
To provide an initial test of this hypothesis, we coded the agency interpreta-
tion as "liberal" or "conservative" in each of the 1014 statutory cases between
Chevron and Hamdan.1 9' We then coded for whether the Court upheld or struck
down the interpretation in each case, and how each Justice voted in the case. We
used this information to calculate three agency-agreement rates for each of the
seventeen Justices who sat on the Court during this period. First, we calculated
an overall agreement rate, which indicated how often the judge voted in the
majority or concurred when an agency interpretation was upheld or voted in the
dissent when an agency interpretation was struck down. Second, we calculated
an agreement rate for liberal agency interpretations, which indicated how often
the judge voted in the majority or concurred when a liberal agency interpreta-
tion was upheld or voted in the dissent when a liberal agency interpretation was
struck down. Finally, we calculated an agreement rate for conservative agency
interpretations, which indicated how often the judge voted in the majority or
concurred when a conservative agency interpretation was upheld or voted in the
dissent when a conservative agency interpretation was struck down. Using the
appointing President as a metric for whether a judge was liberal or conserva-
tive, 19 2 we were then able to determine whether liberal judges were more likely
to agree with liberal agency interpretations than conservative judges, and vice
versa.
As Table 20 on the following page indicates, the norm across Justices is to
support the agency interpretation more often than not. The mean agency agree-
ment rate was 67.0% and the median rate was 68.6%, a figure nearly identical to
the overall agency win rate of 68.8%. Indeed, no Justice displayed an overall
agency agreement rate of less than 52.6%. That said, the Justices do exhibit
191. We followed conventional understandings of these terms. So "liberal" agency interpretations
would be those which favored victim claims in civil rights cases (except for affirmative action claims),
employee claims in labor and pension cases, taxpayer claims in tax cases, debtor claims in bankruptcy
cases, defendant claims in criminal cases, people seeking benefits in entitlement cases, Native Ameri-
can claims in Indian cases, immigrants' claims in immigration cases, and consumer or consumer-
protecting claims in business regulation, telecommunications, and transportation cases. "Conservative"
interpretations are usually the flip side of liberal interpretations.
192. We deviate from this rule only in the labeling of William Brennan who, although appointed by
Republican Dwight Eisenhower, was a known Democrat. One of us would be inclined also to deviate
for John Paul Stevens, a former plaintiffs' antitrust attorney elevated to the Court by President Ford
(and his respected Attorney General Edward Levi), in a rare appointment that was apparently based
solely on merit.
11532008],.
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Table 20. Agreement with Agency Interpretations, by Justice (Sorted from
Highest Agreement Rate to Lowest)
Agreement Agreement
Overall Agency Rate for Rate for
Justice Agreement Liberal Conservative
Justice & Tenure Ideology Rate Interpretations Interpretations
Warren Burger (1969-86) Conservative 81.3% 75.9% 87.0%
Byron White (1962-93) Liberal 74.0% 71.9% 76.3%
Lewis Powell (1971-87) Conservative 72.7% 73.4% 73.0%
Stephen Breyer (1994-) Liberal 72.0% 79.5% 64.9%
William Rehnquist
(1971-2006) Conservative 70.6% 59.4% 79.1%
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
(1993-) Liberal 69.5% 77.1% 61.9%
Anthony Kennedy (1987-) Conservative 69.3% 61.8% 74.0%
David Souter (1990-) Conservative 68.7% 75.6% 62.5%
Sandra Day O'Connor
(1982-2006) Conservative 68.6% 61.5% 73.7%
John Roberts* (2005-) Conservative 65.8% 55.6% 67.9%
Harry Blackrnun
(1970-94) Conservative 65.1% 80.6% 55.3%
Antonin Scalia (1986-) Conservative 64.5% 53.8% 71.6%
Samuel Alito* (2006-) Conservative 64.7% 75.0% 61.5%
Clarence Thomas (1990-) Conservative 63.1% 46.8% 75.8%
John Paul Stevens
(1975-) Conservative 60.9% 79.2% 49.6%
Thurgood Marshall
(1967-91) Liberal 55.6% 84.8% 38.8%
William Brennan
(1956-90) Liberal 52.6% 81.6% 36.7%
*Because Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were appointed to the Court shortly before the end
of the time frame for this study, their agreement rates should be interpreted with caution. Chief Justice
Roberts's agreement rates are based on the decisions from just thirty-eight cases, and Justice Alito's
agreement rates are based on decisions from a mere seventeen cases.
significant variation in their overall agency agreement rates. There is a spread of
nearly thirty percentage points between the most deferential Justice, Warren
Burger, who agreed with agency interpretations 81.3% of the time, and the least
deferential Justice, William Brennan, who did so only 52.6% of the time.
(Ironically, John Paul Stevens, the author of Chevron, is the third least deferen-
tial Justice, consistent with his general philosophy of strictly enforcing congres-
sional expectations and constitutional norms against agencies.)
When agreement rates are broken down by ideology, the variation between
Justices becomes greater. There is a spread of nearly forty percentage points
between Justice Thomas's liberal agreement rate of 46.8% (the lowest of all the
Justices) and Justice Marshall's liberal agreement rate of 84.8% (the highest).
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The spread in conservative agreement rates is even greater, ranging over fifty
percentage points from Justice Brennan's low of 36.7% to Chief Justice Burg-
er's high of 87.0%. (Note that Chief Justice Burger's agreement rate for
conservative interpretation is the highest agreement rate of any Justice in any
category-liberal, conservative, or overall.) Moreover, the disaggregation of
voting rates by ideology reveals dispositions against the agency for the first
time. Such anti-agency dispositions are found in Justice Thomas with respect to
liberal agency interpretations (which he agrees with only 46.8% of the time),
and with respect to conservative agency interpretations in Justices Stevens,
Marshall, and Brennan (which they agree to only 49.6%, 38.8%, and 36.7% of
the time, respectively).
Furthermore, calculation of the agreement rate differential for each Justice
(that is, the difference between each Justice's agreement rate for liberal interpre-
tations and for conservative interpretations) reveals that, for nearly all of the
Justices, voting on issues where agencies had staked out statutory interpreta-
tions is an ideological endeavor. The mean agreement-rate differential is 18.9
percentage points, and the median is 14.6 percentage points. Only two Justices
(White and Powell) had agreement rate differentials of less than 5%. The data
indicate that, across the board, the ideology of the agency interpretation matters
to Justices-and the way it matters depends on the political inclinations of the
Justice.
As Table 21 indicates, the direction of the agreement-rate differential matches
the ideology of the Justice in eleven of seventeen cases. In other words, liberal
Justices are overwhelmingly more likely to agree with liberal agency interpreta-
tions than with conservative agency interpretations, and conservative Justices
are overwhelmingly more likely to agree with conservative agency interpreta-
tions than with liberal agency interpretations. 193 The exceptions to this rule are
easily explained. On the above chart, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter
are labeled conservative because of their appointments by conservative Republi-
can Presidents Nixon, Ford, and George H. W. Bush, respectively. Yet none of
these three was as conservative as his appointing President, and each drifted
leftward as the Court as a whole became more conservative. For his part, Justice
Alito, the most recent George W. Bush appointee, is probably a political
conservative, and is likely displaying a bias towards liberal agency interpreta-
tions only because of the relatively tiny number of cases he heard (seventeen)
during the time frame of our study. We expect his agreement-rate differential to
tip towards the conservative side in the future. Finally, Justices White and
Powell possess very low agreement-rate differentials, 4.4% and 0.4%, respec-
193. Our findings here confirm and, we hope, deepen similar findings by previous legal scholars,
starting with Revesz, supra note 38, at 1719, 1743-47, who found strong evidence of ideological voting
by D.C. judges adjudicating challenges to EPA rules and other actions. See also Kerr, supra note 32, at
37-39 (finding significant evidence of ideological voting in Chevron cases among the courts of
appeals); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 832-47 (finding significant evidence of ideological voting
by Supreme Court Justices in Chevron cases decided between 1994 and 2005).
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Table 21. Agreement Rate Differential (From Highest to Lowest)
Agreement Rate Differentialt
(Liberal Rate-
Justice & Tenure Justice Ideology Conservative Rate)
Thurgood Marshall (1967-9 1) Liberal 46.0%
William Brennan (1956-90) Liberal 44.9%
John Paul Stevens (1975-) Conservative 29.6%
Clarence Thomas (1990-) Conservative (29.0%)
Harry Blackmun (1970-94) Conservative 25.3%
William Rehnquist (1971-2006) Conservative (19.7%)
Antonin Scalia (1986-) Conservative (17.8%)
Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1993-) Liberal 15.2%
Stephen Breyer (1994-) Liberal 14.6%
Samuel Alito* (2006-) Conservative 13.5%
David Souter (1990-) Conservative 13.1%
John Roberts* (2005-) Conservative (12.3%)
Anthony Kennedy (1987-) Conservative (12.2%)
Sandra Day O'Connor (1982-2006) Conservative (12.2%)
Warren Burger (1969-86) Conservative (11.1%)
Byron White (1962-93) Liberal (4.4%)
Lewis Powell (1971-87) Conservative 0.4%
*Due to the fact that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were appointed to the Court shortly
before the end of the time frame for this study, their agreement rates should be interpreted with caution.
Chief Justice Roberts's agreement rates are based on the decisions from just thirty-eight cases, and
Justice Alito's agreement rates are based on decisions from a mere seventeen cases.
tFigures in brackets indicate a negative differential; that is, that the Justice had a higher conservative
agreement rate.
tively. They are the outliers in a Court dominated by ideological voting.
Indeed, our data strongly suggest that ideology plays a powerful and perva-
sive role in shaping Supreme Court decisions with regard to agency statutory
interpretations. Perhaps the best indicator of whether the agency will win in any
given case is the ideological characterization of the agency interpretation and,
therefore the ability of that interpretation to persuade Justices of similar ideologi-
cal leanings on the Court.
Ill. NORMATIVE IssuEs: WHAT SHOULD BE THE SuPREME CouRT's APPROACH TO
AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF FEDERAL STATUTES?
The foregoing empirical analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
deference doctrine is complicated as a matter of theory and chaotic as a matter
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of practice. Both the doctrinal complexity and the chaotic application have
become more apparent after the Court's decision in Mead, which has generated
even more inconsistency and confusion among the lower courts.1 94 Perhaps
most of all, our study reveals that the Supreme Court itself is not settled as to
what is the correct approach to agency statutory interpretations. At one extreme,
Justice Scalia would unify the Court's deference jurisprudence around Chevron,
whose two-step framework would be applicable to all interpretations (except
litigating positions) that are ratified by an agency head. 195 At the other extreme,
Justice Breyer would unify the Court's deference jurisprudence around Skid-
more, with delegated lawmaking authority (the Chevron trigger) being another
deference "plus" for the agency.1 96 In the middle, Justices such as Stevens
(Hamdan), Kennedy (Oregon), and Souter (Mead) recognize Chevron as a
different regime than Skidmore, are comfortable with the doctrines' co-
existence, but apply both regimes unpredictably and episodically. All of these
Justices apply deference regimes with a discernible ideological slant.
In short, the Supreme Court's deference jurisprudence is a mess.
Should the Justices be concerned? Our intuition, from reading the opinions in
1014 cases and from knowing many of the Justices who authored them, is that
the Justices sense the messiness of this jurisprudence but (except for Justice
Scalia) are not deeply troubled by it. From their point of view, the Court's
inconsistent and confusing deference practice has not disabled the Court from
carrying out its primary goals, nor has it created any kind of governance crisis.
One normative judgment that can be drawn from our empirical analysis is that
the substantially ad hoc approach to agency deference the Court has followed is
workable for the Justices. Indeed, the abstract advantages of a more coherent
and consistently applied jurisprudence of deference may not be attainable
among the current collection of Justices (or perhaps among almost any nine
sophisticated jurists with different professional and ideological backgrounds).
To the extent the Court does follow an "approach," it is ad hoc: the amount of
deference the Justices afford an agency interpretation in a particular case
depends on several factors, including congressional delegation of lawmaking
authority, agency expertise and consistency, and perhaps other background
norms. Our empirical study suggests that, whatever approach the Court says it is
following, the Justices will tend to be ad hoc in their actual practice.
Set against the advantages of an ad hoc all-factors-considered approach is
194. On the water-muddying that has accompanied Mead, see Bressman, supra note 32, at 1445;
Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMN. L. REv. 771, 774-76
(2002); Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 347, 347 (2003).
195. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nat'l Cable
& Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1015 n. 10 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (Breyer, J.); Breyer, supra note 17, at 379-81; see also
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007) (Breyer, J.) (applying Chevron,
but also emphasizing agency expertise, the agency's longstanding interpretation, and likely congres-
sional reliance).
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Justice Scalia's argument that a bright-line, universal Chevron approach is
required by legal and constitutional authorities. Justices Stevens and Breyer
reject this argument and believe that the authorities are inconsistent with Justice
Scalia's approach. In section lI.A, we examine their debate with Justice Scalia
through the lens of the Constitution, our legal traditions, and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 197 These formal rule-of-law sources cut too strongly
against Justice Scalia's broad reading of Chevron for the Court to follow his
lead. These sources are more supportive of an ad hoc all-factors-considered
approach (which for convenience we might associate with Justice Breyer) but
are most consistent with a simpler version of the deference continuum that
preserves a key place for Chevron. 
198
Constitutional and legal sources may not be completely dispositive for at
least some judges and commentators, however. In section lI.B, we examine
more functional justifications that are relevant to the institutional-choice issues
involved in agency-deference regimes. In deciding, as a general matter, how
deferential courts should be toward agency statutory interpretations, one ought
to consider the effect of different regimes on the operation of the rule of law, the
utility of decisionmaking by the most competent institutions, and the overall
legitimacy of our government. While cutting in more than one direction, these
considerations support the normative suggestions set forth in section HI.C. Our
main suggestion is that the degree of deference the Supreme Court ought to
afford an agency interpretation of the statute it is applying ought to be driven by
three inquiries: (1) Is the agency interpretation consistent with larger public
norms, including constitutional values (Oregon)? (2) Is the agency interpreta-
tion pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority (Chevron!
Mead)? and (3) Is the agency applying special expertise, using its understanding
of the facts to carry out congressional purposes (Skidmore)?
We offer some intuitions as to how these variables play out doctrinally, and
how they ought to play out, but on the whole, we do not insist on a single
doctrinal structure required by our. analysis. How to translate these variables
into workable doctrine rests upon a judgment that neither we nor other scholars
can make with great confidence. It is a matter for the Court itself. If the Justices
are more concerned with providing lower courts with clear guidance, they ought
to use these variables to simplify and clarify the deference continuum: There
should only be three levels of deference, corresponding to Chevron (presump-
tive deference when an agency is acting pursuant to delegated lawmaking
authority), Skidmore (attention to agency factual materials and expert judg-
ment), and Oregon (anti-deference if agency interpretation is inconsistent with
broader norms). If the Justices are more concerned with articulating a deference
197. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000)).
198. Cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-
Standards, 54 ADamn. L. REV. 807 (2002) (criticizing Mead for adopting a standards approach that, ex
ante, does not provide sufficient guidance for lower courts and other actors).
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approach that reflects their own decisionmaking processes, they ought to use
these variables to deepen the approach Justice Breyer has been developing.
We are not optimistic that the Court will be able to deliberate successfully
about this calculus of institutional risk or to implement the result of its delibera-
tions. Justice Breyer's approach would then continue to be the best reflection of
how the Justices are actually responding to agency inputs in the larger range of
agency-interpretation cases. In that event, we also have modest process sugges-
tions the Justices ought to consider, even if they never reach closure as to the
precise signal they want to send lower courts, agencies, and the citizenry. Our
primary process recommendation is that the Court ought to seek other public-
regarding sources of expert input to supplement the Solicitor General's excel-
lent but sometimes biased presentations.
A. FORMALIST ANALYSIS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY RELEVANT
TO AGENCY DEFERENCE
Justice Scalia's interpretation of Chevron is that its two-step deferential
regime ought to govern any statutory interpretation accepted by the commission
or officer heading an agency charged with implementing a federal statute.
Although Justice Scalia would not defer to litigating positions, he would defer
to agency manuals, letters, informal opinions, -and amicus briefs, as well as rules
and adjudicated orders, so long as they represented the agency head's public and
official understanding of the statute. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia has not
offered a complete defense of this broad understanding of Chevron.' 99
Justice Breyer and numerous commentators have argued that such an expan-
sive reading of Chevron would be a sharp departure from our constitutional
traditions and from the longstanding practice of Congress and the Court. 2°° The
"judicial Power" vested with the Supreme Court in Article III entails the
authority to declare the law in cases or controversies brought to the Court. The
Framers of the Constitution, including both the drafters at Philadelphia and the
ratifying delegates in the state conventions, expected federal judges to enforce
statutes according to their independent judgment based upon standard, canons of
statutory construction. As Publius put it in Federalist 78, "[t]he interpretation of
the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.",20 1 Within the
original understanding, the "judicial Power" was to announce what a statute
199. The closest Scalia has come has been his dissenting opinion in Mead, 533 U.S. at 239-61. For
institutional defenses of an even stronger reading of Chevron, see ADRIAN VERmEuLE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINrY: INsTTrrnONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATnON 183-229 (2006); David B. Spence &
Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 138-41 (2000).
200. Breyer, supra note 17, at 379 ("If taken literally, the Court's language [in Chevron] suggests a
greater abdication of judicial responsibility than seems wise ...."); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 452, 499-526
(1989) (criticizing a strong version of Chevron as contrary to original constitutional concerns about
excessive delegation and alienation of policymaking from We the People's elected representatives); id.
at 472-74 (contrary to the APA as well).
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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means, not to acquiesce in an agency's interpretation of the law unless it is
foreclosed by the statute.2" 2 As most famously illustrated in Marbury v. Madi-
son, the Court's authority to say "what the law is" also entails an authority to
203 Mroverride the executive. (As Marbury also illustrates, that authority has been
deployed very cautiously by the least dangerous branch.204 )
Supporting Justice Scalia's approach, Cass Sunstein argues that the New Deal
took this country "beyond Marbury" by effectively recognizing a new principle:
"It is emphatically the province of the executive department to say what the law
is. '' 2° 5 Unfortunately, Sunstein presents little in the way of normative justifica-
tion for this position, which is not even consistent with the New Deal's
experience. The New Deal Congress rejected extreme proposals that would
have marginalized judges and denied -them their Marbury role of independent
judgment in statutory interpretation. °6 Instead, in 1946 Congress and President
Truman enacted the APA.2 ° 7 Section 706 of the APA provides that "the review-
ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law" and shall "interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions. The APA requires the court to overturn
agency actions, findings, and conclusions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'20 9 And the court
must overturn agency actions "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right., 210 These operative provisions follow the
traditional Marbury model. Nowhere does the APA suggest that courts are
required to defer to agency interpretations of law. If Chevron is a revolution, it
is one seeking to overturn the APA as well as almost two centuries of constitu-
tional understandings.
Has the New Deal made no constitutional difference? Or did the APA nullify
202. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power"
in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001); John Manning, Textualism and
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2001).
203. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see generally Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as
the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 481 (2004).
204. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (holding that although Secretary of State acted lawlessly, the
Court lacked jurisdiction to issue mandamus against him); Mark Graber, Establishing Judicial Review?
Schooner Peggy and the Early Marshall Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 221, 233-36 (1998).
205. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE
L.J. 2580, 2589, 2594-95, 2610 (2006) (relying on Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, S. Rep. No. 77-8, at 90-91 (1941)).
206. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2081
(1990); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REv. 421, 468
(1987) (arguing that post-New Deal evidence strengthens the conclusion that "Congress favors a
relatively aggressive judicial role" in reviewing agency actions for consistency with law).
207. See John Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REv. 113, 193-99
(1998) (providing the most comprehensive demonstration that a broad understanding of Chevron is
inconsistent with the original expectations of, as well as the plain meaning and structure of, the APA).
208. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
209. Id. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added).
210. Id. § 706(2)(C); see generally Duffy, supra note 207, at 193-94; Farina, supra note 200, at
472-74.
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any New Deal revolution? No, and no. Soon after the APA's adoption, Louis
Jaffe explained how the modem administrative state fit into the traditional
framework, while at the same time altering it subtly.2 1' Consistent with Mar-
bury and APA section 706, the Supreme Court remains the expositor of what the
law is, but when interpreting vague or ambiguous regulatory statutes, the Court
ought to be open to agency inputs. Sometimes the statute will be relatively clear
to judges, but at other times statutory vagueness will suggest a range of possible
meanings, and the Court should be open to the agency's expert interpretation if
it were within that range.212 This sounds like Skidmore, a decision of the New
Deal Court. But Jaffe also believed that the New Deal had regularized a
different kind of agency role. In many statutes, Congress has not only enacted
binding law, but has, consistent with the APA, delegated to agencies the
authority to create binding "law," usually through formal adjudications and
legislative rules. Under those circumstances, Jaffe suggested that the role of the
Court ought to be more like the deferential judicial review that the Court has
applied to social and economic legislation.213 Likewise, when reviewing agency
lawmaking, the Court should give the agency's rule the benefit of the doubt and
overturn it only if it is unreasonable, in light of the statutory text and pur-
poses."' 4 This sounds a lot like Chevron (or Batterton v. Francis,21 5 decided
seven years before Chevron).
Jaffe did not work out the details of the foregoing insights, but they suggest
the constitutional basis for the Chevron-Skidmore dichotomy that more recent
scholars have advocated. 16 Consistent with Article III and with Marbury, the
Court has the authority but not the duty to consider agency inputs when it
decides what the law means, especially when the statute is open-textured or
Congress did not anticipate the precise legal issue (Skidmore). Consistent with
Article I and not inconsistent with Article III and Marbury, Congress has broad
power to delegate lawmaking authority to agencies.21 7 In those cases, the role of
the courts is more limited (Chevron and Batterton).218 "Where an agency acts
pursuant to delegated legislative authority, the task of interpretation is merely to
define the boundaries" of what Peter Strauss calls the "zone of indeterminacy"
within which Congress has authorized the agency to act.2 19
This is hardly an unimportant role for courts, as illustrated by the Oregon
211. Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REV. 239, 249-57 (1955).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 263-64.
215. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
216. See, e.g., Administrative Conference of the United States, supra note 22; Monaghan, supra note
22, at 26.
217. See Merrill, supra note 22, 2171-75.
218. Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
219. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under
Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 199 (1992) (first quotation in text); Peter Strauss, One Hundred
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Aid-in-Dying Case. If Congress has Article I power to delegate lawmaking
authority to agencies and has not curtailed judicial review, judges ought to
police agency "law" to make sure that it does not exceed the lawmaking
authority Congress conferred upon the agency. In Oregon, Justice Kennedy was
right to reject the Attorney General's ambitious effort to attach his authority-
expanding Directive to an earlier procedural rule and was also right to carefully
scrutinize the Attorney General's claim that Congress had delegated him lawmak-
ing discretion to regulate state medical practices generally. Even if the Oregon
Court had decided that the Attorney General was acting within the congres-
sional delegation, the judicial role would not have ended. The Court would then
have had to determine that the Ashcroft Directive does not contradict statutory
rules Congress has clearly established and is "reasonable" in light of congres-
sional purposes (the catch-all but easy-to-pass criterion for judicial review of
legislation generally).
Thus understood, Chevron is evolution, not revolution, and Skidmore of
course survives. Justice Scalia and some of his academic allies seem to believe
that statutory ambiguity alone can represent an affirmative congressional delega-
tion triggering Chevron deference.22 ° Such a belief would indeed be revolution-
ary, but in the sense that an old regime is too quickly tossed aside and, with it,
some of our nation's most valuable constitutional traditions. Article I's Vesting
Clause grants "all legislative Powers" to Congress.22' The Bicameralism and
Presentment Clauses of Article I create a process by which the "legislative
Power[]" is only exercised when there is a relative political consensus, with
inputs from the House, whose members represent small districts and are up for
re-election every two years; the Senate, whose members represent entire states
and are up for re-election every six years; and the nationally elected and
term-limited President.222 The point of Article I's structure is that "legislative"
rules, those altering basic allocations of rights and duties and supplanting state
law, should be difficult to accomplish.223 Such a constitutional policy allows
Congress to delegate lawmaking authority to other institutions; to maintain, as
Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review
ofAgency Action, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 1093, 1124 (1987) (second quotation).
220. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE
L.J. 511, 516; Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 269, 277 (1988); see also Louis JAwE, JuIcIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIoN 564-65 (1965) (originating this view, then concededly personal to the
author). Chevron said that Congress may be said to delegate lawmaking authority to the agency "[i]f
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill." 467 U.S at 843-44 (emphasis added). This
language contains more than its share of mysteries, but the Court has not read the language as broadly
as Justice Scalia would. The most natural reading of this language is that if Congress "explicitly"
delegates authority to an agency to fill in statutory gaps, that counts as authority to make law.
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
223. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1982); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a
Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1321, 1339, 1430-38 (2001); John Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 CoLtim. L. REv. 673 (1997).
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Justice Scalia does, that Congress delegates this power when it leaves ambigu-
ities in statutes would be stretching this constitutional policy well beyond a
breaking point. In short, the structure of Article I suggests that congressional
delegations of lawmaking authority ought to be explicit, not implicit. Such a
clear-statement rule is similar to those adopted by the Court to protect against
implicit invasions of executive, judicial, and state power by Congress.224
Even if delegations can be implicit, as Mead says (in dictum), they ought not
be established by showing that a statute is "ambiguous. ' '225 To illustrate,
Congress enacts ambiguous statutes all the time; the Sherman Act and Section
1983 are two notable examples. Other statutes, like Title VII, are pretty specific
but become ambiguous over time, as new issues arise. Judges construe those
statutes dynamically, usually with critical input from the Department of Justice
and other agencies. But that does not mean Congress has implicitly delegated
"legislative" authority to Article III judges; although the lines do blur as
circumstances change over time, dynamic statutory interpretation is different
from legislative updating. The same holds true for agencies.
As John Duffy has shown, Justice Scalia's broad reading of Chevron is also
inconsistent with the structure of the APA. Section 558(b) states: "A sanction
may not be imposed or a substantive rule or order issued except within
jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.",226 The purpose
of that provision was "to confine agencies to the jurisdiction and powers so
conferred" by Congress.227 Given this purpose, it would be anomalous to
interpret the APA to allow agencies to claim "implicit" delegations of lawmak-
ing authority.228 Indeed, the APA itself contains a clear-statement rule: another
statute should not be interpreted to supersede or modify the APA's requirements,
"except to the extent that it does so expressly."'229
In short, Articles I and III of the Constitution, as well as the APA, cut against
Justice Scalia's ambitious reading of Chevron. These sources of law differenti-
ate between judicial review of agency lawmaking and judicial interpretation in
light of agency inputs. They also support the Court's practice in cases like
Oregon and Hamdan. This is not the end of constitutional wisdom, however.
The Constitution also suggests other norms to guide federal courts when they
confront agency interpretations, including those that have been longstanding
ones.
First, Article II vests the "executive Power" with the President. 230 This
Executive Vesting Clause carries with it certain inherent powers, chiefly relating
224. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. Rv. 593, 619-30 (1992).
225. Herz, supra note 219, at 203-07.
226. 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (2000).
227. 92 CONG. REc. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter, House sponsor of APA).
228. See Duffy, supra note 207, at 198-99.
229. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000) (emphasis added); see Duffy, supra note 207, at 198 n.427.
230. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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to foreign affairs, treaty negotiation, and the armed forces, for which there is
textual support in Article 11.23 1 The structure of Article II suggests, therefore,
that the President ought to get deference when he interprets statutes relating to
his command of the armed forces, empowering him to act in foreign crises, and
implementing treaties that he has negotiated. But Article II must also be read in
connection with Article I, which accords Congress primacy in the regulation of
foreign affairs, the governance of the armed forces, and the ratification of
treaties. As the famous Steel Seizure Case held, when Congress has set forth
rules and procedures relating to matters of national security, armed forces, and
the like, the President is obliged to follow those directives.2 32
Concurring in the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Jackson provided a useful
framework for interpretive deference, as well as constitutional power. First, he
said that, in the arena of foreign affairs and national security (the domain of
Curtiss-Wright), Congress's delegations to the President can be implicit.233
Second, Justice Jackson defined a "zone of twilight" where the distribution of
executive and legislative power is "uncertain" and Congress has not authorized
presidential action; in the twilight zone, judges should be deferential to presiden-
tial interpretation even where there is no implicit delegation.234 Like presiden-
tial power, the validity of executive branch application depends on the
"imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law.",235 Third, deference even in the foreign affairs context has
limits. When the President interprets statutes or his authority contrary to the
"expressed or implied will of Congress," he must be rebuffed unless Article II
actually "disables" Congress from preempting executive authority.236
In Dames & Moore, the Court explicitly applied the Jackson framework to
evaluate President Reagan's executive agreement with Iran that created an
arbitral mechanism for resolving hundreds of lawsuits against Iran.2 37 The
Court first ruled that the President had thd authority to transfer frozen Iranian
assets back to Iran and to a fund for paying arbitral awards, pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Protection Act (IEEPA), which authorized
the President to "compel" or "prohibit" any "transfer[s]" with respect to transac-
tions or property "in which any foreign country has any interest. '238 The
executive agreement also "suspended" lawsuits against Iran then pending in
federal courts. The Supreme Court allowed the suspension even though it was
231. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces); U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (presidential authority to negotiate treaties); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (presidential
authority to "receive Ambassadors").
232. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-90 (1950) (Black, J.).
233. Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 635-36 n.2 (discussing and invoking Curtiss-
Wright).
234. Id. at 637.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 637-38.
237. 453 U.S. 654, 667-69 (1981).
238. Id. at 669-74 (relying on and quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. 12001).
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not authorized by IEEPA and even though it was in tension with the jurisdiction
conferred on federal courts pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA). 239 The Court maintained that Congress had "acquiesced" in the Presi-
dent's authority to settle American claims against foreign states, but all the
examples except one mentioned by the Court were pre-FSIA, and none involved
presidential suspension of pending lawsuits. 240 Because the FSIA Congress had
rejected any formal role for the executive in determining federal jurisdiction
over lawsuits against foreign states,2 41 it is not clear that the President had a
lawful suspension power.2 42 A possible basis for the Court's judgment is that
Congress did not address the suspension issue in the text of the FSIA, which
might then be liberally and deferentially interpreted to allow suspension of
lawsuits, pending resolution of American claims in the arbitral tribunal.24 3
Perhaps Dames & Moore illustrates Justice Jackson's zone of twilight, where
cases may be resolved by reference to the "imperatives of events and contempo-
rary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." If so, we consider
Dames & Moore the outer limit of the twilight zone, at the very least.
We do not find persuasive the argument recently made by Jack Goldsmith and
John Manning that Article II also includes a "Completion Power," that is, an
inherent authority for the President to "complete" projects Congress has started. 244
They ambitiously maintain that such an inherent power allows Chevron to apply
to many areas where there is no congressional delegation. 24 5 There is no
persuasive support for such a vaguely articulated power in the text or original
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (2000).
240. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679-84.
241. See Beverly Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979) (examining the law creating special
federal jurisdiction for lawsuits against "foreign states" and reporting that Congress rejected a proposal
that would have allowed the President to remove cases against foreign states from federal court). One
of us was involved in this case, contributing to the Brief for Intervenor-Respondent the Islamic
Republic, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (No. 80-2078).
242. That a treaty ratified by the Senate could have accomplished this amendment of the FSIA
provides further constitutional argument against Dames & Moore. The Supremacy Clause in Article VI
suggests that "treaties" not only trump state law, but also may amend previous federal statutes. U.S.
CoNsT. art. VI. Treaties are only those instruments ratified by the Senate, which suggests that executive
agreements (not ratified by the Senate) cannot modify previous federal statutes. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2,
cl. 2.
243. The Court claimed that the President's suspension order did not divest lower courts of FSIA
jurisdiction but merely created a new rule of law binding on the lower courts. Dames & Moore, 453
U.S. at 684-85. We find that an astounding claim, for it suggests that an executive order (not ratified by
the Senate) can modify a federal statute. More persuasive is the Court's further argument, that the
international tribunal was a more effective remedy for claimants, especially in light of the fact that
IEEPA gave the President authority to transfer all Iranian funds back to Iran, thereby rendering any
federal court judgment worthless. Id. at 686-87.
244. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280
(2006).
245. Id. at 2298-2301. It is not clear how the Completion Power would work in the Oregon
Aid-in-Dying Case. In a debate between Manning and one of the authors at the Yale Law School,
Manning declined to defend the Scalia dissent along Completion Power lines.
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meaning of the Constitution, nor in the Court's doctrine; indeed, the authors'
best citation for the Completion Power is Chief Justice Vinson's dissenting
opinion in the Steel Seizure Case,24 6 which the authors say is now the majority
view.247 That assertion is certainly incorrect as a matter of current Supreme
Court doctrine. For a contrary example, recall that the Court in Dames & Moore
explicitly followed the Jackson concurring opinion. The Court in Hamdan
explicitly followed the Steel Seizure majority. 248 More importantly, the Constitu-
tion's-text strongly undermines their argument. There is a Completion Power in
the Constitution, but it is Article I's Necessary and Proper Clause, which allows
Congress, not the President, broadened authority to adopt measures needed to
carry out national projects. 249 The framers apparently considered the "comple-
tion" issue and authorized it in Article I-at the same time they were instructing
the President to "take Care" that "the Laws" Congress has enacted will "be
faithfully executed., 250 The norm the framers had in mind, and that they
encoded in the constitutional text, is that of the Steel Seizure majority (and
decidedly not the dissenting) Justices: when Congress has legislated, the Presi-
dent's primary duty is to carry out Congress's project, not the one he would
have preferred.
Consider a second Constitution-based postulate. The Bill of Rights suggests
constitutional support for anti-deference in some cases. If the executive presses
a criminal statute too aggressively or bends other statutes in ways that raise free
speech (or other constitutional) concerns, the Court should not only withhold
deference, but also should be extra-cautious when it construes those statutes.
The rule of lenity is the most famous example. It is constitutionally inspired by
the notice and equal-treatment norms of the Fifth Amendment and by non-
delegation concerns-that Congress, not the courts or prosecutors, should make
the moral judgments that certain conduct is criminal.25' So the federal govern-
ment does not get the benefit of statutory ambiguity; in theory, ambiguous
criminal statutes are supposed to be interpreted in favor of defendants. Our
study shows some continuing influence of the rule of lenity; it played a role in
McNally, the Kentucky Kickback Case, among other cases.
In some agency-interpretation cases, the Court has ruled that the "avoidance
canon" (interpret ambiguous statutes to avoid "serious constitutional difficul-
246. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667 (1952).
247. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 244, at 2284-2301 (arguing for post-World War H ratifica-
tion of Chief Justice Vinson's dissenting opinion in Youngstown).
248. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006). Even the Solicitor General, defending
the President's unauthorized military commissions, did not rely on the Steel Seizure dissent, which
Goldsmith and Manning claim is now the prevailing approach. See Brief for Respondent, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184).
249. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 324 (1819).
250. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3 (emphasis added).
251. See e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes,
71 VA. L. REv. 189, 198-201 (1985); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994
Sup. CT. REV. 345, 345.
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ties") trumps Chevron. Thus, even when an agency has adopted orders or rules
pursuant to congressional delegation, the Court has sometimes ruled against the
agency under Chevron Step 1.252 The majority opinion in the Oregon Aid-in-
Dying Case considered this concern at Step 0. Under some circumstances, it
may be a denial of Fifth Amendment due process for the federal government to
prevent a dying person in great pain from obtaining drug therapies that will
speed the end of her or his life.253 Such sensitive constitutional conclusions
might require a clearer statement from Congress, not just the say-so of an
aggressive bureaucrat, or even the President himself.
Third, the Constitution's structure is grounded upon the principle of federal-
ism: states have general authority to regulate according to the diverse values
and judgments of their own citizens; the federal government can trump state
regulation, but only when required or allowed by the Constitution.254 The Court
has derived from this structure a number of canons requiring super-strong clear
statements from Congress before it will allow federal rules to supplant state law
or interfere with the operation of state government.255 Like the avoidance
canon, these constitutionally inspired clear-statement requirements might trump
deference to agencies.
Every Term, the Supreme Court must decide several cases asking whether
federal statutory schemes preempt state regulations, either explicitly (through
preemption provisions in the federal statutes) or implicitly (state regulations
interfere with federal statutory operation or goals). Like the Oregon Aid-in-
Dying Case, most of these preemption cases involve federal agency interpreta-
tions opposing, supporting, or imposing preemption. The Court has derived
from the structure of the Constitution a presumption against congressional
interference with the operation of state property, tort, contract, and other police
power regulatory law. Thus, "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it
will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance" by
depriving states of their traditional police powers.256 Within the Chevron re-
gime, this presumption suggests that the Court ought to be reluctant to conclude
252. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001),followed in
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988),followed in BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002).
253. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), analyzed supra note 190 (rejecting, in five
concurring opinions, a general constitutional "right to die," but also concluding that it was premature to
reject such claims under all circumstances); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990) (saying in dictum that the Due Process Clause protects people's right to refuse unwanted
life-saving medical services).
254. On the values of federalism, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-65 (1991); Clark,
supra note 223, at 1339.
255. For an early survey and analysis of these rules, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 224, at
619-29; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law
as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 102-04 (1994) (containing a list of such rules).
256. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); see also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
536 U.S. 355, 375-77 (2002) (applying this reasoning to state tort law); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1994) (state property law).
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that Congress has implicitly delegated to an unelected official the power to
preempt state law, precisely as the Court ruled in Oregon, and ought to interpret
explicit delegations strictly.257 Within the Skidmore regime, where more of the
cases fall, agency views will be most persuasive when they provide the Court
with factual information on the effects of state regulation on. the operation of
federal statutes. As Justice Thomas has opined, the Court has most often found
the agency input useful when the agency concluded that state regulation should
not be preempted.258
B. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS: AGENCY DEFERENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY,
AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
Analysis of the Constitution and the APA by two generations of scholars
lends some support to the analytical structure for deference that the Court
majority followed in Mead, Oregon, and Hamdan. This analysis strongly coun-
sels against expanding Chevron and abrogating Skidmore (Justice Scalia's
preferred regime), but it also counsels against absorbing Chevron into an
all-factors-considered regime (probably Justice Breyer's preferred regime). The
foregoing formal analysis does not, however, prevent Justice Breyer from
interpreting Chevron in a manner more consistent with his philosophy. In
Barnhart v. Walton, Justice Breyer gave Chevron deference to a legislative rule
adopted pursuant to a lawmaking delegation (sufficient under Mead), but then
went on to justify deference also on the grounds that the agency had greater
expertise and had consistently adhered to that interpretation for years before
encoding it in a rule.259 The latter considerations, of course, are those long-
associated with Skidmore rather than Chevron deference.
The legal and constitutional authorities suggest that Barnhart is the most
plausible competitor to the more sharply defined Chevron-Skidmore approach
the Court seemed to announce in Mead and Oregon. We shall pursue that
possibility in the discussion that follows. Our primary goal is to articulate the
kinds of functional concerns that ought to be relevant to an institutional choice
between Barnhart and Mead-Oregon, with some discussion of Justice Scalia's
257. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 273-75 (2006).
258. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 675-84 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, NOTE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
(supporting Justice Thomas's point empirically through analysis of 130 Supreme Court preemption
cases involving agency interpretations or rules, at Table 1) (on file with the author); see generally Nina
A. Mendelsohn, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MIcH. L. REv. 737 (2004). Tom Merrill is working on a
project which will devise default rules for deferring (or not) to agency preemption of state law. See
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008),
available at http:www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/constitutionallaw/Merrill.pdf.
259. 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (giving Chevron deference to recent Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) legislative rule, but also emphasizing that SSA's interpretation was "longstanding" and
reflected the agency's "expertise" and "careful consideration" over a period of time); see also Nat'l
Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (applying Chevron so long as the agency was not resolving "unusually basic legal
question[s]").
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universal Chevron approach, which might be justified on functional grounds
notwithstanding its legal and constitutional problems. To the extent that we can
draw conclusions from the functional considerations, we think they do support a
simplified deference continuum that differentiates between Chevron and Skid-
more deference.
1. The Functioning of a National Rule of Law
As we have argued above, standard applications of constitutional text, struc-
ture, and original intent support the Court's current approach, for the most part.
The APA cuts the same way. For these reasons alone, the "rule of law" supports
something like the status quo and argues against a regime where federal courts
abdicate their Marbury duty to say what the law is. Some scholars have made an
excellent functional argument for a broad understanding of Chevron based upon
the rule-of-law values of transparency, predictability, and stability.
Peter Strauss says that the Chevron regime "enhances the probability of
uniform national administration of the laws.,, 26 0 Thus, when an agency develops
a regime of rules to implement a statutory scheme, those rules have immediate
nationwide application, are likely to be coherent with one another, and are able
to address issues with greater clarity and precision than either Congress could
accomplish through legislation or the federal courts could accomplish through
lengthy case-by-case adjudication. 261 "The U.S. Code, patched together from
layers of legislative enactments that are often poorly integrated, frequently is
incomprehensible to anyone not an expert in the area," Tom Merrill has
added.262 In contrast, "the CFR, periodically revised by agencies under their
broad delegated authority with an eye to making the law more accessible and
improving voluntary compliance, is something that even non-lawyers can often
follow."
263
A Straussian rule-of-law argument provides a functional reason to read
Chevron both more narrowly and more broadly than the Court did in Mead. The
advantage of clear, coherent nationwide rules is particularly applicable when the
agency engages in rulemaking, with its product appearing in the Code of
Federal Regulations. Agency adjudications (including those to which Mead
gives Chevron deference) do not generate these kinds of advantages nearly as
often, while interpretive rules and guidances (which usually receive only Skid-
more deference or less) typically do. 2 4 In short, the best functional argument
for something like Chevron is that it channels agency articulation of policymak-
260. Strauss, supra note 219, at 1121.
261. Id. at 1121-29.
262. Merrill, supra note 22, at 2154.
263. Id.; accord Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (observing that Congress
cannot accomplish its regulatory objectives without the ability to delegate to agencies the job of
drafting the precise rules needed to implement statutory goals).
264. See Peter Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE L.J. 1463, 1478 (1992) (discussing
levels of deference given by courts to agency decisions and publication rules); see generally Todd D.
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ing into published rules that are easily available to the public. The same
argument would support a revised regime that accorded Chevron two-step
deference only to agency regulations published in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions or, less ambitiously, promulgated in a form readily available to the public.
Moreover, Justice Scalia's universal Chevron approach gets a boost from Strauss's
argument if it is willing to make a small concession: to receive Chevron
deference, the interpretation must be publicly promulgated by the agency head.
Either the Chevron-Mead or the universal Chevron (Scalia) regime faces a
problem under rule-of-law criteria, however. The law's horizontal predictability
that Strauss emphasizes (we are better able to say what the rules are at any
given time) may come at some expense to the law's vertical predictability (in
2008 we can predict what the rules will be in 2009).265 Chevron says that
agencies ought to be able to change their interpretations of laws they are
delegated authority to implement.266 This is potentially an important virtue of
the Chevron approach because it allows the law to evolve in response to
changed circumstances. From a rule-of-law perspective, however, it is also a
potential cost, because it allows agencies to shift interpretations every time
there is a new Administration.267 Justice Scalia reads Chevron's dictum to ratify
agency volte-faces simply in response to changes in political regimes,268 a
reading that would sharpen Chevron's conflict with the rule of law.
We found, moreover, that the Court has not followed this dictum aggres-
sively-neither in cases involving legislative rules entitled to Chevron defer-
ence nor in cases involving interpretive rules entitled to Skidmore deference. We
do not know exactly why the Court has been so reticent, but as a theoretical
matter the Court's practice can be supported by rule-of-law values. Longstand-
ing agency rules or interpretations are more likely to have generated private as
well as public reliance. Changing those rules or interpretations undermines
those specific reliance interests, which is a nontrivial rule-of-law cost of defer-
ence. (The cost may be justified of course, but the fact that this is a cost must be
considered.)
Indeed, very few of the cases that reached the Supreme Court between the
1983 and 2005 Terms (only 3.8%) involved the kind of ideologically-driven
shift in agency interpretations that we see in the Ashcroft Directive (Oregon) or
Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMN. L.
REv. 159 (2000).
265. The distinction between horizontal and vertical predictability is drawn from William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MicH. L. REv. 67, 116 (1988).
266. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 862-64 (1984).
267. The classic case is the NLRB, which jettisons its own adjudicative precedents right and left,
literally. See generally Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707 (2006) (documenting ideological voting on the Board as the reason driving
the Board's overruling and recycling its own precedents).
268. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1015-20
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for greater judicial tolerance of agency shifts in interpretation).
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the Military Commissions Executive Order (Hamdan).2 6 9 Instead, more than
96% of the cases involved either longstanding agency interpretations; new
issues forced upon the agency by evolving case law, unanticipated issues, and
new statutes or amendments to old ones; or changes in agency interpretations
because of new legal circumstances (such as new legislation or judicial rul-
ings).27° In the period we studied, we were more struck by the dramatic
examples where the Justices themselves sacrificed rule-of-law values and reli-
ance interests by overturning longstanding agency interpretations that had been
ratified by Congress, the lower courts, or both.27 1
The weight one places on reliance interests and other stability-in-the-law
considerations is going to be driven by context, and so this countervailing value
is hard to evaluate. What can be said is that this concern is another argument for
giving deference to notice-and-comment rulemaking. Rules are not only highly
public and knowable, but they also cannot be easily changed. To change a rule,
the agency must provide notice of proposed rulemaking to the public, consider
comments, reconsider its proposed rules in light of the public comments,
provide reasons for not following significant suggestions, and, finally, defend its
final rule if affected parties seek judicial review. 272 Although agencies claim,
with much justification, that the notice-and-comment process slows them down
considerably and makes needed changes too expensive, this process does serve
rule-of-law values: it ensures both public knowability and transparency of law,
while also providing greater assurance of law's relative stability and ordered
change. Contrast this process, the one followed by the agency in Chevron, with
the less law-like process followed by the Attorney General in Oregon, where the
agency's volte-face came out of the blue, with no recorded input from the public
or even the medical experts down the street in HHS.
2. Comparative Institutional Competence
Everybody has views about the relative competence of agencies and courts to
fill in the details of statutory schemes. Unfortunately, those views are in sharp
conflict as to the claims most relevant to the role that courts ought to play in
reviewing agency lawmaking and statutory interpretation. So we see confident
269. See supra Table 11 (reporting only 39 cases in our population of 1014 where an agency
interpretation was apparently driven by a change in presidential administrations).
270. See supra Tables 10 & 11 (reporting our breakdown of longstanding, evolving, and recent
agency interpretations, with a further breakdown of recent interpretations).
271. See, e.g., Cent. Bank v. First Nat'l.Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 192-99 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority overturns longstanding SEC interpretation of Securities Exchange Act
§ 10(b) that had been adopted by all the courts of appeals and approved by the relevant congressional
committees).
272. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (informal rulemaking); id. § 706(2)(a) ("arbitrary and capricious"
standard of judicial review); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42-43 (1983) (describing the requirements of § 706 review to include rational explanation normatively
connected with congressional purposes and factually grounded in the record before the agency; failure
to consider "an important aspect of the problem" can be arbitrary under § 706).
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assertions that agencies cannot be trusted because they are "captured" by the
interests they are supposed to be regulating 273 set against equally confident
counter-assertions that it is the judiciary that is more easily captured by special
interests.274 Some serious scholars admire judges as intelligent generalists
whose case-by-case approach is an intelligent check on agency misfires,27 5
while other equally serious scholars seem to consider judges little more than
bothersome functionaries who need to be kept on a short leash,2 76 and yet other
serious scholars suggest that federal judges are ideologues whose voting pat-
terns are more easily explained by their political biases than by their adherence
to statutes and precedent.277 Finally, eminent legal scholars maintain that even
uncaptured agencies would benefit from the knowledge that their decisions will
be monitored by reviewing judges, 278 while other equally eminent scholars
claim that judicial second-guessing will throw agencies off course.27 9
Unfortunately, no one has systematic data supporting her or his views, which
often amount to ill-informed impressions or even ideologically driven dogma.
We are most favorably impressed with the argument that, whatever the relative
competence of judges and agencies, second-guessing of agency results and new
procedural requirements imposed by courts produce unpredictable results and
often undermine the agency's ability to carry out the statutory scheme.28 °
Although institutional competence considerations loom as a less important
critical tool for us than it may be for other scholars, we credit the point that two
heads are often not as good as one when it comes to public administration.
Additionally, there are some modest propositions as to which there is at least
case-study support as well as substantial consensus in the literature. For ex-
273. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and
the Public Agenda, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 1039, 1064-67 (1997); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1685 (1975).
274. See, e.g., Spence & Cross, supra note 199, at 141-42.
275. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979); Stewart, supra note 273, at 1786.
276. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13
(1997) (denouncing the old common law method as obsolescent in the modem regulatory state);
VERMEULE, supra note 199, at 229.
277. See, e.g., James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OIno ST. L.J. 1675, 1689-91 (1999); Revesz, supra
note 38, at 1719. This literature, in turn, is contested. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, M, Judges, Ideology,
and Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons from a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53
ADMIN. L. REv. 45, 98-99 (2001).
278. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 520 (2002).
279. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation, 1 J.L. EON. & ORG. 85 (1985); R. Shep Melnick,
Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Rationality, 44 ADMN. L. REV. 245, 257 (1992).
280. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 242 (1990); Thomas
0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400-02
(1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review ofAgency Rules: How Federal
Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADmIN. L. REv. 7, 8 (1991). This
body of literature is grounded upon excellent case studies from several different fields.
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ample, no one seriously disputes the New Deal-era adage that agencies are
usually better informed than courts along several dimensions: they understand
the subject matter of their statutory scheme and the regulated industry with
greater depth, have better access to experts (such as scientists and economists)
who provide specialized information in response to targeted inquiries, and have
the kind of practical wisdom that comes from dealing with legal issues arising
day-to-day under the statute (or perhaps triggered by the agency's own propos-
als and experiments). To this we should add a further epistemic advantage that
we learned from our study, especially from reading hundreds of briefs filed by
the Solicitor General between 1983 and 2006: the agency usually knows the
legal history of the statute better than any other institution.28 Agency officials
frequently help draft the statute and are consulted during congressional hear-
ings, propose or resist subsequent amendments to the statute, and are involved
in or follow much litigation surrounding the statute. This is useful information
for citizens as well as judges trying to figure out "where the law is going" in a
particular area.
The agency's superior knowledge of the social, economic, and legal history
and context of the statute is a potentially powerful institutional advantage.
Whether the agency's epistemic superiority supports deference to its interpreta-
tions is contingent of course. It depends not only on the perception of agency
bias or neutrality, but also on the reviewing court's confidence in its own
knowledge. Thus, the Ashcroft Directive came to the Court burdened by
institutional red flags: the Directive and the supporting memorandum from the
Office of Legal Counsel revealed a superficial and slanted view of the extensive
medical literature on aid-in-dying and seemed driven by a partisan perspec-
tive.28 2 There was little to learn from the Directive and the memorandum, and
the Court gave them little weight on the Skidmore scale.
Consistent with the foregoing reasoning, our study found little evidence of
deference by the Supreme Court as to matters of federal jurisdiction and
procedure, where the Justices are just as much experts as (and probably more so
than) the executive and independent agencies. The Justices also know, or think
they know, a lot about statutory issues involving civil rights, federalism, and
substantive criminal law-areas where we found a mixed record of deference.
On the other hand, the Justices recognize that they know very little about the
intricacies of environmental science, energy regulation, intellectual property,
281. See, e.g., Brief for Federal Petitioners, at 37-43, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281
(1988) (No. 86-495) (setting forth the statutory and regulatory history of the import restrictions on
goods bearing a trademark owned by an American firm in an excellent Solicitor General brief drafted
by now-Dean Robert Rasmussen).
282. See Memorandum from Sheldon Bradshaw, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Attorney
Gen. (June 27, 2001), reprinted as App. E to Petition for Certiorari at 106a-148a, Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) (No. 04-0623) (surveying authorities distinguishing between legitimate medical
use of drugs and illegitimate use to "assist suicides," but without any mention of modern authorities in
medical ethics explaining the moral bases of the "death with dignity" movement and supporting
participation of doctors).
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pension regulation, and bankruptcy. As to these areas, we found the Justices
drawing heavily from materials the agencies gave them. Indeed, opinions for the
Court were often little more than reprints of the government briefs, even in
closely watched cases such as Geier, which involved federal preemption of state
tort liability for auto accidents.283
Although not addressed by the academic literature, we found examples where
the Court concluded (rightly as far as we can tell) that agencies have tremen-
dous advantages in dealing with regulatory uncertainty.2 84 The hardest issues of
statutory interpretation tend to be those Congress avoided or did not anticipate
when it enacted the statute. Applying the statute to new circumstances involves
several different kinds of uncertainty, including uncertainty as to legislative
expectations, uncertainty as to the social costs and benefits of different rules or
policy balances, uncertainty about the enforceability and feasibility of different
rules, and so forth. 85
Typically, agencies are much better equipped to handle issues of uncertainty
than courts are. This is true not only because agencies have superior information
and experience with the -statute, but also because they. have the regulatory
flexibility that courts generally lack.286 Agencies can conduct or commission
pilot studies before adopting a nationwide rule, can solicit public comments
directed at areas of uncertainty during notice-and-comment periods, and can
modify or revoke rules that do not work. Agencies making law primarily
through adjudication experiment in the ways that courts do, through trial and
error, but can approach case-by-case adjudication more systematically than
generalist courts are accustomed to doing. Not least important, agencies can
modify or even overrule their prior positions more easily than courts can.
(Hence, there is some tension between the rule-of-law and institutional-
competence criteria.)
An important limitation of agencies is the flip side of their specialized
knowledge and expertise. That is, agencies tend toward tunnel vision, where
they pursue their statutory mission with varying degrees of diligence, but often
without sufficient regard to a larger normative framework such as the Constitu-
283. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Geier v. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (No. 98-1811) (arguing that the Safety Act does not expressly preempt
state tort liability for auto manufacturers' failure to provide airbags, but such liability falls because it
conflicts with the agency's standard for the issue), with Geier, 529 U.S. at 867-77 (following the
Solicitor General's reasoning closely).
284. In addition to Chevron and Geier, which are very much cases about regulatory uncertainty, see
also Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 273 (1998) (deferring to HHS on floodgates problem); Walters v.
Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997) (deferring to EEOC on policy consequences).
285. There is a growing literature on the government's management of uncertainty more generally.
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFmctVE RISK REGULATION 29 (1993)
(criticizing the government for spending too much money on reducing or eliminating low-risk harms,
while under-spending on reducing higher-risk harms).
286. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Cm. L. Rv.
1383 (2004).
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287tion. Examples of this phenomenon are more common at the Supreme Court
level than elsewhere; cases like Oregon, Hamdan, Alvarez-Machain, and Mc-
Nally are rare at the district or even circuit court level, but occupy a significant
chunk of the Supreme Court's docket. Although individual Supreme Court
decisions can be criticized for their assertedly incomplete understanding of our
constitutional traditions and the useful role they might play in governance, it is
much harder to argue that agencies do as thoughtful a job. Compare the shoddy
normative effort reflected in the Ashcroft Directive with the much more thought-
ful discussion in either the majority or dissenting opinion in Gonzales v.
Oregon.
3. Legitimacy
Justice Stevens's opinion in Chevron posited that statutory gapfilling or
policy elaboration by agencies is more legitimate than similar gapfilling or
elaboration by federal judges because agencies are accountable to the President,
our only nationally elected official.288 Some judges and professors have invoked
presidential accountability as a justification for strong deference.289 A few have
even suggested that the President is a more democratically accountable branch
of government than Congress, not just the Court. 290 To be sure, other commenta-
tors object that presidential involvement in agency lawmaking and statutory
gapfilling cuts against the rule-of-law and institutional-competence justifica-
tions for deference. 291 But the presidential-accountability justification can be
best understood as a legitimacy point.
Emphasis on this justification would render the Chevron approach both over-
and under-inclusive. It would be over-inclusive because relatively few interpreta-
tional issues presented to the courts by agency adjudication and notice-and-
comment rulemaking reflect regime changes that purportedly come with
presidential elections.292 Our study of the Supreme Court's docket from 1983-
287. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 258.
288. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984); cf. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (making a similar point).
289. See, e.g., Mathew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 875-76 (1997); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in
the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 312 (1986).
290. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GovERNANcE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE To IMPROVE
THE LAW 152 (1997); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2335 (2001);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
105-06 (1994).
291. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227 (1998) (arguing that presidential control is anti-regulatory); Thomas 0.
McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. REv. 443 (1987)
(arguing that presidential control interferes with agency independence); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential
Rulemaking, 72 Cm.-KErr L. REv. 965 (1997) (arguing that presidential rulemaking threatens to upset
the constitutional checks and balances within the national government).
292. Elena Kagan argues that Chevron deference should be limited to issues for which there has
been significant White House input. Kagan, supra note 290, at 2333-35. But see David Barron & Elena
20081 1175
HeinOnline  -- 96 Geo. L.J. 1175 2007-2008
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
2006 found very few cases like Chevron, where a new President and his
appointees shifted statutory policy to reflect an ideological change endorsed in
the prior election. And when those cases came to the Supreme Court, the
Justices often overturned them, as they did in Hamdan, the Military Commis-
sions Case. Additionally, most White House involvement in legislative rulemak-
ing is hard to detect, usually for political reasons.293 The presidential
accountability justification for Chevron is also under-inclusive because there is
often significant White House influence on interpretive rules and agency prac-
tices that receive only Skidmore deference. This could support Justice Scalia's
view that Chevron should govern any interpretation adopted by the head of an
agency-namely, the person or group appointed by the President and, in the
case of executive agencies, removable by the President as well.
A serious normative problem with strong versions of the presidential-
accountability justification is that they rest upon no systematic examination of
presidential accountability and the extent to which his accountability actually
drives agency lawmaking (Chevron) or interpretation (Skidmore). Scholars who
tout the President as nationally accountable in contrast to a parochial Congress
are on particularly weak ground. As Cynthia Farina and Jide Nzelibe argue, the
President, chosen by an Electoral College that frequently graduates preference
outliers, does not necessarily reflect majoritarian preferences better than Con-
gress does.29 4 Unlike members of Congress, the President can only be reelected
once, a fact that diminishes his theoretical accountability advantage.
A weaker version of the argument is the one Justice Stevens originally
penned, that agencies have accountability advantages over judges.295 Our study
contributes this point to the argument: agencies are more democratically account-
able, not so much because of their link to the White House, but because of their
links to Congress. Our reading of government briefs in Supreme Court cases
suggests to us that agencies usually have institutionally superior access to the
original expectations of the legislators. Add this further point: agencies also
have better knowledge than courts about current congressional expectations,
Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. CT. REv. 201, 234-37 (retracting that limitation
and arguing for the application of Chevron to any interpretation adopted by an agency head appointed
by the President; a much broader application for Chevron); see also Stack, supra note 165 (arguing
more cautiously that when Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to the President, his interpreta-
tions are entitled to Chevron deference).
293. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administra-
tive State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 506-11 (2003). For example, the so-called "Republican war on
science" that has been fought out of the White House during the George W. Bush Administration has
been conducted through backdoor (therefore hard to detect) influences on more formal decisionmaking
processes. See John Horgan, Political Science, N.Y. TmIES BOOK REv., Dec. 18, 2005, at 11 (reviewing
Cms MooNEY, THE ReuumcUAN WAR ON Scm cE (2005), and discussing the Bush Administration's
repeated attempts to overrule expert opinion in scientific and environmental agencies).
294. Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's
Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 109, 128-29 (2000); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President
and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1217, 1231-42 (2006).
295. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
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through formal congressional oversight and budgetary hearings and through the
myriad informal processes of Congress-agency communication.296
Our empirical study reveals the power of this last point. When the statutory
materials are less than determinate and the issue is one of major public
attention, the Court is usually at risk, because a badly justified decision that riles
a portion of the body politick may undermine the Court's legitimacy. Indeed,
that is what happened during the 1988 Term, when the Court handed down
conservative readings of our major job discrimination statutes in six high-profile
cases. 297 Even Republican politicians denounced the Court for "reneging" on
Congress's commitment to the anti-discrimination norm in the workplace, and
in 1991 Congress and the White House delivered a sweeping statutory rebuke
for the Court's work product that Term.298 In half of the controversial cases,
George H. W. Bush Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried had submit-
ted amicus briefs arguing for more liberal interpretations of civil rights stat-
utes.29 9 If the Court had gone along with the Administration, and the careful
legal reasoning its briefs supplied, the "reneging" charges would surely have
been less fierce. We hypothesize that the Court is much (by a wide margin)
more likely to be overridden by Congress when it rejects agency statutory
interpretations than when it accepts those interpretations.
There is another problem with the presidential-accountability argument for
Chevron: Is legitimacy in our constitutional system the product of nothing but
majoritarian preferences? If the President's advisers took a poll which reliably
found 51% of Americans opposed to "death with dignity" or "assisted suicide"
(assume the terminology did not make a difference), would the Ashcroft Direc-
tive have been more legitimate? Not much. Are the military commissions
rendered legitimate by popular support, even if they violate the nation's treaty
commitments and statutory commands? Clearly not.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution considered and rejected lawmaking by
direct vote of We the People, in part because they were suspicious of majority
296. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article , Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523,
539 (1992); see also Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REv. 2027, 2126-28 (2002).
297. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (narrow interpretation of Title
VII's counsel fees provision); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (narrow
interpretation of § 1981, disallowing a claim of race-based job termination); Lorance v. AT&T Tech.,
490 U.S. 900 (1989) (broad, employer-protective interpretation of Title VII's statute of limitations);
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (interpreting the law of judgments to allow "reverse discrimina-
tion" plaintiffs to challenge affirmative action decrees); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989) (narrow interpretation of Title VII's disparate impact claim for relief); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (narrow interpretation of Title VII in "mixed motive" cases).
298. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (overriding all six decisions
cited in note 297 supra); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress!
President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991) (describing the furor created by the Court's
aggressive cutback on civil rights statutes and anticipating the 1991 override).
299. The Solicitor General filed amicus briefs firmly supporting civil rights claims in Patterson and
Lorance, and supporting a fairly pro-plaintiff interpretation of plaintiff's burden in Hopkins.
300. This empirical claim will be tested in subsequent work.
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rule and in part because they believed that governmental legitimacy came from
public deliberation in pursuit of the "public interest," and not based on simple
responsiveness to the "will of the people.",30 1 Unfortunately, the framers failed
to anticipate several phenomena, including the democratization of American
politics and public values 30 2 and the modem administrative state where much
lawmaking is accomplished by agencies.30 3 These new phenomena have in-
spired some judges and scholars to justify an expansive understanding of
Chevron based mainly on agencies' greater responsiveness to popular opinion.
They believe democratization and bureaucratization can be compatible, espe-
cially under the umbrella of the nationally elected President. We have argued
above that this kind of synthesis has a poor link to majority values. We now add
that the presidentialist synthesis too readily abandons the legitimacy-conferring
features of deliberation. The disastrous Ashcroft Directive is exhibit A for both
of these defects: it not only reflected the views of an electoral minority, but it
also sought to shut down national deliberation about aiding-in-dying, as the
media and citizens of other states observed the Oregon policy in action.
Philosopher Henry Richardson advances a different kind of synthesis. Like
the presidentialists, he embraces both democracy and bureaucracy-but his
synthesis rests upon, rather than resists, the legitimacy-conferring features of
open public deliberation. Thus, Richardson argues for "democratic rulemaking,"
whereby agencies that are both public-regarding (professional) and responsive
(political) deliberate about general goals and particular rules only in contexts
where citizens can meaningfully contribute and provide feedback.3° This best
approximates notice-and-comment rulemaking, but is'reformed so that fewer
perspectives are left out than we see now.3° 5 Rulemaking, in Richardson's
vision, advances both democracy and the public interest when Congress has
301. THE FEDERAMLIST Nos. 10 & 51 (James Madison) (rejecting direct democracy and arguing for a
representative democracy); see also CAss R. SUisram, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); Rebecca L.
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1515-16 (1991); Frank
Michelman, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YmA L.J. 1493, 1508-09 (1988).
302. See ALExIS DE TocQuvu.iLE, DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Penguin
Putnam 2004) (1837) (observing that democratic values had saturated American public culture by the
1830s); ALEXANDER KAYssAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE: THE CowrS'TED HISTORY OF DEMOCRAcY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1999) (tracing the dramatic expansion of the franchise in the early nineteenth century and,
again, after World War I).
303. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 327, 370 n.168 (2002).
304. RIcHARDsON, supra note 185, 214-19; see also Mark E. Warren, Deliberative Democracy and
Authority, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 46, 47 (1996). Complementary accounts have been derived from
standard civic republican sources by Bressman, supra note 293; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73
Thx. L. REV. 83 (1994).
305. RiCHARDSON, supra note 185, at 219-22 (criticizing notice-and-comment rulemaking for not
considering enough voices and not considering them early enough). Richardson mentions "negotiated
rulemaking" as a possible amelioration but follows the reservations of Jody Freeman. See Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 88 (1997). Another
innovation since Richardson set forth his theory is that some agencies now maintain internet sites for
notice-and-comment rulemaking; this potentially opens up rulemaking to more of the public.
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vested the agency with responsibilities through a clear mandate, when legisla-
tors and other public officials examine the agency's progress toward clarifying
statutory goals and implementing them, and when the agency develops a
professionalism that justifies the public trust that has been placed in its hands.3 °6
The most legitimate process (rulemaking) may come at a substantial institu-
tional cost, however. A number of scholars argue that judicial preferences for
rulemaking, and then judges' tendency to send agencies back for more work,
has ossified the administrative process.30 7 Rejecting the ossification hypothesis,
other scholars maintain that careful rulemaking creates better rules and that the
extra process is worth it in terms of results.3°8 We take no position on this
debate, except to note that reasonable minds have reached different conclusions,
and that the ossification concern is genuine even if indeterminate.
C. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: WHAT SHOULD THE COURT'S DEFERENCE REGIME
LOOK LIKE?
Our main positive findings are that the Justices defer a lot to agency interpre-
tations, but their deference is not driven by Chevron and the other formal
regimes; statutory subject matter and institutional context appear to be more
important in the Justices' own evaluation of agency inputs than the rhetorical
"deference" regime the Justices attach to the case. The Justices are particularly
open to agency analyses of the consequences and risks posed by different
interpretations, especially as they relate to statutory-reliance interests and con-
gressional purposes, when the statute involves national security, tax, or instrumen-
tal economic regulation. In contrast, the Justices believe themselves more
confident when interpretive issues involve process, anti-discrimination norms,
criminal liability and sentencing, and federal-state relations. As a means for
deciding the cases before them, the Justices' subject-matter-driven ad hoc
approach has not been a disaster and might charitably be considered a practical
success.
Even though the deference continuum we have uncovered seems to be
working non-disastrously, or even well enough, at the Supreme Court level from
an ex post point of view, it is a significant missed opportunity from an ex ante
point of view--one that considers the deference continuum as a structure within
which lower courts, legislators, and citizens must operate. Our positive sugges-
tions start with some general principles that should guide the Court's deference
306. RICHARDSON, supra note 185, at 222-30.
307. See Mashaw, supra note 279;'MASHAW & HARFsT, supra note 280, at 224-54 (providing an
excellent case study of agency paralysis because of judicial review and endless rulemaking); Melnick,
supra note 279, at 246; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN.
L. REV. 59 (1995); Paul R. Verkuil, Comment: Rulemaking Ossification-A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN.
L. REv. 453 (1995).
308. See, e.g., KEVIN MACDONALD, SHIFTING OUT OF PARK: MOVING AuTo SAFETY FROM RECALLS TO
REASON 96-97 (2006); William S. Jordan, H, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 393 (2000) (answering no to the question posed in the title).
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decisions and will then turn to rule-based clarifications to the Court's overall
deference jurisprudence. We shall conclude with some process points that might
be useful to the Court, whatever deference regime it ends up following (includ-
ing the current continuum, applied in an ad hoc way).
Our overall goal in making these suggestions is to improve the ability of the
judiciary and the country to have an increased benefit of agency inputs in
statutory interpretation but without the sacrifice of the rule of law, legislative
supremacy, and the judicial role that more extreme proposals might bring. We
appreciate that some of our suggestions might be presumptuous, perhaps be-
cause it may not be easily possible for nine Justices to come together on a more
coherently articulated and consistently applied approach. With respect, we
would still suggest to the Chief Justice of the United States and his colleagues
that there are few (if any) matters of judicial practice more deserving of their
attention than this one.
1. Precepts That Ought To Guide the Court's Deference Jurisprudence
The degree of deference the Supreme Court ought to afford an agency
interpretation of the statute it is applying should involve three variables. First:
Is the agency interpretation consistent with larger public norms, including
constitutional values (Oregon)? Agencies are statutory specialists and often
operate with a tunnel vision, or sometimes reflect a partisan perspective. The
greatest value added by the judiciary flows from the fact that judges are
generalists and enjoy life tenure that gives them potential freedom from partisan-
ship. The recent Military Commissions Case and Aid-in-Dying Case illustrate
the constructive role the Court can play when it trumps an excessively ambi-
tious agency under the aegis of fundamental national values such as due
process, federalism, and privacy.
Second: Is the agency interpretation pursuant to a congressional delegation of
lawmaking authority (Chevron/Mead)? For the same kinds of legitimacy and
rule-of-law reasons that the Court takes a deferential attitude toward congres-
sional judgments in enacted statutes, the Court should take a deferential attitude
toward agency judgments entailed in rules and orders pursuant to delegated
lawmaking authority. Following Henry Richardson, this reason for deference is
greatest when the agency process looks legislative, as it usually does in rulemak-
ing proceedings, where affected interests provide relevant information that the
agency must consider.
Third: Is the agency applying special expertise to a technical issue, seriously
applying its understanding of the facts to carry out congressional purposes
(Skidmore)? Our empirical examination of the Supreme Court's practice sug-
gests that this is the most significant variable, and in our view it ought to be in
most cases. Many of the subject-matter areas before the Court are ones where
the Justices have neither practical experience nor the intellectual tools to form
mature judgments about the complicated policy issues entailed in the legal
questions presented. When the agency is staffed with experts and it is making a
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Table 22. Proposed Structure for the Court's Deference Jurisprudence



















Level of Deference Chevron Chevron Chevron Chevron Skidmore Skidmore Skidmore with Skepticism
with with Skepticism and Anti-
Skepticism Skepticism deference
serious effort to carry out congressional purposes, the Court should be most
deferential. Some, but less, deference is appropriate in cases where the agency
knows more than the Justices but has no particular expertise advantage com-
pared with other amici in a case.
Table 22 provides a roadmap as to how the factors work together. If the
Justices answer "yes" to all three questions, they will and ought to be highly
deferential to the agency's interpretation; this was the legal context for the
Court's deference in Bragdon v. Abbott (the AIDS-as-Disability Case),30 9 and
Auciello Iron Works (the Labor Contract Case).31° If they answer "yes" to the
first question and either of the other two, they will and ought to be deferential to
the agency's interpretation; this, in our view, was the situation in Chevron itself.
If the Justices answer "no" to the first question but "yes" to the other two, the
Justices will and ought to struggle with the task of accommodating their
understanding of public norms and the agency's understanding of its mandate;
one or both understandings will have to give way, and we believe that the
Justices ought to be open to rethinking their own (quasi)constitutional priors, at
least as applied to the case at hand. In Geier, federalism concerns gave way to
the agency's expert view about national traffic-safety regulation; in contrast, the
Justices in Hamdan trumped presidential judgment about national security with
due-process norms and apparent congressional purposes. (In both cases, there
were strong dissents, as both judgments were contestable ones.) If the Justices
answer "no" to all three questions, they will and ought to be skeptical and
anti-deferential toward the agency's interpretation; examples of this include
Oregon, the Aid-in-Dying Case, and McNally, the Kentucky Kickbacks Case.
309. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
310. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781 (1996).
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We have some specific suggestions as to how these three variables might be
translated into a workable doctrine by the Justices, but we should not press
those suggestions too hard, for we are not sure what would work for the Justices
and we are somewhat skeptical they could stick to one doctrinal framework.
Several Justices have personally distinctive approaches to deference. Justice
Breyer, for example, is very deferential when the agency is applying its
comparative expertise or there has been discernible public or private reliance.
Justice Scalia is not particularly deferential unless the statutory text is vague or
open-ended. Justice Stevens considers constitutional norms and, especially,
statutory purpose as his most important variables. How these individual Justices
approach the deference issue also depends on how it is briefed by the Solicitor
General and his assistants. Not least important, all of the Justices are uncon-
sciously influenced by their views of the substantive issues in the cases (like
Gonzales v. Oregon) where they have personal views.
For all these reasons, it is not easy for the Supreme Court to develop a
coherent deference jurisprudence. It is possible if one Justice (preferably the
Chief Justice) took it upon himself or herself to monitor everyone's opinions to
make sure the deference issue was treated, and treated consistently, with a
coherent standard, and to object in published opinions when that does not occur.
Obviously, this is a matter for the Justices' own time management, and one or
more of them would have to make this a matter of some priority. Should they?
On the one hand, the Court's substantially ad hoc approach has been work-
able in connection with its own caseload. Indeed, we do not think the existence
of a particular deference regime-whether it be the continuum we have outlined
or Justice Scalia's universal Chevron approach or Justice Breyer's synthesis of
Chevron and Skidmore-makes a big difference in how the Justices decide
actual cases. Our empirical examination of the Court's 1014 agency-interpreta-
tion cases between Chevron and Hamdan makes us skeptical that any doctrinal
framework would affect the Court's approach to any but a handful of cases.
Thus, in Gonzales v. Oregon, we do not think the Attorney General's directive
would have prevailed even if all nine Justices had committed themselves to a
universal Chevron approach; the majority Justices could have trumped Chevron
with the constitutional-avoidance canon. Nor would the Oregon dissenters have
been willing to override the Ashcroft Directive even if they and the other
Justices had been committed to the all-factors-considered approach or even a
universal Skidmore. Indeed, the dissenters dissented, essentially, because they
agreed with the Attorney General: aid-in-dying is "assisted suicide," one half
step away from murder.
On the other hand, there are nontrivial institutional reasons the Court ought to
invest some institutional capital in developing and consistently applying a more
coherent approach to agency deference. The Court's own hodge-podge of
deference doctrines serves no useful purpose, and at the very least it ought to be
trimmed. More important, if we are anything close to correct in asserting the
almost random application of Chevron and the other regimes, the Court ought to
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be mildly embarrassed that its much-trumpeted Chevron Revolution is begin-
ning to look like a Potemkin village. Most important, there are systematic
institutional reasons why the Chief Justice of the United States ought to take the
lead in tidying up the Court's deference jurisprudence.
The Court's deference continuum is both complicated and is applied in a
context-specific way-in other words, it is a classic example of a "standards"
rather than a "rules" approach to a legal issue.311 Although a standards approach
works fine for the Court's own caseload, it is not nearly so good as a rules
approach for lower courts, agencies, and litigants who want to know, in
advance, when an agency interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. The
Mead mess illustrates this problem. The Court's opinion was filled with vague
pronouncements about implicit congressional delegations of lawmaking author-
ity, which has produced not only confusion but chaos among lower court panels,
especially in light of somewhat different standards-like pronouncements (find-
ing Chevron-significant the agency's careful consideration and its consistent
interpretation over several administrations) that the Court made a year later in
Barnhart v. Walton.312
Because most of the agency-monitoring that goes on in the federal system is
accomplished by the lower courts and within the agencies themselves, a rules
approach is probably preferable for determining what deference regime is
applicable.313 This is because it is more important for agencies, firms, and
citizens to know what the precise parameters are than for those parameters to be
exactly right in each case. Moreover, an important audience for the Court's
deference jurisprudence is Congress itself, which is the trigger under Mead for
the application of Chevron. Even if Congress does not follow the Court's
jurisprudence closely, the Court has a systematic obligation to provide clearer
guidance to legislators as they consider the consequences of different delegation
structures.31,
2. Simplify and Clarify the Deference Continuum
In the spirit of the foregoing discussion, we shall now suggest ways that the
Court's deference regime can be simplified and clarified, if the Justices are
311. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139-41 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press
1994) (1958) (providing the classic account of the choice between rules and standards for legal
regulation); cf Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. Rv. 347 (2005) (applying the rules-versus-
standards literature as a way of understanding the distinction between a textualist like Scalia and an
intentionalist like Breyer).
312. 535 U.S. 212, 219-22 (2002); see also Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875 (7th Cit.
2002) (vigorous debate between Judges Posner and Easterbrook over what Mead and Barnhart require
of lower courts); Bressman, supra note 32, at 1457-74 (exploring the variety of ways Mead and
Barnhart have produced a "muddle" in the lower courts).
313. Cf Merrill, supra note 198, at 819-26 (urging the Court to adopt bright-line meta-rules for
Chevron Step 0 inquiries).
314. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, in
THE RuLE OF LAW 4 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
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willing to devote some effort to this issue. Most of what follows would be pretty
easy to announce as a matter of doctrine.
Suggestion One: Boil Down the Deference Continuum to Oregon, Skidmore,
and Chevron. Following the constitutional structure described above and the
practical considerations revealed in our empirical analysis, our biggest sugges-
tion is Thoreauvian: simplify, simplify, simplify. The deference continuum
should be reduced to Oregon, where an agency interpretation raising constitu-
tional concerns, such as those reflected in the Bill of Rights, is treated with
skepticism; Skidmore, the independent but informed-by-agency-inputs judgment
model suggested by Article III; and Chevron, the deference model when Con-
gress has delegated lawmaking authority to agencies pursuant to Article I.
Consistent with our empirical findings, the default regime-the one the
Supreme Court should make generally clear it is applying if the opinion for the
Court says nothing-ought to be an expanded understanding of Skidmore.
Under Skidmore, the Court ought to consider factual materials as well as legal
arguments, such as are found in Solicitor General amicus briefs; informal
agency interpretations found in policy guidances, manuals, websites, and the
like; and even "litigating positions" taken by the agency and supported by
briefing. Hence, we would explicitly expand Skidmore to include instances we
coded as "consultative deference" or Skidmore-Lite (reflecting our judgment
that in many of the consultative cases a citation to Skidmore would have been
appropriate). The Court should make clear-or perhaps just continue to assume
what we would make explicit-that it will seriously consider the factual and
analytical materials upon which agencies rely when they interpret statutes.
Moreover, we urge the Court to abrogate the special deference regimes we
have gathered under the Beth Israel umbrella and accord those cases either
Chevron or Skidmore deference, depending on the existence of a congressional
delegation. There is no persuasive reason to perpetuate the earlier deference
regimes, and, in areas like labor law, the Court's alternation between Beth Israel
and Chevron in otherwise similar cases only creates doctrinal confusion. There
is even less justification for a separate Seminole Rock regime. The Court
invokes Seminole Rock in a tiny percentage of cases where it is potentially
applicable, which creates the impression that it is being invoked either ran-
domly or selectively. The amount of deference Seminole Rock requires has
always been ambiguous, also contributing to doctrinal confusion for those lower
courts and commentators who follow such matters. 315 To the extent that Semi-
nole Rock deference exceeds Chevron deference, it is open to abuse by agencies
that try to bootstrap unauthorized policy innovations under cover of interpreting
vague housekeeping rules.
Somewhat hesitantly, we also urge the Court to abandon Curtiss-Wright as a
315. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 32, at 1307-09 (noting that lower courts have already
tended to apply Skidmore rather than Seminole Rock when agencies are interpreting their own
regulations).
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separate deference category. This is a category the Court has rarely invoked
explicitly; only two Justices invoked Curtiss-Wright deference in Hamdan,
where it would seem to have been applicable. 31 6 "When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb," and that is the rule followed in Hamdan.3 17 Where
Congress has not legislated, Curtiss-Wright correctly suggests that the President
will sometimes have inherent authority to act in matters of diplomacy, armed
forces, war, and treaty making. And Congress can delegate lawmaking or other
coercive authority to the President, using the traditional conventions that Kevin
Stack has identified.318
The doctrinal interment of Curtiss-Wright super-deference would not mean
that the President's judgment would never receive special treatment in foreign
affairs and national security cases. Congress has generally not been stingy when
it has delegated authority to the President in times of war or national emergency,
and such delegations are entitled to the powerful deference accorded by Chev-
ron.3 19 Cardozo-Fonseca, the Asylum Case, illustrates this approach. Textual
plain meaning and the legislative and treaty background of the statute estab-
lished that the INS's burden-of-proof rules in asylum cases were incorrect, but
the Court left the agency plenty of room to develop rules and standards within
the general approach demanded by the statute. More important, even where
Congress has not delegated the President lawmaking authority and the President
does not have such authority under Article II, Skidmore deference assures the
executive branch broad latitude. We think that the Court gave too much latitude
in Alvarez-Machain, the Mexican Kidnapping Case, ostensibly decided under a
consultative deference standard, but this makes our point. So long as the
Justices feel the President is much more competent than they to handle delicate
foreign affairs issues, their Skidmore-inspired deference will go a long away
toward accommodating presidential initiatives.
Suggestion Two: Clarify Chevron's Domain. Consistent with Mead and a
fairly longstanding academic consensus, Chevron's framework ought only be
applied to agency interpretations pursuant to congressional delegations for the
agency to create legally binding rules, orders, or directives. The Court says, and
316. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2846 (2006) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The majority ignored Curtiss-Wright, and Justice Alito (a dissenter on all procedural as well
as substantive issues that divided the Court in Hamdan) declined to join the Curtiss-Wright deference
discussion in Justice Thomas's dissent. Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in the case, because he
had joined the opinion below which was reversed in Hamdan. Notably, the lower court did not invoke
Curtiss-Wright deference. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
317. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (quoting Youngstown Steel Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
318. Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLuM. L. REv.
263 (2006) (arguing that the President should only be able to claim statutory power if the statute
expressly grants such power and, if power is granted to an executive officer, there should be a strong
negative inference against the President having directive authority).
319. See Stack, supra note 165, at 539 (arguing that congressional delegations of lawmaking
authority to the President should be accorded Chevron deference).
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we emphatically agree, that Chevron deference is exceptional and represents a
departure from the traditional multi-factored approach to statutory interpretation
by judges. If that is the case, then Chevron should only be triggered when the
agency has been lawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and not just general
authority to implement and interpret the statute.
The Court should identify statutory authorizations with greater care and then
stick to its characterizations. 320 For example, the Court should probably follow
the tax bar and give the IRS Skidmore deference when it issues substantive
regulations, letters, or rules pursuant to its section 7805 general rulemaking
authority. Chevron deference should be reserved for those cases where the IRS
is acting pursuant to a more particular delegation of lawmaking authority. As to
the U.S. Code more generally, we have identified almost two dozen statutes that
regularly trigger Chevron deference.321 The Court ought to confirm or edit this
list and then add to it systematically.322 And then the Court should stick with the
list, systematically invoking or at least mentioning Chevron when agencies are
acting pursuant to the lawmaking delegations in those statutes.
The Court should also make clear what its bright-line rule is and then stick to
it. This would have the rule-of-law advantage of providing lower courts and
agencies themselves with clearer indication of how much freedom different
agencies have under various enabling legislation. Thus, the Court should clarify
the position it took in Mead but not in the direction it went in Barnhart.
323
Consistent with the position they have taken in the federalism and separation-of-
powers arenas, the Justices should adopt a clear-statement rule for congressional
320. Specifically, the Court needs to address the Merrill and Watts demonstration that the NLRA and
the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, for example, are not properly viewed as such congressional
delegations. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 151. The Court might still conclude that it is too late to
overrule precedents assuming the contrary, especially because Congress, the agencies, and the public
have operated under this assumption for so long. But this is not an issue the Court should ignore, as it
has done.
321. The statutes (including various amendments to them) are the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Communications Act of 1934, the
Federal Power Act of 1934, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Social Security Act of 1935,
the Food Drug & Cosmetics Act of 1938, the Federal Power Act of 1935, the Natural Gas Act of 1938,
the Immigration & Naturalization Act of 1952, the Medicaid Act of 1965, the Medicare Act of 1965, the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Federal Labor Relations Act of 1978, the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978, the Staggers Rail Act of 1982, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
322. Following the footsteps of Justice Frankfurter, his Harvard Law School predecessor on the
Court, Justice Breyer often compiles neat appendices to his opinions. He or a colleague might usefully
compile an appendix of statutes they (rather than just we) consider to have delegated lawmaking
authority, with references to Supreme Court or lower court opinions properly applying Chevron under
those circumstances.
323. From a rule-of-law perspective, the Scalia approach of affording Chevron deference to all
interpretations adopted by the agency head (but not litigating positions) is preferable to the Barnhart
criteria, unless the Court decides to eliminate Chevron as an independent category and subject all
agency interpretations to Skidmore deference. Unfortunately, the constitutional and statutory problems
we have identified with the Scalia approach disqualify it as the best rule-of-law alternative.
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delegation of lawmaking responsibility to agencies. Contrary to Mead's dicta,
the Court should recognize no implicit delegations of lawmaking responsibili-
ties to agencies, just as it does not recognize implicit congressional interference
with the operations of state governments, abrogations of state sovereign immu-
nity, or diminishment of the inherent powers of the federal judiciary and
324executive.
We do not have a strong independent view of what the delegation rule ought
to be, but we are inclined to agree with scholars who have argued that Chevron
ought to be limited to delegations to agencies to engage in formal adjudication
and notice-and-comment rulemaking.3 25 This bright-line rule is consistent with
the APA (unlike other possible bright-line rules), would be relatively easy for
both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals to administer, and would give
the Chevron boost to agency decisions that are relatively the most legitimate
because of public inputs. The main drawback-and it is a big one---of this
delegation rule is that agencies, thoughtful jurists, and many scholars believe
that notice-and-comment rulemaking is "ossifying," "stultifying," or simply too
resource-consuming to be cost-effective for many regulatory initiatives.326
We also endorse the approach the Court took in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying
Case, which considered Chevron with attention to constitutional values. Read
literally, the Controlled Substances Act seems to vest the Attorney General with
considerable authority to revoke doctors' licenses to use drugs for what the
Attorney General determines to be non-medical purposes. Such a broad reading
of the Act would be inconsistent with the suggestion made by five Justices in
Glucksberg that terminally ill patients sometimes have constitutionally pro-
tected privacy interests in exercising some control over the circumstances of
their deaths. The Court might well uphold such a broad rule if Congress
deliberated about the matter and specified it in the statute-but absent such
action the Court was right to override the Attorney General. The Oregon Court
was also bothered by the fact that the Attorney General was, effectively,
preempting state law. Although the Court did not say so openly, we read
Gonzales v. Oregon to reflect the Justices' application of an anti-deference
regime informed by constitutional values.
Suggestion Three: Tie Skidmore Deference to Rule-of-Law, Agency-Exper-
tise, and Legitimacy Considerations. Any agency interpretation that is not an act
of delegated lawmaking should receive flexible Skidmore deference. The Skid-
more opinion itself emphasized procedural features of agency action, such as
thoroughness of consideration and consistency of application, but the overall
324. For discussion of these "clear statement" rules, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 255, at
101-05.
325. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 32; Seidenfeld, supra note 278; see also Merrill & Watts, supra
note 151 (discussing various strategies the Court might follow in light of the delegation conventions
Congress actually followed at various points in the twentieth century).
326. See, e.g., BREYR, supra note 285, at 49; MAsHAw & HARFST, supra note 280, at 224-54;
McGarity, supra note 280; Pierce, supra note 280.
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point of Skidmore is that agency materials be evaluated for their "power to
persuade., 327 We strenuously urge the Court to make clear that an agency's
"power to persuade" under Skidmore be understood by reference to the substan-
tive factors discussed in section III.B--especially comparative agency exper-
tise: Is the issue a technical one where the agency has exercised intelligent
expert judgment, based upon a factual connection between its choice and the
(complex) statutory purpose? If so, there is greater reason for the Court to defer.
This is the classic Chevron scenario, and it should be the core reason for
Skidmore deference as well. In contrast, the Court in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying
Case not only felt that the Attorney General displayed little expertise- in setting
medical practice rules, but pointed out that the statute vested this type of
decisionmaking in HHS instead.
Also highly relevant is the level of public participation or feedback. Interpreta-
tions adopted after notice-and-comment rulemaking receive a big boost under
this criterion-but so do regulations and guidances actively monitored by
Congress. Even though they were not adopted pursuant to a delegation of
lawmaking authority, HEW's Rehabilitation Act guidelines ought to receive
strong Skidmore deference, as they did in Bragdon, because they were subjected
to immediate and ongoing congressional oversight and were relied on by
Congress when it adopted the ADA. Conversely, less Skidmore weight should
attach to substantive policy stances adopted in low-visibility agency documents
and guidances of the sort that Professor Nina Mendelson has recently identified
and discussed.328
Finally, the level of Skidmore deference should consider rule-of-law factors.
The agency sometimes has a lesson or two to teach the Justices about how to
read the statute or make sense of its structure, but the primary rule-of-law
variable will be reliance, which in turn is usually related to consistency in the
agency's interpretation. Thus, a longstanding agency interpretation that regu-
lated parties have internalized and that Congress has acquiesced in should rarely
be overturned, a point made by the Court in several cases during the 2006 Term
(and therefore not included in our empirical study).329 In contrast, a novel
interpretation not well connected to statutory purpose or the evolution of the
327. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). We do not make a sharp distinction
between a "power to persuade" reading of Skidmore and a "deference" reading of Skidmore. For a sharp
distinction, see Hickman & Krueger, supra note 32, at 1294-99.
328. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL
L. REv. 397 (2007) (examining how the use of guidance documents affects the interests of regulatory
beneficiaries and arguing for procedural reforms that would enable regulatory beneficiaries to engage in
the agency's decisionmaking process); see generally Rakoff, supra note 264 (outlining the framework
within which American administrative agencies are returning to informal administrative procedures and
comparing American administrative procedures with other legal systems); Erica Seiguer & John J.
Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and Drug Administration: Obligations and Trade-Offs in
Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 17 (2005) (examining rulemaking and guidance document
development at the FDA).
329. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (consultative-deference case where
Court went along with longstanding agency interpretation against which Congress had amended the
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statute, such as the George W. Bush Administration's military commissions
experiment (overturned in Hamdan), ought to receive less deference under
Skidmore.
Thus, the Court should almost always go along with a longstanding
agency interpretation upon which Congress had probably relied when it
revisited the statute, that is supported by documented agency experience and
expert opinion, and that was arrived at through a public process where the
agency considered the arguments and evidence offered by affected interests.
For example, the EEOC's Sexual Harassment Guidelines are not entitled to
Chevron deference, but the Court has given them strong Skidmore deference
for precisely these reasons. 330 A recent Chevron example to the same effect
is the Court's decision in Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department
of Education.331 The Court upheld the Department of Education's formulae
for determining state eligibility for reimbursement under the Federal Impact
Aid Program.332 Although the statutory text concededly did not support the
Department, the Court still Chevron-deferred because of the institutional
history of the Department's functional rather than strictly textual reading of
the statute.3 3 3 Specifically, the Department had adhered to its functional
interpretation for two decades and had drafted the present statutory lan-
guage, adopted by Congress, under the assumption that it codified its own
consistent construction.334
On the other hand, the Court should give little or no weight to novel
agency interpretations reaching matters as to which the agency has no
particular expertise and where affected interests were not heard. The Ash-
croft Directive fits this description well. In the Directive, the Attorney
General displayed a shallow understanding of evolving medical thinking on
aid-in-dying and presumed to occupy a field Congress had reserved for
HHS; there was no public input regarding the Directive, nor even apparent
consultation with more expert agencies and medical groups; the Directive
was a striking departure from earlier Department of Justice deliberations on
this and similar issues; and the Directive ran against congressional delibera-
tion about-and rejection of-Senator Ashcroft's similar proposal in 1997-
98. For these reasons, the Oregon Court was right to give the agency
interpretation little weight on the Skidmore scale.
statute); Zuni Pub. Schs.' Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1541 (2007) (Chevron
deference case to same effect, but with stronger affirmative evidence of legislative approval).
330. See Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998) (accepting the EEOC
Guidelines as settled law because of congressional acquiescence and developing liability rules for
employers); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (adopting the EEOC's legal
structure).
331. 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007).
332. Id. at 1546.
333. Id. at 1540, 1544-45.
334. Id. at 1541.
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3. New Procedural and Structural Suggestions That Might Facilitate
Court-Agency Cooperation
Suggestion One: Solicitation of Agency Views. A largely unremarked feature
of the Court's deference jurisprudence is the extent to which the Justices have
solicited agency inputs, usually through requests for amicus briefs. Sometimes,
in fact, the Supreme Court insists upon lower court solicitation of agency views.
In Mead Corp. v. Tilley, for example, the Court deferred to Department of Labor
guidelines for interpreting ERISA, but remanded to the lower court with
instructions to solicit more guidance from the Department.335
Expanding upon Tilley, our suggestion is that the lower courts should be
encouraged to solicit agency views more often than they do, especially in labor,
pension, civil rights, bankruptcy, and other areas where the Supreme Court
often follows a consultative deference approach. Until the publication of this
Article, there was no reason lower courts should have been aware that the Court
relies so strongly on Solicitor General amicus briefs in these areas. With the
publication of our empirical study, lower courts are now on notice and ought to
adjust their practices, including in their options the solicitation of federal
executive viewpoints. This would make the operation of the federal judiciary
more efficient at resolving legal issues.
There is a speculative "cost" that should be investigated and considered by
the Supreme Court as well as lower courts. The cost is that the Court might be
influenced too much by the Solicitor General's Office, excellent as it is.
Agencies complain, sometimes bitterly, that the Solicitor General often does not
represent their expert judgments and sometimes pushes aside their informed
viewpoints without sufficient legal justification. We do not know how serious
this problem is, though it is one that has persisted across different administra-
tions.3 36 Presumably, the Solicitor General's inattention to agency expertise is
less serious in cases where there is a formal agency action-a rule, a policy
guidance, an adjudicated order, perhaps even an official agency manual. Al-
though the Solicitor General sometimes abandons agency positions he thinks
erroneous, the existence of such rules tethers the Solicitor General's submis-
sions to the agency's perspective-in contrast with amicus briefs, answering an
issue the agency has not publicly addressed.
Another potential cost is that the Court's reliance on federal agency inputs
might distort statutory law in ways that might not be in the national interest. In
bankruptcy cases, for example, executive department amicus briefs tend to
favor creditors' interests, because the United States is itself often a creditor in
bankruptcy. In Rash, for example, the Court followed the Solicitor General to
choose the most pro-creditor rule for valuing debtor-retained property in bank-
335. 490 U.S. 714, 725-26 (1989).
336. Professor Peter Strauss, a former agency official and one of the top administrative law
professors of the twentieth century, pressed this point upon us in comments he made at our Fall 2006
workshop at the Columbia School of Law and in follow-up conversations.
1190 [Vol. 96:1083
HeinOnline  -- 96 Geo. L.J. 1190 2007-2008
THE CONTINUUM OF DEFERENCE
ruptcy, even though most of the courts of appeals (including the respected
Second and Seventh Circuits) had rejected that rule.33 7 As Seventh Circuit
Judge Easterbrook argued, such a rule is neither economically justified nor
required by the statutory text or structure.338
Judicial deference to agency inputs would press criminal, antitrust, and
securities law toward expanded liability (the Kentucky Kickback Case), national
security law toward greater executive authority over individuals (the Military
Commissions Case), and voting rights, banking, and health and safety law
toward increased preemption of state regulation (the Oregon Aid-in-Dying
Case). In the noted cases, the Court resisted executive department pressure, but
that is the exception and not the rule. We leave to the gentle reader her own
judgment as to whether the law is being unbalanced in some areas. If she thinks
so, what is the solution? After study, the Judicial Conference should seek
congressional funding for personnel within the judicial branch (perhaps an
office) that could provide independent analysis for the Supreme Court and
perhaps lower courts on technical issues, where the Solicitor General has an
effective monopoly today.
Suggestion Two: Signaling Future Deference. In statutory areas where Con-
gress has granted an agency lawmaking authority but the agency has not
exercised that authority, the Court should not evaluate the agency input under
the Chevron criteria, though it can signal to the agency that its interpretation is
potentially Chevron-eligible. We found examples in our dataset. For a dramatic
example, the Army Corps of Engineers has been delegated authority to adopt
rules for preserving environmental quality and habitats in and around the
"waters of the United States. ' ' 339 Reflecting green politics, the Corps adopted
regulations protecting the nation's "wetlands, ' ' 34° which the Supreme Court
upheld in 1985.341 In Rapanos v. United States,3 42 the Court held that the Corps
had gone too far when it construed its wetlands regulations to include spaces far
from the nation's waterways, but Chief Justice Roberts (in a concurring opin-
ion) and Justice Breyer (in dissent) urged the Corps or the EPA to revisit the
issue through legislative notice-and-comment rulemaking.343
337. Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 958-59 (1997) (abrogating In re Hoskins,
102 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996) and In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997)).
338. In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 317, 319 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in judgment), abrogated by
Rash, 520 U.S. 953; accord Rash, 520 U.S. at 966-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
339. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7) (2000).
340. 33 U.S.C. § 328.3(a)(2) (2000).
341. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
342. 126 S. Ct. 715 (2006).
343. Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For other cases
where concurring Justices have made similar pitches, see, for example, Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529
U.S. 344 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000)
(Souter, J., concurring); United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 158-59 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
But see id. at 158 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting Breyer's position that the Court's opinion posed no
obstacle to the Sentencing Commission reversing the case's outcome because the statute was clear and
therefore allowed no agency flexibility).
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In several other cases, Court majorities have overruled agency interpretations
but openly invited agencies to respond with notice-and-comment rulemaking. 34
This is a practice that we should encourage. For cases where Congress has
delegated an agency lawmaking authority (usually through substantive rulemak-
ing) but the agency has not availed itself of that mechanism, the Court should
avoid unduly broad interpretations of the statute and should explicitly discuss
the extent to which its analysis precludes agency rulemaking at some future
date. We also strongly support the Court's occasional practice of granting
review, vacating the judgment below, and remanding to the lower court ("GVR"
orders) when an agency generates or is generating a substantive rule to which
the lower court should probably Chevron-defer.345
This practice is a partial response to concerns about statutory ossification. For
the broad swaths of law where Congress has delegated agencies lawmaking
authority, the Court should guard against hard-wiring its own constructions into
a statute and should more often recognize that its Skidmore-ish all-things-
considered take on a statutory issue can be reversed by an agency acting under
congressional delegations. Indeed, we would go so far as to propose, for the
Court's consideration, a presumption that the Court's Skidmore-inflected interpre-
tations of statutory texts should be reversible by agencies if the interpretation
falls within the domain of issues where agency rules are potentially entitled to
Chevron deference.
Suggestion Three: Attention to Historical and Factual Materials. In a democ-
racy, we are nervous that rules adopted by our elected representatives are being
updated by unelected and perhaps unaccountable officials. 346 Agents interpret-
ing and applying the legislation may "distort" its meaning because they have a
non-public-regarding agenda. Those usurpative agents might be administrative
agencies, but they might also be judges. We believe that foxes ought not guard
henhouses. But how can we tell the foxes from the guardians? Isn't there a risk
that any judicial monitoring of agency updating will merely substitute one set of
foxes (namely, unelected biases) for another? Over time, the pas de deux
between foxes in the agencies and foxes on the bench may press the statute
further and further from its original legitimating expectations and purposes.
The Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case illustrates that fear. The Justices who are
most firmly pro-life in their personal viewpoints fought every legal conclusion
with the fierceness of a tigress protecting her cubs. The Justices who are most
friendly to constitutional protection of death with dignity joined the opinion of
the Court without cavil, even though it did not answer all the cogent legal
344. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County
of Kent, Mich., 510 U.S. 355, 368 n.14, 374 (1994).
345. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 171 (1996) (per curiam).
346. Cf Bressman, supra note 32, at 462-63 (urging administrative law to get past the countermajori-
tarian anxiety); see generally ALExANDER M. BicKL., TaE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrrcs (1962); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YAE L.J. 153 (2002).
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objections raised by the dissenters. Examine your own reaction to the arguments
in the case: Didn't you cheer the arguments of the side you agree with, while
questioning the good faith of the Justices and officials on the other side? If you
did, you are altogether human, but re-read the opinions and see if you do not
agree with us, that each side advanced excellent legal arguments that could be
persuasive to a neutral observer.
As Tables 20 and 21 reveal, the pattern we found in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying
Case can be generalized. With the exception of Justice Powell,3 47 Justices with
socially conservative or business-oriented backgrounds and appointed by conser-
vative Republican Presidents voted with the agency much more often when the
agency reached a conservative result than when the agency reached a liberal
result. With the exception of Justice White, 34 8 Justices with public-service or
plaintiff-oriented backgrounds and appointed by moderate Republican or Demo-
cratic Presidents voted with the agency much more often when the agency
reached a liberal result than when the agency reached a conservative result.
The overall pattern, revealed most starkly in Table 21, will not surprise
academics.349 And few of us believe that ideological voting means the end of
democracy. Indeed, we are inclined to think that our survey reveals a surpris-
ingly modest amount of ideological voting. In the two decades of cases we
examined, the Supreme Court's docket has shrunk by half. The selection effect
of having fewer circuit splits, to which Chevron has probably contributed,
suggests to us that the "missing half' of the Court's 2005 Term docket would
have yielded much less ideological voting among the Justices. Compared with
the Chevron Court in 1984, the Hamdan Court in 2006 may actually be less
ideological.
Nonetheless, ideological voting does persist. And, for the reasons suggested
above, our culture fears that the rule of law itself will be undermined if
unelected judges have their fingers on the scales when they decide cases. (We
the People expect agencies, but not judges, to consider "political" factors.) So
once ideological voting is documented for the Supreme Court, it becomes a
problem to be managed.
Most academics who have addressed this topic seem quite certain that the
proper judicial methodology will reduce or eliminate judicial discretion to
override agencies. For example, John Manning and Adrian Vermeule maintain
that if judges follow the plain-meaning rule they will tend to leave agencies
347. Justice Powell was only one of three Justices during our survey period who did not serve as a
judge before appointment to the Court.
348. Like Justice Powell, Justice White also had no judicial experience before appointment to the
Court. He is unique among our collection in that his voting in the period from 1984-93, when he
retired, was the opposite of his political affiliation, New Frontier Kennedy Democrat.
349. Indeed, the dominant, almost monopolistic, political-science model is that the Justices' votes
are determined only or primarily by ideology. See, e.g., LEE EPsTEin & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICEs
JusncEs MAKE (1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTrrUDiNAL
MODEL (1993); see also Theodore W. Ruger & Pauline T. Kim, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project,
104 COLUM. L. REv. 1150, 1163-71 (2004).
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alone3"' or will at least follow the politically neutral approach of a faithful agent
of the original congressional majority.351 Vermeule and Manning would surely
say that no one better epitomizes the predictable rule of law than Justice Scalia,
for whom both clerked. We are agreeable to that proposition-yet even the
nation's most outspoken rule-of-law jurist agreed with conservative agency
interpretations at a significantly higher level than with liberal agency interpreta-
tions. Using a different methodology, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein found
that Justice Scalia's agreement rate with Clinton Administration agency cases
was significantly lower than his agreement rate with those supported by the
George W. Bush Administration.352 So even the best of the textualists reveals
ideological 'voting. Moreover, the other strong textualist on the Rehnquist-
Roberts Courts, Justice Thomas, has the second largest ideological gap in his
agreement rates among all the currently serving Justices.35 3 It is not credible to
think that the plain-meaning rule exercises any constraint on his decisions.
James Brudney and Corey Ditslear argue that consulting legislative history
offers a better method for constraining judges than the new textualism, and
unlike the previously discussed legal academics they support this theory with
empirical data. Surveying almost a generation of the Court's labor cases,
Brudney and Ditslear found that consultation of legislative history had a
moderating effect on the more liberal Justices.354 We have not tested for a
similar pattern in our own (incomplete examination of our) data, but it is
noteworthy that the biggest user of legislative history on the current Court,
Justice Stevens, reveals the most ideologically polarized voting pattern. (Every-
one on the Burger Court relied lavishly on legislative history, including the
highly deferential and less ideological Justices White and Powell as well as the
undeferential and highly ideological Justices Brennan and Marshall.) Nonethe-
less, because the Brudney-Ditslear theory does have some empirical support in
the labor cases, we consider it a plausible approach, unlike that of Vermeule and
Manning.
Finally, Cass Sunstein believes that "nondelegation" canons of statutory
construction will constrain executive as well as judicial officials in the new
350. See VERMEULE, supra note 199, at 1-3, 12 (arguing for a no-frills textualist approach by federal
judges that would leave virtually all statutory gapfilling to agencies).
351. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Principle, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 673, 738-39
(1997) (arguing that, to avoid legislative self-delegation problems, federal courts should apply a strict
textualist approach that does not treat legislative history as authoritative).
352. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 879.
353. See id. at 880; Table 21 supra.
354. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns
of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, JUDIcATURE, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 220,
226-27 (finding that reliance on legislative history had a moderating influence on liberal Justices in
labor cases); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' Reliance on Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect 26-27 (Ohio State Univ. Moritz College of Law Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 95, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1008330
(providing a more detailed examination of the evidence).
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post-Chevron era.355 We are dubious, in large part because the canons are
(in)famously numerous and manipulable, by agencies as well as judges. Thus,
one of Sunstein's favorite canons-the avoidance of serious constitutional
questions-was a key argument posed by the Office of Legal Counsel to justify
the legality of executive torture of detained persons, as Trevor Morrison has just
reminded US. 3 5 6 Importantly, there is no evidence-and our study did not come
up with anything helpful-that the canons operate as constraints on judicial
decisionmaking. To the contrary, Brudney and Ditslear found, as an empirical
matter, that conservative Justices have deployed canons of construction to
trump legislative expectations and to justify reading their pro-employer prefer-
ences into American labor law. 357 Thus, not only is a canons approach not
constraining, but the only empirical evidence now available suggests that the
canons are applied in a way that liberates Justices from the possible restraints
that legislative history might impose.
The existing evidence does not give us much hope that some "method" of
interpretation will reduce (much less end) ideological voting among the
Justices. Our strategy would be institutional and informational. Institution-
ally, an informal coalition of Justices ought to coalesce around an informa-
tional strategy.358 The reason textualist and canonical methods do not
constrain judges is because these sources are too thin to overwhelm judicial
preconceptions. A pro-life judge reading the CSA's provision that the Attor-
ney General should not register doctors prescribing drugs in a manner not in
the "public interest" is of course going to assume that "assisted suicide" is
banned; a death-with-dignity judge will not, however many dictionaries or
canons you ply her with. The main reason we think legislative history
sometimes has some traction is that it provides judges with a thicker context
for the statute that offers greater chance of supplanting the judge's own
preconceptions. Our hypothesis is that Justices critically reading legislative
materials in addition to statutory text will be better attuned to the agenda of
Congress, and less prone to fall into their own agenda, than Justices who
just read statutory text and then play with it.
355. See Sunstein, supra note 205, at 2607-10.
356. See Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLuM. L. REV.
1189, 1193-94 (2006) (discussing the Yoo Memorandum justifying the legality of executive branch
torture).
357. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 40, at 59-63.
358. Interestingly, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, Kennedy, and Scalia-clustered together in the
middle of Table 21, supra-were students in the Hart and Sacks course on The Legal Process in the late
1950s and early 1960s. The Hart and Sacks project aimed to -facilitate the neutral operation of good
government through reasoned elaboration by agencies and courts. Although they have wildly different
personal and even writing styles, these five students of Hart and Sacks love the rule of law, carefully
follow precedent, are dedicated students of the administrative and legislative process, and believe that
agencies should take the lead in developing the contours of statutory policy. In this spirit, we offer a
challenge to the new Chief Justice, who is himself familiar with Hart and Sacks's work: help foster a
nonpartisan center of the Court that will reinvigorate statutory interpretation and agency lawmaking in
the modern administrative state.
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This is why the survival and flourishing of Skidmore can be just as useful as
Chevron, if not more so. There is a danger of too much Chevron formalism,
where big-issue cases become pitched battles over Chevron Step 0; this is an
important reason for the Court to settle on a bright-line rule, clearly announce
what is eligible and what is not, and then stick to it. An advantage of a Chevron
regime limited to legislative rulemaking is that the agency always has to earn its
deference. To be Chevron-eligible, a boon even if of indeterminate importance,
the agency usually has to make law through notice-and-comment rulemaking
and therefore provide evidence supporting its rule and respond to alternatives. If
not Chevron-eligible, the agency has to be persuasive to earn its stripes under
Skidmore. To be persuasive, the agency has to say more than "we have viewed
the statute this way from the beginning." The agency has to provide useful and
factual information about the legislative history of the statute and its evolution,
successful ways to handle statutory risks and meet statutory purposes, experi-
ments that have been tried (perhaps at the state level or abroad), professional
consensus and expert reports, and so forth.
CONCLUSION: RETHINKING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE MODERN
ADMINIsTRATIVE STATE
Most of the cases discussed in this Article illustrate the inevitability of
dynamic statutory interpretation and the ways this inevitability plays out in the
modem administrative state.35 9 As reflected in cases from Chevron to Hamdan,
the primary engine of statutory dynamism is and long has been agencies, with
courts* as second-level interpreters (if that) in most instances.36 ° In our view, the
constant stream of agency-generated law, interpretations, factual materials, and
policy analyses digested by courts in the last three generations has changed (and
ought to have changed) the way judges approach statutory interpretation.36'
Consider a few of the arenas where we think the Supreme Court has benefited
from its interaction with agency interpretations.
Legislative History. Traditionally, judges and scholars have justified resort to
legislative history as a means of discerning the "intent" of the legislators who
359. The theoretical bases for the inevitability of dynamic statutory interpretation are discussed in
WnII N. ESKRIDnE, JR., DvYNsc STATUTORY INTERPRErAToN, at ch. 2 (1994), and applied to various
problems in id. chs. 1 and 3. See also Adrian Vermeule, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and the
Institutional Turn 1-13 (Berkeley Electronic Press, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Art. No. 3, 2002),
available at www.bepress.comils/iss3/art3.
360. See Edward Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State 13 (Berkeley
Electronic Press, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Art. No. 2, 2002), available at www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/
art2; Jerry Mashaw, Agency Statutory interpretation, 9 (Berkeley Electronic Press, Issues in Legal
Scholarship, Art. No. 9, 2002), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9; accord EsKPIocE,
supra note 359, at ch. 4.
361. Cf. EDWARD L. RUBIN & MALcoLM M. FEELy, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE:
How THE CoutRTs REFORE AmRcA's PRisONs 1-4, 20-25 (1998) (arguing that judicial handling of
public-interest class actions and constitutional law needs to borrow ideas from judicial handling of
administrative law).
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enacted the statute. The intent might be the specific meaning the legislators
expected their statute to carry with it362 or the more general purposes the
legislators were trying to accomplish with the statute.3 63 From all these perspec-
tives, legislative history is archaeological: it enables the interpreter to under-
stand the statute as its drafters and enacters understood it at the time of
enactment. Because they are often involved in statutory drafting and congres-
sional deliberations, agencies usually know the legislative history very well, and
their briefs provide the statutory archaeologist with excellent material, albeit
slanted in favor of the agency's interpretation.
Agency briefs also deploy legislative history in a dynamic manner, to recount
the life of the statute and not just its birth. Although the Solicitor General's brief
in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case came up with some excellent original-
meaning arguments from the pre-history of the CSA,3 6 most of its discussion
of legislative history involved post-1970 developments, including legislative
history of the 1974 and 1984 amendments to the CSA 3 6 5 and numerous federal
statutes establishing national standards for legitimate medical practice. 366 Thus,
the government's briefs in Gonzales v. Oregon revealed an evolving understand-
ing of the CSA as something more than merely a law that criminalized drug
crimes; over the years, the Department and Congress came to see it as a situs for
an agency-based federal common law of legitimate medical deployment of
scheduled substances.367
One might readily suppose that this kind of "subsequent legislative history"
simply marks the contrast between administrative and judicial approaches to
statutory interpretation, and that has been the official line of the post-1969
Supreme Court. But, in fact, both pre- and post-1969, the Court deployed
ongoing legislative history to support statutory interpretations-usually in cases
where the Court was assimilating agency understandings of statutes that had
generated ongoing exchanges between the agency and Congress. 368 In the
362. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 230-51 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (relying on legislative history to demonstrate that the critical supporters of Title VII did not intend
to allow even "voluntary" affirmative action programs).
363. See, e.g., id. at 201--04 (Brennan, J.) (relying on legislative history to demonstrate that Title
VIl's general purpose was not to prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts); HART &
SACKS, supra note 311, at 1377-80 (criticizing resort to legislative materials to determine specific
intent, but admitting them to learn the general purpose of the statute).
364. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 19-20, Gonzales v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (May 12, 2005)
(arguing astutely that the Supreme Court had interpreted prior federal criminal statute regulating
dangerous drugs not to allow doctors to use morphine to ease a patient's pain and presuming that
Congress acquiesced in such interpretation when it adopted the CSA in 1970).
365. Id. at 34-35, 48.
366. Id. at 42-43.
367. See id. at 34-48.
368. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 122 (2000) (rejecting
FDA assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products in light of repeated FDA representations to
Congress that it did not have such jurisdiction); Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792
(1998) (following EEOC interpretation of Title VII to protect against workplace sexual harassment,
based upon congressional ratification of the idea); Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 702 (1995)
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Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case, for example, the majority opinion gave some
emphasis to the facts that Congress assumed in 1974 that HEW and not the
Department of Justice would take the lead in making medical decisions,369
followed that assumption in a 1978 statute,370 created in 1984 a five-factor test
(including reliance on state law) to be applied to deregister doctors, 37 1 relied on
statutory amendment rather than executive action to expand the CSA in 1990 to
include some drugs that are not addictive or psychotropic (for example, ste-
roids), 372 and in 1999 rejected the proposal to preempt Oregon's death-with-
dignity law when Ashcroft presented it as a Senator.
373
In our view, attention to the ongoing legislative history of a statute is often
going to be useful information for courts evaluating agency rules and interpreta-
tions. At the very least, such evidence provides the Court with valuable informa-
tion about public and sometimes private reliance on or acquiescence in agency
interpretations. It also provides the Court with useful information about the
possible political consequences of disagreeing with the agency. The Supreme
Court suffered needless humiliation when it dismissed serious agency views
about the proper meaning of the nation's civil rights laws in pregnancy discrimi-
nation cases of the 1970s and race discrimination cases of the 1980s.374
Stare Decisis for Statutory Precedents. Courts take stare decisis seriously,
both to save themselves the effort of revisiting prior decisions and to reassure
the citizenry that legal rules are stable. Traditionally, stare decisis has been
considered virtually sacrosanct in statutory cases, so that the responsibility for
correcting judicial mistakes will be understood as lying solely with Congress.375
As with legislative history, this commitment to stare decisis is understood as a
feature fundamentally distinguishing court from agency statutory construction.
Thus, in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case, the majority went to great pains to
justify its narrowing interpretation in light of precedent and to distinguish
precedents that had construed the CSA's ambit liberally.37 6 Conversely, dissent-
ing Justices scored important points by arguing that the Ashcroft Directive's
national standard barring the use of scheduled drugs for "assisted suicides" is
consistent with the Supreme Court's reading of the CSA in recent constitutional
(following Department of Interior interpretation of Endangered Species Act, based on subsequent
congressional ratification of the agency's highly dynamic interpretation); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (following IRS interpretation of Code to deny tax exemption to
racially discriminatory schools, based upon congressional acquiescence in the controversial agency
interpretation).
369. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 265 (2006).
370. Id. at 266 (invoking Congress's implementation of the Psychoptropic Substances Convention,
21 U.S.C. § 801a(3) (2000)).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 273 (relying on the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 1902,
104 Stat. 4851 (1990)).
373. Id. at 253.
374. See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
375. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988).
376. Oregon, 546 U.S. at 269 (distinguishing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975)).
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cases.
377
The modem administrative state has greatly undermined this distinction
between courts religiously applying precedent and agencies free to roam from
one interpretation to another. As a theoretical matter, it must be recognized that
the rule of law depends on horizontal as well as vertical coherence-the
consistency of a rule with other norms and rules in society today (horizontal), as
well as the rule's consistency over time (vertical). Now that agencies are the
primary articulators of legal rules and interpretations, they have recognized the
value of vertical consistency-but at the same time the Supreme Court has
bowed explicitly to the value of horizontal consistency and has recognized that
stare decisis creates risks of legal ossification. This has been explicit in the
Court's Chevron jurisprudence. Chevron itself recognized that agency rulemak-
ing "must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis. 378
The implication of Chevron is that a Supreme Court decision deferring to an
agency interpretation does not create a stare decisis effect for that interpretation.
Because there is a zone of indeterminacy in the statutory command, any
reasonable agency interpretation within that zone ought to be acceptable, and so
the stare decisis effect of the Supreme Court's decision is minimized. In
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, for
the best recent example, the Court held that a prior lower court construction of
an ambiguous statute was not a bar to the agency's formulation of a rule to the
contrary.379 Because Brand X involved notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
agency was required to consider the previous interpretation and to provide
plausible reasons why the statute should be interpreted in another way.
38 0
Brand X represents an understanding of stare decisis as a process of ongoing
elaboration or experimentation that we should extend beyond the facts of Brand
X and the Court's Chevron jurisprudence. Consider an example from the
Skidmore-Lite category in our deference continuum. The Court periodically
revisits and overrules its Sherman Act precedents with rarely a mention of the
super-strong presumption of correctness of statutory precedents. The reason for
the periodic overrulings is that expert evaluation of many of the older prece-
dents suggests that they burden market decisions without any discernible benefit
for consumers (the Court's current understanding of the Sherman Act's pur-
pose). The Court does not lightly cast aside these precedents-in fact it usually
377. Id. at 299-301 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's departure from the broad
interpretation.the Court gave the CSA in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)).
378. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984). For a
powerful statement of the effect that Chevron should have on stare decisis, see United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
379. 545 U.S. 967, 968-69 (2005); see id. at 1019 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging a broader
rethinking of stare decisis in agency-interpretation cases).
380. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(setting forth arbitrariness criteria for judicial review of notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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does so only after the FTC and the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
formally suggest an overruling in an amicus brief.
3 8 1
We should urge the Court to generalize its Sherman Act jurisprudence, at
least somewhat. Typically, when the Court overrules a Sherman Act precedent,
it is rejecting an interpretation that originated in a Justice Department or FFC
prosecution during the 1950s and 1960s-and it is doing so at the behest of the
same agencies, which have now concluded that the earlier, more aggressive
approach to the Sherman Act did not serve its consumer-welfare purpose. (We
emphasize that neither the agencies nor the Court comes to such conclusions
lightly; the process of reconsideration and then overruling usually proceeds over
ten years or more.) Likewise, the Supreme Court should be willing to revisit
other kinds of precedents when the agency that helped persuade the Court of the
cogency of one reading under Skidmore has come to a new and deeply consid-
ered conclusion that is at odds with the old precedent. Although we have found
a couple of overrulings where this course of action was probably misguided,382
this pattern of experience and critique/agency proposal/judicial response is a
model for how our legal system can evolve in a manner that is both responsive
to learning and experience, yet also orderly and respectful of reliance interests.
Substantive Canons of Statutory Construction. Traditionally, scholars and
judges have justified the substantive canons of statutory interpretation as either
rules that reflect likely legislative preferences 383 or as mechanisms to place the
burden of deliberating about constitutional or other fundamental norms on
Congress.384 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Oregon Court declined to invoke
"clear statement requirements" or "presumptions," but instead invoked the
federalism and nondelegation values underlying those canons as "background
381. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968). But see Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986)
(rejecting the Department of Justice's suggestion that the Court overrule Keogh).
382. The Supreme Court's opinion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989),
closely followed the views of Solicitor General Charles Fried to cut back and narrow Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), where the Court had closely followed the views of Nixon Administra-
tion Solicitor General Erwin Griswold. Together with several decisions where the Court unwisely
rejected moderate readings offered by Solicitor General Fried, Wards Cove generated the proverbial
"firestorm of protest" and an angry congressional override. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. For another decision that strikes us as open to question, see Leegin Creative
Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007), overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1991).
383. See, e.g., ScALtA, supra note 276, at 25 (1997); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2051 (2002); Geoffrey Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of
Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1179, 1186. Compare the "gap-filling" role scholars find'for many
default rules in contract interpretation. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the
Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. IwranEisc. L.J. 389, 390 (1993).
384. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 224, at 597; Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 2162, 2164 (2002). Compare the "equilibrium-inducing"
role scholars have attributed to some default rules in contract interpretation. See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729
(1992).
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principles." They "belie the notion that Congress would use such an obscure
grant of authority to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the States' police
power.
385
More recently, scholars have suggested that the substantive canons should be
baselines designed to serve the purposes of the modem regulatory state, as by
giving voice to under-represented voices or correcting for dysfunctions in the
political process.38 6 Reflecting a different kind of normative canon, the theme of
the government's brief in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case revolved around the
strong "presumption in favor of a uniform national standard" to implement
regulatory statutes.387 What both academics and the government add to the prior
thinking is that the substantive canons are relentlessly normative and not just
positive. They deeply involve issues of policy and value. Insofar as the substan-
tive canons reflect policy judgments, agency inputs are valuable but ought not
be dispositive.
Agency practice is driven by one substantive canon above all others: advance
the interpretation that best advances the statutory purpose (so long as the
statutory text can accommodate that interpretation). 388 This canon, for example,
animated Attorney General Ashcroft's Directive, which read the CSA as creat-
ing national rules regulating the use of drugs that Congress or the Attorney
General has designated as dangerous. Ashcroft also read the CSA as vesting him
with discretion to determine what exactly is meant by dangerous and what the
public interest requires-hence the ban against "medical" use of drugs to induce
death. Oregon also helps us see how the process of interpreting-from-purpose is
doubly normative. The Attorney General was not only reasoning from a statu-
tory norm, but his application of that norm to the problem of "assisted suicide"
(as he termed aid-in-dying) changed the norm itself.389 Before the Directive, the
CSA's almost-exclusive focus was the abuse of hallucinogenic or psychotropic
drugs. What the Ashcroft Directive brought into focus is that many of the
scheduled drugs were not just potentially fatal, but could be used to induce
fatality, and the Attorney General read the statute as regulating that, too.
Rejecting Ashcroft's reading, the Supreme Court majority judged that this was
too severe and problematic a reworking of the statutory purpose. As the
385. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006).
386. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 359, at 49; CASS R. SuNsmiN, AFrER THE RiGrHTs REVOLUTIoN:
RECONCErVING THE REGULATORY STATE 161 (1990). Compare the "normative" or "transformatory" default
rules some scholars have attributed to some default rules in contract interpretation. See, e.g., Jedediah
Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 ComLL L. REv.
653, 667 (2006) (praising "transformatory" default rules); Schwartz, supra note 383, at 393 (criticizing
"normative" default rules in contract interpretation).
387. Brief for Petitioners at 25, Gonzales v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (May 12, 2005).
388. This agency-based canon is the Hart and Sacks formula, HART & SACKS, supra note 311, which
was inspired by Henry Hart's service in the Office of Price Administration during World War H. See id.
at li (critical introduction by William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Phillip Frickey).
389. On the endogeneity of reasoning from purpose, see RicHRDSON, supra note 185; William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 747-49 (1992).
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dissenters correctly observed, this judgment was one of constitutional policy as
much as, statutory interpretation. What the majority probably appreciated was
that the same thing can be said of the dissents.
The Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case also illustrates how the Court's substantive
canons serve institutional goals as well as normative ones (and of course the
two are related). Even when canons like the rule of lenity and the presumption
against preemption of traditional state functions are subtly invoked, as they
were in Oregon, they are laying out rules of the game reminding this agency,
and all the other agencies, that the Supreme Court will jealously protect its
Marbury role as guardian of the nation's constitutionalism, including rule-of-
law values in continuity, the federalist structure, and the rule of lenity (all of
which were implicated in Oregon). These and other substantive canons consti-
tute an interpretive regime, whose goal is not only to assert important constitu-
tional or public values, but also to assert the Court's own important role to call a
halt when agency elaboration and evolution of statutory purposes go too far.390
The same message ought to inform the Court's deference jurisprudence. The
interpretive regime the Court has assembled, mostly through inadvertence, is a
complicated continuum of deference tests that ought to be simplified and its key
prongs (Chevron, Skidmore, and Oregon) clarified. Where Congress has del-
egated lawmaking authority to an expert agency and has left statutory criteria
open-ended, the judicial role is at a minimum. Where an agency has applied its
expertise to an issue as to which judges are substantively much less competent,
judges should and do take a deferential attitude, subject to rule-of-law limits
such as textual plain meanings, legislative compromises, and precedent. Where
an agency interpretation raises larger normative concerns, including constitu-
tional as well as larger statutory-purpose concerns, the jildicial role is at its
apex.
390. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 255, at 56, for an early statement of this idea.
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APPENDIX - CODEBOOK
The dataset for this study consists of all Supreme Court cases decided after
the 1983 Term decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defer-
ence Council and before the end of the 2005 term in which a federal agency
interpretation of a statute was at issue. Each case was coded for 156 variables,
described below.
The cases are listed in chronological order. The Burger Court cases are
assigned numbers between 1 and 138. The Rehnquist Court cases are assigned
numbers between 139 and 975. The Roberts Court cases are assigned numbers
between 976 and 1014.
Variables
Reporter
Lists the Supreme Court Reporter citation for each case.
Term
Identifies the term in which the case was decided and the chronological order
of cases within that term (e.g., the first relevant case for the 1985 term is
85.1, the second is 85.2, etc.).
Name
The case name consists of one to three words from the petitioner's name,
unless the plaintiff is a common entity, such as the United States or the
NLRA. In such cases, the case name consists of one to three words from the
respondent's name. If both the petitioner and respondent have common
names, the case name incorporates parts of both. Case names are included







Bush I = 1
Clinton = 2
Bush II = 3
Presidential Politics
Liberal = 0 (Clinton)
Conservative = 1 (Reagan, Bush I, Bush II)
House
Liberal = 0 (Democrats control)
Conservative = 1 (Republicans control)
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Senate
Liberal = 0 (Democrats control)
Conservative = 1 (Republicans control)
Note: Party control of the Senate shifted several times during the period we
studied. The Republicans controlled the Senate until January 3, 1987. The
Democrats controlled the Senate until January 3, 1995. The Republicans con-
trolled the Senate between January 3, 1995 and May 24, 2001, when Senator
Jeffords switched parties in an evenly divided Senate. The Democrats controlled
the Senate between May 24, 2001 and January 3, 2003. The Republicans
controlled the Senate for the remainder of the period covered by this study,

























Patent & Trademarks = 23
Pension Guar. = 24
Post Office = 25




Panama Canal Comm'n = 30
Dep't of State = 31
FEC = 32







Veterans Admin. = 40
Customs = 41
FAA = 42
Nat'l R.R. Adj. Board = 43
Judicial Conference = 44
Nat'l Mediation Bd. = 45
Comptroller General = 46
Note: For agencies within larger executive departments (such as the Coast
Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers, both within the Department of
Defense (DOD)), the department rather than the specific agency was coded,
with the exception of the CIA, which has its own category. The residual
category was the Department of Justice, whose Solicitor General represents
the federal government before the Court in almost all cases and whose staff
routinely make policy-significant decisions that the agencies themselves
would not have made (and sometimes do not support).
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Subject Matter
Bankruptcy = 1 Health & Safety = 11 Education = 21
Business Regulation = 2 Immigration = 12 Foreign Affs/Nat'l Security = 22
Civil Rights = 3 Indian Affairs = 13 Housing = 23
Criminal Law = 4 IP = 14
Energy = 5 Labor Relations = 15
Entitlement Programs = 6 Maritime = 16
Environment = 7 Pensions = 17
Federal Government = 8 Tax = 18
Fed. Jur. & Proc. = 9 Telecom = 19




Neutral or Mixed = 2
Note: Interpretations were coded as liberal if the agency view favored
the interests of bankruptcy debtors, antitrust and securities plaintiffs, civil
rights plaintiffs and other victims of discrimination (except claimants in
"reverse discrimination" cases), criminal defendants, energy consumers,
claimants seeking information or entitlement benefits from the govern-
ment, citizens demanding environmental protection, plaintiffs seeking ac-
cess to federal courts, governmental and private employees, persons ben-
efiting from health/safety protections, immigrants, Native Americans,
claimants opposing intellectual property interests, pension beneficiaries and
state regulators of pension funds, taxpayers, telecomm and transportation
consumers, students and their parents seeking educational benefits, and
tenants.
Interpretations were coded as conservative if the agency view favored the
interests of bankruptcy creditors, antitrust and securities defendants, alleged
discriminators in civil rights cases (except defendants in "reverse discrimina-
tion" cases), criminal prosecutors, energy companies, agencies withholding
information, government institutions paying for statutory entitlements, compa-
nies accused of polluting the environment, defendants opposing access to
federal courts, governmental and private employers, defendants charged with
violating health/safety rules, officials opposing the rights of immigrants, state
and federal entities denying claims by Native Americans, holders of intellectual
property interests, pension funds and their managers, tax collectors, telecomm
20081 1205
HeinOnline  -- 96 Geo. L.J. 1205 2007-2008
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
and transportation companies, schools and school boards, and landlords.3 9 1
Interpretations were coded as neutral or mixed if the agency interpretation
was liberal on one issue and conservative on another. See, for example, IBP,
Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (presenting two issues to the Court, with
Department of Labor regulation liberal on one issue, conservative on the other).
Agency Format
Legislative Rule or Executive Order =0
Formal Adjudication = 1
Informal Agency Interpretation = 2
Informal Interpretation
Agency Litigating Position = 1
Interpretative Rule/Guidance = 2
Agency Manual or Letter = 3
Agency/Solicitor General Amicus Brief = 4
Not Applicable = 999
Continuity (Agency Position is...)
Longstanding and Fairly Stable = 0
Evolving = 1
Recent = 2
Note: An agency position was coded as longstanding and fairly stable if the
agency had publicly and stably adhered to that same interpretation for a number
of years before the Supreme Court took the case. The coding did not rely on a
bright-line cut-off point, such as any interpretation that was ten years old
counted as longstanding. The main reason is that the category is "longstanding
and fairly stable," so time is not determinative without a judgment of stability.
Also, it was often hard to tell exactly when the agency first took the position
before the Court. Finally, the concept of "longstanding" is relative: a five-year-
old child's practice of two years is longstanding, while something an eighty-year-
old has been doing for a couple of years is not.
For recent statutes, therefore, a longstanding and fairly stable interpretation
could be embodied in a formal declaration that was less than a decade old; if the
agency had taken the same position since the early days of its enforcement of
the statute, the position was coded as longstanding and fairly stable. Compare
391. The tax category could have been coded differently, as Michael Graetz pointed out to us. Is it
conservative for a court to sustain the tax load of the well-to-do taxpayers and companies who bring
most of the claims against the IRS? The coding choice to label pro-IRS rulings as conservative was
driven by consistency with the other categories, which reflect the conventional view that pro-
government rulings are conservative. The same normative ambiguity can be seen in criminal cases: it is
not inevitably conservative for a court to sustain federal prosecutions against purveyors of fraud, auto
thieves, sexual assaulters, etc., but that is the conventional, process-driven categorization in criminal
law and procedure, and the coding scheme follows that idea in the tax cases.
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Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), where the relevant agencies' interpreta-
tion of the ADA in 1990 had been formally adopted within a decade of the
Supreme Court decision but reflected the only public interpretation those agen-
cies had offered on the issue of AIDS coverage (and reflected the construction
those agencies had placed on the Rehabilitation Act, upon which the ADA was
based), with Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005),
where the relevant agencies took no position on the ADA issue until 2004.
Bragdon was coded as longstanding, Spector as recent.
For older statutes, an interpretation was not coded as longstanding and fairly
stable unless the relevant agency had adhered to it, without wobbling, for a
somewhat longer period of time. As before, the coding was attentive to whether
the agency's position was consistent with its prior positions. For example,
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (interpreting the Sherman Act
(1890)), was coded as longstanding, even though the DOJ/FTC Guidelines
dated from 2000; the reason is that the Guidelines apparently reflected the
agencies' stance well before that date. In contrast, Illinois Toolworks, Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (also interpreting the Sherman Act),
was coded as recent, even though the DOJ/FTC position was articulated in
earlier 1995 Guidelines. The reason for the different treatment was that the
DOJ/FTC Guideline in Toolworks was a renunciation of the position those
agencies had taken in the prior generation (and was embedded in Supreme
Court precedent the agencies were asking the Court to overrule in Toolworks)
and so was not as stable as their interpretation in Dagher.
Evidence of a continuing agency interpretation was culled from the briefs
in the case and from the Court's opinion.39 2 The agency position did not have to
be reflected in a formal rule or adjudication but did have to have repeated
(quasi)public expression over a period of time. In criminal cases, a pattern of
lower court opinions accepting or rejecting the Department of Justice's interpre-
tation over a period of five years or more was sufficient evidence of a longstand-
ing and fairly stable interpretation on the part of DOJ (which of course rarely
engages in national rulemaking to announce its interpretations of the criminal
code). For example, see Cook County v. United States, 538 U.S. 119 (2003),
where DOJ's interpretation of the False Claims Act had been developed and
followed in a series of prosecutions over time, ultimately winning acceptance
by the Court.
In regulatory cases, the best evidence of longstanding and fairly stable
agency interpretation would be legislative rules left unchanged by the agency
for a relatively long period of time. For example, see K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), where the Customs Service had issued a series of
392. The methodology in text creates a bias in favor of longstanding and fairly stable interpretations
because the Solicitor General's briefs almost always present the most detailed accounts of agency
practice, and the Solicitor General has an incentive to present the agency's practice as longstanding and
stable because that appeals to the Court's rule-of-law values.
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narrowing regulations in the 1930s-50s, therefore presenting an easy case of a
longstanding and fairly stable interpretation by the time the Court heard the case
(and struck down one of the regulations). Equally good evidence would be
public adjudications taking the same position on a point of law over a lengthy
period. If the agency adjudications wandered, however, then the agency position
would be considered either evolving (if the wandering proceeded in a direction
clearly indicating that the agency position was being driven by experience with
a changing world) or recent.
Also, good evidence of longstanding and fairly stable agency views would
be public rulings by the agency or opinions by its counsel (as in Bedroc Ltd.
v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004)); agency memoranda (as in Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)),
especially if the memoranda were contemporaneous with the statute (as in
National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004));
agency compliance manuals and letters (as in Pennsylvania State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)); agency testimony before Congress or other
public fora (as in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000)); and so on.
If Recent, Because...
New Issue for the Agency = 0
New Administration = 1
New Statute = .2
Practical Experience = 3
Litigating Position = 4
Not Applicable = 999
Note: An issue was coded as a new issue for the agency when the agency
addressed the precise issue only recently, based on the evidence outlined in the'
previous Note. See, for example, Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S.
129 (2004), where the Court followed a 2002 EEOC manual, and the case was
coded as involving a recent interpretation because there was no evidence the
EEOC had taken a position on the issue before 2002. Often agencies will take
positions on new issues when the Supreme Court requests an amicus brief from
the Solicitor General; often the whole point of the Court's request is probably to
get the Solicitor General or the agency to think about an issue it has not taken a
public position on, and so many of these cases will be coded as a new issue for
the agency. This is especially true in bankruptcy cases, where there is no agency
in charge of bankruptcy policy, but the Court frequently asks for Solicitor
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Note: Cases were coded "yes" for notice and comment if they involved an
agency rule that had been issued after notice to and comment from interested
persons, companies, and groups. Because most such rulemaking that is pub-
lished in the Code of Federal Regulations involves notice and comment, cases
involving legislative rules were coded as yes for notice and comment unless the
briefs or the judicial opinion(s) indicated otherwise. For example, in Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), both the Solicitor General's brief and the opinion
for the Court emphasized that the Attorney General's Directive was not a rule
issued pursuant to the notice-and-comment process.
Acting Pursuant to Congressional Delegation of Lawmaking Authority
No 0
Yes = 1
Note: To make this determination, the coder examined the underlying statu-
tory authorization under which the agency was rendering the interpretation in
suit. Agencies were coded as acting pursuant to congressional delegation of
lawmaking authority if they were acting pursuant to a statutory authorization
that met either the strict Merrill-Watts criterion (explained in the next Note) or
the more lenient criterion developed by the federal courts in the 1970s, what we
call the Petroleum Refiners criterion (explained in the Note after that). The
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001),
includes all the cases that would be coded "yes" under Merrill-Watts and
probably includes all or almost all of the cases that would be coded "yes" under
Petroleum Refiners. Mead also theoretically includes some cases falling outside
both categories, namely, those where there has been an "implicit" delegation of
lawmaking authority, considering the broad context of the legislation. Mead did
not supply sufficient guidance for this study to use in coding statutory delega-
tions, and the lower courts have not been able to derive predictable standards
either. Hence, cases are not coded for Mead's residual category, and delegated
lawmaking authority under Mead might include some cases, but probably very
few, if any, that are not so coded under this study's standards.
Type of Delegation
Delegation According to Strict (Merrill-Watts) Approach = 0
Delegation According to Lenient (Petroleum Refiners) Approach = 1
Not Applicable = 999
Note: An agency rule or order was coded as falling under the strict approach
if the statutory delegation met the rigorous standard set forth in Thomas Merrill
& Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force' of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467 (2002). For statutes enacted before 1973,
the Merrill-Watts standard requires that the statute vest an agency with the
authority to issue rules or orders whose violation carries with it the possibility
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of immediate sanctions. For example, the NLRA (1935) does not satisfy this
standard, because a party prevailing before the NLRB must still go to court to
obtain an order requiring the losing party to comply. Other examples of early
general statutory delegations that do not meet the strict approach include the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 5(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (2000); Food
Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2000); I.R.C. § 7805 (2000); Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209.(2000); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 § 628, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000); Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000).
Statutory delegations that do meet the Merrill-Watts standard include the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317
(2000) (concerning the EPA), and § 403, 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) (concerning
the Army Corps of Engineers); Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensar
tion Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (2000) (delegating adjudication authority to the
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) within the Department of
Labor (DOL)); Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2000) (SEC); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2000) (Federal Power
Commission (FPC), now Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC));
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000). Statutory authoriza-
tions to the INS to detain, adjudicate, and deport noncitizens have the same
lawmaking-delegation feature. Some agencies, such as IRS (under IRC) and
DOL (under FLSA) do not have lawmaking authority under their general
delegations, but their authorizing statutes have been amended to provide spe-
cific lawmaking authority (i.e., meeting Merrill-Watts) to address certain prob-
lems. See, for example, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (DOL acting
under special FLSA authorization, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000)); Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (FDA acting under special Medical Device
Amendments of 1992, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2000)).
Section 405(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 605 (2000), is a
slightly special case. Like the other delegations, § 409(a) does not give the SSA
(now in HHS) the authority to make substantive law, and so it does not meet the
Merrill-Watts standard for lawmaking delegation. See, for example, Sullivan v.
Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990). But § 405(a) does delegate to SSA the authority
to make and enforce procedural rules, and some of the SSA cases involve that
particular authority, which was coded as meeting Merrill-Watts. See, for ex-
ample, Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
Merrill and Watts demonstrate that this standard had been forgotten by the
1970s and was obliterated by a series of court of appeals decisions announcing a
more lenient standard. For statutes enacted in or after 1973 (a date Professor
Merrill suggested to us), the Merrill-Watts standard would be satisfied by a
statute vesting an agency with the authority to issue legislative (substantive)
rules and engage in formal adjudications, the standard adopted in Petroleum
Refiners. Thus, Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 and delegated general rulemak-
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ing authority to the Department of Labor and the IRS, 29 U.S.C. § 1135. This
delegation would not meet the Merrill-Watts test before 1973 but does meet it
after that date. Another example is the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.), which creates the Federal Labor Relations Authority and
vests it with NRLB-like adjudication power. Before 1973, this would not meet
Merrill-Watts; after 1973 it does.
The second category is a residual one, covering agency rules or orders that
might be considered authorized lawmaking, but not according to the strict
Merrill-Watts standard articulated above. Thus, an agency rule or order was
coded as falling under the lenient approach if the statutory delegation did not
meet the Merrill-Watts standard but did meet the more lenient approach of
Petroleum Refiners, which suggested that congressional grants of power to issue
legislative rules or engage in formal adjudications were lawmaking delegations.
Thus, the NLRB's authorization to engage in formal adjudications would meet
the Petroleum Refiners standard but not Merrill-Watts. For another example,
IRC § 7805 gives the IRS general rulemaking authority, but not power to
impose sanctions (other IRC provisions do have immediate sanctions). Hence,
this authority would not meet the Merrill-Watts standard and would fit into the
residual category of Petroleum Refiners. In contrast, ERISA (1974) delegates
legislative rulemaking authority to the IRS and the Department of Labor after
Merrill-Watts pronounces that a more lenient standard has prevailed, and so
ERISA cases involving IRS or DOL rules fall under Merrill-Watts and not
Petroleum Refiners, as the coding system works for this study.
Agency Issue 1: Jurisdiction and Regulatory Authority
Agency's Jurisdiction or Regulatory Authority NOT at Issue = 0
At Issue = 1
Note: An agency interpretation was coded as relating to the agency's jurisdic-
tion or regulatory authority only if the agency was asserting (or denying) its
own power to regulate a whole category of conduct or activity. Examples
include Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), where the Attorney General
was asserting a new authority to criminalize a doctor's prescription of drugs in
compliance with a state death-with-dignity law, and FDA v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), where the FDA was asserting a new
authority to regulate tobacco products. In National Cable & Telecommunication
Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), the FCC opined
that it did not have the authority to regulate cable companies providing broad-
band internet access pursuant to Title II of the Communications Act. Even
though the agency was denying regulatory authority, the case was coded as
relating to the agency's jurisdiction.
In contrast, if the agency were setting forth rules that regulated entities must
follow or clarifying a regulatory category, the interpretation was coded as not
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involving the agency's jurisdiction or regulatory authority. Thus, in Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), it was not disputed that Dr. Bragdon was subject
to the ADA; he only argued that the ADA did not require him to treat a patient
who was infected with HIV, the virus that leads to AIDS. Hence, this was not a
case involving the agency's jurisdiction or regulatory authority.
Agency Issue 2: Interpretation
Agency Interpretation of Own Regulation NOT at Issue = 0
At Issue = 1
Note: Like some of the other variables in this Codebook, this one can only be
figured in most cases by reading the briefs as well as the opinions in the case.
The agency's brief, whether a party or an amicus brief, will usually identify the
relevant rule(s). If the rule does not address the issue by its plain language, the
brief typically represents the agency's interpretation of its own rule. (In order to
avoid the fatal tag, "litigating position," the agency brief will identify any
earlier written interpretations if they exist.)
Agency Issue 3: Preemption
Preemption of State Law NOT at Issue = 0
At Issue = 1
Agency Issue 4: National Security
Agency Interpretation Does NOT address Foreign Affairs or National Secu-
rity Issue = 0
At Issue = 1
Note: Issues of foreign affairs or national security include immigration,
international travel and trade, military affairs, and treaty interpretation. Issues
having a transnational element were coded as foreign affairs or national secu-
rity. Thus, the issue in Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005), was
whether the ADA applied extraterritorially; because this had potential interna-





Neutral or Mixed = 2
Note: Applies the same criteria for liberalism and conservatism as described
above. Neutral decisions are those where there is no political valence for the
issue decided. Mixed decisions are those where the Supreme Court ruled
conservative on one issue and liberal on another issue, or split the political
difference on one issue.
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Decision with Respect to Agency
Case Decided in Favor of Agency's Interpretation = 0
Case Decided Against Agency's Interpretation = 1
Mixed Decision - 2
Note: Mixed decision captures situations in which the Supreme Court ruled
for the agency with regard to some issues and against the agency with regard to
others. For example, in South Florida Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004), the Court agreed with the agency suggestion
that the case be remanded, but went against the agency on other issues raised in
the case. Hence, this was coded as a mixed decision with respect to the agency's
interpretation.
The Court did not have to accept the agency's interpretation 100% for the
decision to be coded in favor of the agency's interpretation. In some cases, for
example, the agency will offer a broader rationale or statement of the proper
interpretation, but the Court accepts a narrower rationale or version. In those
cases, the coding would still be in favor of the agency's interpretation.
Outcome
Affirmed Lower Court = 0
Reversed Lower Court = 1
Remanded and/or Vacated = 2
Mixed = 3
Note: The remanded and/or vacated category includes cases where the
Supreme Court decided an issue of law but remanded the case back to the lower
court to apply the rule to the case, to consider other legal issues, or to conduct
other proceedings. See, for example, South Florida Management District v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). This category does not
include cases where the Supreme Court just remands a case to a lower court for
routine procedural action such as entry of a judgment consistent with the
Court's opinion.
The mixed category includes cases where the Supreme Court affirmed in part




Note: Some cases included both statutory and constitutional issues; this study
focused only on the statutory issues. Thus, a decision was coded as unanimous
if there was no dissent from the disposition of the statutory issue, even if there
was non-unanimity as to the constitutional issue(s). For example, the Court in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), was
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unanimous in concluding that the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 applied to
the states as employers (a contested issue on which certiorari was granted), but
sharply divided as to the constitutionality of that application.
Concurrences
Number of concurring opinions written.
Note: As above, only concurrences as to statutory issues are noted. In Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), there were
concurring opinions as to the statutory issue (which are included in the coding),
but not as to the constitutional issue.
Dissents
Number of dissenting opinions written
Note: As above, only dissents as to statutory issues are noted. For example,
the Court in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), generally upheld the 2001
McCain-Feingold campaign finance law against First Amendment attack, but
the majority narrowly construed § 323(d), regulating donations. Justice Kennedy's
opinion dissenting on the constitutional issues also tackled and disagreed on the
statutory issue, but Justice Thomas's separate constitutional dissent ignored the





Note: Decisions are coded as citing Chevron if the Court majority cited a
precedent following and discussing Chevron and applying its two-step frame-
work. For example, Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987); and K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), were early and
leading cases that followed Chevron and applied its two-step formula. Some
subsequent Supreme Court decisions cite only Chemical Manufacturers, Cardozo-
Fonseca, or K Mart for the two-step Chevron test and so were coded as citing
Chevron itself.
Chevron Step Zero
Does the Court think that the Chevron framework applies?
No= 0
Yes= 1
Note: Decisions are coded as applying the Chevron framework if the Court
cited Chevron or a Chevron precedent (Chemical Manufacturers, Cardoza-
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Fonseca, or K Mart) and then applied a deference approach consistent with
Chevron.
Decisions are coded as not applying the Chevron framework when the Court
cited Chevron or a Chevron precedent but announced that it need not decide
whether Chevron applies, as the Court did in California Dental Ass'n v. FTC,
526 U.S. 756 (1999) (holding that the statute clearly supported the agency, so
there was no need to determine whether Chevron governs). Obviously, this
category also includes cases where the Court was not deferring, did not cite
Chevron or a Chevron precedent, etc.
Chevron Step One
Does the Court determine that Congress has clearly addressed the issue?
No= 0
Yes= 1
Not Applicable = 999
Note: Decisions are coded as yes, Congress has clearly addressed the issue,
when the Court announces that there is an answer dictated by traditional sources
of statutory meaning (statutory text, the whole act, legislative history and
purpose, judicial precedent, various canons of statutory construction). It does
not matter to the coding scheme whether Congress's answer is the same as, or
different from, that of the agency.
Decisions are coded as no, Congress has not clearly addressed the issue,
when the Court is unable to say for sure that there is one answer dictated by
traditional sources of statutory meaning, as in Chevron itself. Thus, even when
the Court believes that the traditional sources provide somewhat more support
for one interpretation than another, but is not prepared to say that the other
interpretation is precluded, the decision is coded as no, Congress has not clearly
addressed the issue.
Chevron Step Two
Does the Court determine that the agency interpretation is reasonable?
No= 0
Yes= 1
Not Applicable = 999
Note: Decisions are coded as yes, the Court determines that the agency
interpretation is reasonable, when the Court applies Chevron (Step 0),
announces that Congress has not clearly addressed the issue (Step 1), and
says that the agency interpretation prevails. It is implicit in such decisions
that the Court has made a judgment that the agency interpretation is
"reasonable" for Chevron purposes. And, of course, if the Court explicitly
says the agency interpretation is reasonable (Step 2), then the decision is
coded as yes.
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Reasons Cited for Reliance on Agency Interpretation
Note: For each reason-category below, decisions are coded as no reliance on the
mason if the Court says nothing explanatory and just cites and follows Chevron or























Not Cited = 0
Cited but Not Applied = 1
Cited and Applied = 2
Note: See the Notes on Chevron Cited and Chevron Step Zero, above.
Deference Regime Invoked
No Regime Indicated, Directly or Indirectly = 0
Anti-Deference (Lenity) = 1
Consultative (Skidmore-Lite) Deference = 2
Skidmore or Similar = 3
Beth Israel et al. = 4
Chevron = 5
Seminole Rock = 6
Curtiss-Wright = 7
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Note: "Deference regime invoked" captures the approach the Court takes
towards agency deference. It does not measure whether the Court opinion was
ultimately in favor of the agency interpretation, which is captured by the
"decision with respect to agency" variable. Indeed, every deference regime
includes both cases in which the agency interpretation is upheld and others in
which it is rejected by the Court. There are eight possible deference regimes,
listed below in reverse order (highest to lowest). Some Supreme Court decisions
discuss and seem to apply more than one regime. In that event, the case was
coded for the regime with the highest number. Thus, if the Court cited and
seemed to apply Seminole Rock, Chevron, and Skidmore, as it did in Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), the case would be coded as Seminole Rock, the.
most deferential category.
7. Curtiss-Wright Super-Deference. A decision was coded Curtiss-Wright
super-deference only if the Court announced that it was applying a special
deference to executive department actions touching upon foreign affairs or
national security. A decision was not coded Curtiss-Wright simply because it
involved foreign affairs or national security issues. In most cases so coded, the
Justices cited Curtiss-Wright or an analogous precedent, such as Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (broad statement of executive authority over
immigration), but we also coded the decision Curtiss-Wright if the Court made
clear it was applying special deference. Thus, in Department of Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988), the Court deferred to the agency on security
clearances, saying that, "unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise,
courts traditionally [should be] ... reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the
Executive in military and national security affairs."
6. Seminole Rock Strong Deference. A decision was coded Seminole Rock
only if the agency was interpreting one of its own regulations and the Court
announced that it was following Seminole Rock or an analogous precedent, such
as Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), or Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504 (1994). If the Court said nothing or announced the applicability of
another deference regime, the coding will not invoke Seminole Rock. In Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), for example, the agency claimed to have been
interpreting its own regulation, but the Court only applied Skidmore deference be-
cause the regulation was clear and did not require interpretation. Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion argued the applicability of Chevron and did not invoke Seminole
Rock, probably for the reason given by the majority.
5. Chevron Deference. A decision was coded Chevron only if the Court cited
Chevron or another Chevron case (Chemical Manufacturers, Cardozo-Fonseca,
or K Mart) and followed the Chevron framework of analysis. More than for the
previous two categories, the agency did not prevail in many of the cases where
the Court was applying Chevron deference. For example, Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006), applied
Chevron deference and rejected the Corps of Engineers' interpretation because
it was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.
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Decisions were coded as Chevron when the Court applied Chevron, even if
the coder thought the Court was wrong. For example, the Court in Presley v.
Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491 (1992), applied Chevron to a
Department of Justice interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, even though the
Act delegates no lawmaking authority to the Department, which is usually a
litigant. This was, in our view, an incorrect deployment of Chevron, but the
decision was coded as Chevron deference, as was Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490
U.S. 714 (1989) (also an incorrect deployment of Chevron, in regard to a
Department of Labor guidance and a letter).
4. Beth Israel Deference. Decisions were coded as Beth Israel deference if the
Court applied a framework similar to Chevron (allowing any "reasonable"
agency interpretation if Congress has not addressed the issue) but cited one of
the pre-Chevron cases applicable to particular subject areas, including Beth
Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978), and NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251 (1975), for NLRA cases; National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), for tax cases; Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187
(1961), and Sumitomo Shoji of America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982),
for treaty-interpretation cases.
For some areas judgment calls were made. The Court has not applied a
consistent deference approach to the Guidelines developed and interpreted by
the Sentencing Commission. In United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997),
for example, the Court discussed Chevron deference but ultimately applied a
more general deference, which was coded as Beth Israel-something beyond
Skidmore but clearly not Chevron. In at least one sentencing case, the Court
announced that it was applying Chevron deference, and the case was coded as
Chevron.
3. Skidmore Deference. Decisions were coded as Skidmore deference if the
Court announced that it would give deferential weight to agency views based
upon considerations of expertise, continuity, and other Skidmore factors. Obvi-
ously, if the Court cited Skidmore and said it was applying its level of deference,
the coding was easy. See, for example, Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243
(2006), and Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). Even when the
Court failed to cite Skidmore, the decisions were coded as Skidmore (or higher)
if the Court deployed the rhetoric of "deference." For example, in Ragsdale v.
Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002), the Court gave a Department
of Labor rule "substantial weight" in the interpretation of the FMLA; the
decision was coded as Skidmore, even though the Court did not cite Skidmore.
In Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2005), the Court said it
was deferring to the EEOC's ADEA Guidelines, without citing a particular
deference regime. Because the Court has consistently used Skidmore and not
Chevron for EEOC interpretations of Title VII and the ADEA, for example, in
EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 (1991), and because the Smith decision empha-
sized Skidmore's functional factors, this decision was coded as Skidmore.
The Court in Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999), announced it
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was giving "substantial deference" to the Department of Justice's VRA interpre-
tation. This decision might have been coded as Beth Israel, for the Court cited a
pre-Chevron case (Sheffield), but the earlier case had emphasized the Skidmore
factors of expertise and practical application. The Beth Israel category was
reserved for pre-Chevron cases that emphasize Chevron-like delegations of
lawmaking or gapfilling authority to agencies, not agency expertise and consis-
tency.
In Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003), the Court mentioned both Chevron
and Skidmore in deferring to a HUD interpretation. Normally, under the rule of
the highest-numbered regime, the decision would have been coded as Chevron,
but Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court only emphasized the functional
Skidmore factors, and so the decision was coded as Skidmore. This was rare and
may have been unique in this regard.
2. Consultative (Skidmore-Lite) Deference. This is a category that arose from
the coder's perception that there were many cases where the Court's statutory
interpretation was significantly influenced by agency-generated factual materi-
als, interpretations, and recommendations-but where the rhetoric of "defer-
ence" or interpretive "weight" was substantially absent. Most of the decisions
could have been coded as Skidmore (hence our nickname, Skidmore-Lite),
because the agency inputs had functional value for the Court, and we would
have no quarrel. The reason these cases are placed in a separate category is that
the decisions were not written along lines of "deference," as Skidmore clearly is.
Instead, the Court built on agency inputs to reach a decision, or used agency
inputs to confirm the correctness of a decision. Hence, the separate category in
this study.
There were several kinds of cases where this category was particularly apt.
First are the decisions where the agency provides factual materials relevant to
the statute as understood by the Court. An example is Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126
S. Ct. 2749 (2006). The Court not only rejected Justice Thomas's argument for
applying Curtiss-Wright super-deference to the-President's interpretation of the
relevant treaties and military justice laws, but declined to invoke either Chevron
or Skidmore deference in responding to the President's arguments. However, as
to one issue the statute imposed a practicability requirement, and as to that the
Court announced itself open to persuasion by the superior factual understanding
the executive branch brought to that issue (though the Court ultimately dis-
agreed with the President's bottom line). Id. at 2791. For that reason, Hamdan
was coded as consultative deference. For another example, see Schaeffer v.
Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51, 59 (2006), where the Court relied on agency data on the
enforcement of IDEA. Generally, a decision was not coded as consultative
deference for this reason unless the Court explicitly acknowledged the value of
the agency's factual inputs.
Second, cases were coded as consultative deference when the Court followed
an agency amicus brief (usually solicited by the Court) propounding a distinc-
tive resolution of the statutory issue before the Court. Thus, in Ministry of
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Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Elahi, 546 U.S. 450 (2006), the Court acknowledged and closely followed the
Department of State's amicus suggestions as to the proper (and safe) construc-
tion of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (1976). In Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher,
126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006), the Court closely followed the Solicitor General's brief
and the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines, but without explicit acknowledgment in
the opinion for the Court. Nonetheless, the decision is coded consultative
deference because the agency input significantly influenced the Court's interpre-
tation. In Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997), a
bankruptcy case, the Court adopted the test proposed by the Solicitor General's
amicus brief, and so that decision was coded as consultative deference. Cases
are not coded as consultative deference when the United States was a party to
the case, as in criminal matters, and the Court agreed with and followed its brief
on the merits; in these cases, the agency is just another winning litigant.
Consultative deference as a category in this study is reserved for those cases
where the United States' participation is in a lawmaking or judge-like capacity,
rather than as a litigant.
Third, cases were coded as consultative deference when the Court used an
agency rule, policy, or interpretation as a premise or step in the Court's chain of
reasoning (but without announcing at any point that the Justices were "defer-
ring" or giving "weight" to the agency rule, etc.). For example, the Court in
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398 (1999),
rejected the Independent Counsel's and DOJ's aggressive reading of the crimi-
nal law barring "unlawful gratuities." Although the Court had problems with the
government's plain meaning arguments, the clinching argument for Sun-
Diamond was that the government's broad reading undermined the regulations
issued by the Office of Government Ethics. The regulations were part of the
broad tapestry of law the Court was willing to consider. Likewise, in Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), the Court counted
revised DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines as one reason it could overrule an old
Sherman Act precedent that had been urged upon an earlier Court by the same
agencies.
1. Anti-Deference. A decision was coded as anti-deference when the Court
applied a presumption against the agency interpretation of the statute.
Most of the anti-deference cases were those where the Court invoked the rule
of lenity (which construes ambiguous statutes in favor of criminal defendants).
Most substantive criminal cases were not coded as anti-deference because the
Court did not even mention the rule of lenity. Any mention of the rule of lenity
triggered this coding, even if the mention were at the end of the opinion and
even if the Court still accepted the Department of Justice's interpretation. A
possible exception to this precept is Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995), where
the Court briefly discussed the rule of lenity as it might apply to a Bureau of
Prisons interpretation relating to a defendant's conditions of confinement. Be-
cause the Court ultimately applied Skidmore deference to the Bureau's interpre-
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tation, the case was coded as Skidmore and not anti-deference.
Cases involving the constitutional avoidance canon (favoring interpretations
that do not raise serious constitutional concerns) were coded as anti-deference if
the Court anchored its opinion on the canon and it cut against the agency
interpretation. For example, in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), the Court
rejected an NLRB interpretation because it raised serious constitutional con-
cerns. The case was coded as anti-deference because the Court's discussion
started with the avoidance canon and concluded that there was no reason to
determine Chevron's applicability because of the constitutional problem. The
Court structured its opinion the same way in Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps
of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), which rejected the Corp's construction of
the Clean Water Act Amendments without reaching the Chevron issue, and so
the case was coded as anti-deference. Contrast Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.
Ct. 2208 (2006), where the plurality opinion opened with Chevron's applicabil-
ity and mentioned the avoidance canon as a reason supporting the plurality's
plain meaning analysis; hence, Rapanos was coded as Chevron deference and
was not coded as anti-deference.
We only included in this category those avoidance-canon cases in which the
Court used the canon to create a presumption against the agency interpretation;
we did not include cases that used the avoidance canon to rule in the agency's
favor.
0. No Deference. A decision was coded as no deference regime when the
Court applied its traditional sources of statutory meaning, without citation to
any deference regime and without any apparent reliance on the special facts or
arguments advanced by the agency (in an amicus brief, etc.). The agency view
might prevail under this regime, and the Court might in fact agree with the
agency's argument(s), but unless the Court cited to the agency's position or its
factual presentation or followed the unique argumentation of the agency's brief,
the decision was coded as no deference regime.
Interpretive Reasoning
Every opinion in every case was coded according to the methods of
statutory interpretation relied on by the Justices. The methods of statutory
interpretation evaluated are outlined below.
Each method of interpretation was coded with the following rubric.
0 No reference to this method of interpretation
Some reference to the method, but not
1 meaningfully relied on to advance reasoning
Genuine/positive reliance on method that
2 helps bring about the result reached
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Method is "a" or "the" key determining
3 factor in the reasoning process
Indicates that ranking is not applicable
999 because no such opinion in case
Note that opinions are abbreviated as follows:
Majority = M
Concurrence(s) = Cl, C2, C3, etc.
Dissent(s) = D1, D2, D3, etc.
Thus, in the dataset, "PlainM" is the column that lists reliance on plain
meaning in the majority opinion (0, 1, 2, 3, or 999), while "PlainCl" is the
column that lists reliance on plain meaning in the first concurrence (0, 1, 2, 3,
or 999), and so on.
The methods of statutory interpretation that were evaluated are:
Plain Meaning
This method includes reliance on how. an ordinary speaker would interpret
the relevant statutory language, considering dictionaries, grammar, usage, and
the linguistic canons such as inclusio unius. If an opinion discussed the text
and found it ambiguous, it was coded as 1; if the opinion found a textual
"plain meaning," it was coded as 2 or 3 depending on the reliance on this
plain meaning in the opinion.
Whole Act
This method includes the whole-act canons, such as the rule against surplus-
age, the meaningful-variation maxim, etc. If an opinion discussed the whole
act and found it ambiguous, it was coded as 1; if the opinion found that the
whole act established or supported a "plain meaning," it was coded as 2 or 3
depending on the reliance on this reasoning in the opinion.
Whole Code
This method considers how other statutes shed light on the interpretation of
the statute at issue. It includes the in pari materia rule, references to
borrowed statutes, the presumption against implied repeals, etc. If an opinion
discussed the whole code and found it ambiguous, it was coded as 1; if the
opinion found that the whole code established or supported a "plain mean-
ing," it was coded as 2 or 3 depending on the reliance on this reasoning in the
opinion.
Legislative History
This method considers reliance on legislative history, such as committee
reports and floor statements. It includes reliance on "subsequent legislative
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history," but not legislative inaction. If an opinion discussed the legislative
history and found it irrelevant, unpersuasive, or insufficiently persuasive to
counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If the opinion found that the
legislative history confirmed the meaning suggested by the text or the whole
act, it was coded as 2. If the opinion found that the legislative history
provided an independent basis for a statutory interpretation, it was coded as
3.
Legislative Purpose
This method considers reliance on references to what Congress meant to
accomplish, the mischief aimed at being remedied, and general policy justifi-
cations imputed to a statute. (It also includes the purpose/policy behind a
Constitutional provision when that is applicable.) If an opinion discussed the
legislative purpose and found it irrelevant, unpersuasive, or insufficiently
persuasive to counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If the opinion
found that the legislative purpose confirmed the meaning suggested by the
text or the whole act, it was coded as 2. If the opinion found that the
legislative purpose provided an independent basis for a statutory interpreta-
tion, it was coded as 3.
Stare Decisis
This method includes reliance on the stare decisis doctrine and more general
reliance on past decisions as authoritative or probative. If an opinion dis-
cussed precedent(s) and found it/them irrelevant, unpersuasive, or insuffi-
ciently persuasive to counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If the
opinion found that precedent confirmed the meaning suggested by the text or
the whole act, it was coded as 2. If the opinion found that precedent provided
an independent basis for a statutory interpretation, it was coded as 3.
Legislative Acquiescence
This method includes reliance on evidence that the post-enactment Congress
agreed with the agency view (for example, by ratifying the view when it
reenacted or amended the statute, or by acquiescing in the agency view by
leaving it intact after learning of it). If an opinion discussed legislative
acquiescence and found it irrelevant, unpersuasive, or insufficiently persua-
sive to counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If the opinion found
that legislative acquiescence confirmed the meaning suggested by the text or
the whole act, it was coded as 2. If the opinion found that legislative
acquiescence provided an independent basis for a statutory interpretation, it
was coded as 3.
Common Law
This method includes reliance on common law meanings of terms used in
statutes, as well as common law rules or baselines that are presumptively left
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in place or incorporated into statutes. If an opinion discussed the common
law and found it irrelevant, unpersuasive, or insufficiently persuasive to
counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If the opinion found that the
common law confirmed the meaning suggested by the text or the whole act, it
was coded as 2. If the opinion found that the common law provided an
independent basis for a statutory interpretation, it was coded as 3.
Federalism Canons
This method includes the presumptions and clear-statement rules the Court
has developed to protect federalism values, including the rules that judges
ought not presume that Congress meant to preempt laws in which states are
exercising their traditional police powers; that Congress must use specific
language to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity; etc. If an opinion
discussed a federalism canon and found it irrelevant, unpersuasive, or insuffi-
ciently persuasive to counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If the
opinion found that the canon confirmed the meaning suggested by the text or
the whole act, it was coded as 2. If the opinion found that the canon provided
an independent basis for a statutory interpretation, it was coded as 3.
Avoidance Canon
This method includes application of the rule that when a statute is susceptible
of two readings, one of which raises "serious constitutional questions,"
judges should adopt the reading that "avoids" those questions. If an opinion
discussed the avoidance canon and found it irrelevant, unpersuasive, or
insufficiently persuasive to counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If
the opinion found that the canon confirmed the meaning suggested by the text
or the whole act, it was coded as 2. If the opinion found that the canon
provided an independent basis for a statutory interpretation, it was coded as
3.
Due Process Canons
The method encompasses the rule of lenity, the notion that ambiguous penal
statutes should be construed in favor of defendants. If an opinion discussed
the rule of lenity and found it irrelevant, unpersuasive, or insufficiently
persuasive to counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If the opinion
found that lenity confirmed the meaning suggested by the text or the whole
act, it was coded as 2. If the opinion found that lenity provided an indepen-
dent basis for a statutory interpretation, it was coded as 3.
Other Substantive Canons
This category absorbs residual substantive cannons, such as the rules presum-
ing Congress not to invade the inherent powers of the other branches; not to
apply regulations outside the territorial limits of the United States; to protect
the rights of Native Americans; and so forth. If an opinion discussed a
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substantive canon and found it irrelevant, unpersuasive, or insufficiently
persuasive to counterbalance other factors, it was coded as 1. If the opinion
found that the canon confirmed the meaning suggested by the text or the
whole act, it was coded as 2. If the opinion found that the canon provided an
independent basis for a statutory interpretation, it was coded as 3.
Votes of Individual Justices (by Name)
The vote of each justice is recorded with a three digit code. The first two
digits indicate the opinion.
10 = Majority
21 = Concurrence 1
22 = Concurrence 2
23 = Concurrence 3
31 = Dissent 1
32 = Dissent 2
33 = Dissent 3
The third digit indicates whether the judge wrote the opinion (0) or joined it
(1). So, for example, a judge who wrote the second concurrence would be
coded as 220. Judges are only coded for one opinion. If a judge wrote an
opinion, s/he is automatically coded for that opinion. If a judge wrote or
joined a concurrence, s/he is coded for the concurrence, even if s/he also
joined the majority.
0 = Not on Court
400 = Did Not Participate in Decision
Authorship of Opinions for Majority. Concurrence(s) and Dissent(s)
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